Answering Critics: Resurrection Proves Christianity?

Recently, I saw a video by YouTuber Omedyashar (a.k.a. Yosef), a former Christian who converted to Orthodox Judaism. In his video, he responds to the following question:

"In the New Testament, Jesus' ascension into heaven was witnessed by many people. As you place great emphasis on the importance of witnesses and witnessing an event as proof, for example Mount Sinai where God speaks and everybody hears, what is your understanding of how so many people may have witnessed such an event if it either did not happen or could not happen due to Jesus being a false Messiah?"

The question has a great deal of merit, but can be made even stronger. If we give secular historians the benefit of the doubt, what information can we glean about Jesus of Nazareth? I will go through three passages believed by the majority of New Testament historians to be historically authentic.

First, Jesus' claim in Matthew 11. Jesus says: "All things have been handed over to me by my Father, and no one knows the Son except the Father, and no one knows the Father except the Son and anyone to whom the Son chooses to reveal him." This passage is considered historically authentic because Jesus is claiming to be unknowable. Yet, the post-Easter church taught that you can know Jesus. Therefore, this passage is very unlikely to have been fabricated. In this passage, Jesus is claiming to have a unique relationship to the Father, superior to all of humanity, and to be the only way to know the Father.

Second, Jesus' parable of the tenants in the vineyard in Mark 12. In this parable, the landowner goes away on a long journey and leaves a group of tenants in charge. During the harvest, the owner sends a series of servants to collect payment, and each time, the wicked tenants kill the servant. Finally, the owner sends his own son to collect payment, and the tenants kill him as well. The landowner represents God the Father. The servants represent the prophets of Israel. The son represents Jesus, and the land represents the land of Israel. The point of the parable is that because of the disobedience of the people of Israel, God would strip the land from the Jews and give it to the gentiles, at least for a time. In this parable, Jesus portrays himself as superior to all the prophets.

Third is Jesus' saying in Matthew 24: "But concerning that day and hour no one knows, not even the angels of heaven, nor the Son, but the Father only." Here, Jesus places himself in a position on an ascending scale. He sees himself as superior to humanity, and even above the angels in heaven. Historians consider ths passage almost indisputably authentic, because the church would not invent a passage where Jesus ascribes ignorance to himself (the knowledge was suppressed in his subconscious). Indeed, the manuscript evidence shows that many copyists tried to remove the phrase "nor the son" from the passage.

However, there is also strong evidence for the historicity of Jesus' resurrection. The passage recording the appearance of Jesus to more than 500 people at one time comes from 1 Corinthians 15. 1 Corinthians is one of the best attested books in the New Testament, considered by secular historians as authentically Pauline, and written around the year 56 of the Common Era. The passage I am about to quote, however, is considered, even by atheists like Gerd Ludemann, a piece of oral tradition that dates back to within 5 years of the crucifixion. Here it is.

For I delivered to you as of first importance what I also received: that Christ died for our sins in accordance with the Scriptures, that he was buried, that he was raised on the third day in accordance with the Scriptures, and that he appeared to Cephas, then to the twelve. Then he appeared to more than five hundred brothers at one time, most of whom are still alive, though some have fallen asleep. Then he appeared to James, then to all the apostles. Last of all, as to one untimely born, he appeared also to me.
(1 Corinthians 15:3-8 ESV)

Yosef's video response, far from answering this challenge, shows just how indefensible Rabbinical Judaism is against evidential arguments. First, let's get the quick answers to his questions out of the way.

Q. Why is James not considered among the twelve?
A. Because it was a separate appearance to James the brother of Jesus, who was not one of the twelve apostles.

Q. Why didn't Paul refer to this appearance to 500 when he preached to the people of Antioch in Acts chapter 13?
A. He didn't need to. He made mention of Jesus' repeated appearances to many people over many days. The people of Antioch were convinced by Paul's teaching, and by the next Sabbath, huge crowds came to listen to the preaching of Paul and Barnabas.

Q. Couldn't an imposter have posed as the resurrected Jesus for the 500?
A. Conspiracy theory hypotheses to explain the belief in Jesus' resurrection have been universally rejected from the professional historical journals since the 18th century. The conspiracy hypothesis implies that the disciples suffered torture and died for something they knew firsthand to be a lie. Worse than that, the hypothesis is deeply anachronistic. The idea of a crucified Messiah was as absurd to Second Temple Judaism as the idea of a married bachelor, and Jewish expectations of the day precluded anyone experiencing resurrection before the general resurrection at the end of the world. No one was expecting Jesus to come back from the dead.

Q. Jesus wasn't the firstfruits of the resurrection.
A. The Tanakh teaches about resurrection in Isaiah 26, Ezekiel 37, and Daniel 12. So I am glad that he affirms that God can raise the dead. However, resurrection is not merely the return of the soul to a lifeless body.

The Second Temple belief in resurrection is stated well in Daniel 12:2. "Those who sleep in the dust of the earth shall awaken; some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt." Resurrection was defined as something that happens at the end of the age, where the dead will be brought back to life and transformed supernaturally into an immortal state, where they will then be judged by God.

Therefore, it is incorrect to think of Lazarus and others raised from the dead as resurrected. A better term would be resuscitation. They were brought back to life, but in the same weak, frail, mortal bodies in which they died, and they all died at a later date. Jesus was the first and only so far to be resurrected into the supernaturally powerful and immortal state as predicted by Daniel. Hence, he is the first of the resurrected dead.

Q. Didn't Jesus abolish the law, which would make him a false prophet under Deuteronomy 12?
A. Jesus did not abolish the law. He reinterpreted it so that it became an internal moral guide. Even the Rabbis agree that the Law of Moses makes no sense unless it is interpreted. After the destruction of the second temple, the vast majority of the Mosaic commands simply could not be followed, and required reinterpretation in order to be followed. The only difference I have with Rabbinical Judaism is that I believe that it is Jesus who has the ultimate authority over interpreting the Torah, and not the Rabbis.

Except for the last one, these types of questions betray a deep ignorance of the New Testament. An undergraduate in any decent seminary could have answered them.

With that out of the way, we can get to the real heart of the issue: the Rabbinic dismissal of evidence. Historically, the Rabbis have been somewhat paranoid of evidence that might undermine their claims to absolute authority over the Jewish people. No example better illustrates this than the Akhnai Oven in tractate Bava Metzia of the Talmud:

It is taught: On that day R. Eliezer brought forward every imaginable argument, but the Sages did not accept any of them. Finally he said to them: "If the Halakhah (religious law) is in accordance with me, let this carob tree prove it!" Sure enough the carob tree immediately uprooted itself and moved one hundred cubits, and some say 400 cubits, from its place. "No proof can be brought from a carob tree," they retorted.

And again he said to them "If the Halakhah agrees with me, let the channel of water prove it!" Sure enough, the channel of water flowed backward. "No proof can be brought from a channel of water," they rejoined.

Again he urged, "If the Halakhah agrees with me, let the walls of the house of study prove it!" Sure enough, the walls tilted as if to fall. But R. Joshua, rebuked the walls, saying, "When disciples of the wise are engaged in a halakhic dispute, what right have you to interfere?" Hence in deference to R. Joshua they did not fall and in deference to R. Eliezer they did not resume their upright position; they are still standing aslant.

Again R. Eliezer then said to the Sages, "If the Halakhah agrees with me, let it be proved from heaven." Sure enough, a divine voice cried out, "Why do you dispute with R. Eliezer, with whom the Halakhah always agrees?" R. Joshua stood up and protested: "The Torah is not in heaven!" (Deut. 30:12). We pay no attention to a divine voice because long ago at Mount Sinai You wrote in your Torah at Mount Sinai, `After the majority must one incline'. (Ex. 23:2)"

Besides the misquote of Exodus 23:2, which says do not go with the majority, the deeper problem here is that the Rabbis simply refuse to admit any evidence that clashes with their beliefs. God himself must submit to the will of the Rabbis.

I actually agree with one atheist blogger when he said: "One simply cannot presuppose the truths of disputable historical events prior to investigating whether or not those events actually took place and keep a straight face."

It is very hard to take someone seriously who holds a position on historical events and absolutely refuses to allow evidence to change his mind. The idea that the Rabbis today have an uncorrupted and authoritative tradition that comes from Moses on Sinai is a historical claim and is subject to historical investigation. If you do not allow your views on this matter to be falsified by evidence, you risk delusion.

You become like the man who went to his doctor believing that he was a dead corpse. The doctor argued to the patient's satisfaction that corpses have no pulse and cannot bleed. The doctor then pricked the finger of the man, and blood came out. The man looked at his bleeding finger and concluded "I guess corpses can bleed." The man, like the Rabbis, was not open to evidence. And what better evidence is there against the Rabbinic tradition, than the evidence for the radical self-image and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth. If the Rabbis were correct, then the last thing one would expect is for the God of Israel to resurrect from the dead a man who saw himself as the great divine judge of humanity as prophesied in Daniel 7.

So again I ask: on what consistent basis can the Rabbis accept the historicity of the Exodus while rejecting the historicity of the radical self-image and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth? And if your religion cannot handle this evidence, I suggest you get yourself a new religion.

For further reading on this subject, the Resurrection of the Son of God by N.T. Wright is a thorough, scholarly work on the subject. Wright is one of the world's leading scholars on late Second Temple Judaism and provides a very detailed account on the people, culture, and idea of resurrection during that time period. Wright also does ground-clearing work, refuting every major alternative hypothesis to the resurrection.

Pascal's Wager Against Calvinism

One of the more inventive arguments for the existence of God is an argument invented by Blaise Pascal. At the end of his life, Pascal wrote out various thoughts on the big questions of life, such as whether or not God exists. His pragmatic argument, known as Pascal's Wager, is an argument for people who have heard his arguments for the Christian faith and were still indecisive about it.

Pascal asked his audience to construct a chart, labeling one axis objective and another subjective. Label one "God exists" and the other "God does not exist" On the subjective axis, label one "follow God" and the other "do not follow God"

If you choose to follow God, then you have infinite to gain if you are right and only finite loss if you are wring. If you choose not to follow God, you have finite to gain if you are right and infinite loss if you are wrong.

The main objection to this argument is the trickster deity approach. The trickster deity will send you to heaven if you are an atheist and to hell if you are a theist. Does this refute Pascal's Wager?

Hardly.

In order for this objection to work, the trickster god has to be as likely to exist as the God of the Bible. However, I have given arguments for the existence of an omniperfect God, which if successful exclude the possibility of a trickster god. Even if those arguments fail, Pascal's Wager gives the unbeliever a very heavy burden of proof. That unbeliever has to give arguments for the existence of the trickster god that are at least as strong as arguments for the God of theism. Otherwise, one can argue that since there are better arguments for God than for the trickster deity, theism is more likely to be true and therefore is the wiser bet.

All of this is well and good, but how does it apply to Calvinism? I'm glad you asked. One of the key prooftexts for Calvinism is Romans 9:16, which in the ESV states "So then it depends not on human will or exertion, but on God, who has mercy." History has given a myriad of interpretations regarding what exactly "it" is. It could be national election, or election to service, or the circumstances in which you are born, or God's criteria as to which people get saved. Also, some of the "not...but" verses in the Bible, such as John 6:27 (Do not work for the food that perishes, but for the food that endures to eternal life) do not exclude the "not" section but merely de-emphasize it.

However, Calvinists insist that Romans 9:16 states that the salvation of individuals does not depend in any way on human will or exertion. Can we come up with a practical argument to reinforce other arguments? No. But we don't have to, because Pascal already has. Assume that salvation either does or does not involve human will, and assume that we can choose either to believe it or not to believe it.

If it does involve human will and we believe it, our belief bolsters our evangelism and apologetics efforts and more people receive salvation.
If it does not involve human will and we believe that it does, our belief bolsters our evangelism and apologetics efforts and no fewer people receive salvation.
If it does involve human will and we do not believe that it does, our belief harms our evangelism and apologetics efforts and fewer people receive salvation.
If it does not involve human will and we do not believe that it does, our belief harms our evangelism and apologetics efforts and no fewer people receive salvation.

From a practical standpoint, we should believe that salvation does involve human will and exertion. We have everything to gain if we are right, and little to lose if we are wrong.

How might the Calvinist respond to these charges? The first is that belief that human will affects salvation robs God of his glory. Even if true, this objection hardly defeats the argument. Would you rather risk robbing God of some of his glory for a finite period of time (until you go to heaven and God corrects you), or risk souls spending eternity in hell for an infinite period of time?

Another objection is that practical arguments should not shape our beliefs. However, no one lives this way. If you see a lump on your skin, and there's only a 10% chance that it is a malignant tumor, and a 90% chance that it is benign, should you then assume on the basis of probability that it is benign and simply ignore it? Another example is the insurance industry. There is only a small chance that your home will be destroyed by a natural disaster, but does that justify not getting insurance? Because the payoffs are unequal, a prudent individual will seek to minimize risk and maximize reward. Similarly, practical-minded individuals will assume that libertarian free will plays a role in salvation and will bias his thinking in favor of it. They will assume free will, and give the free will position every benefit of the doubt.

Similarly, if the God of the Bible is more likely to exist than trickster deities, then prudent individuals should give theism every benefit of the doubt.

James Galyon objects to an older version of the argument, declaring that the Synod of Dort states that evangelism makes a difference in the salvation of the evangelized. Much of his argument is based on a misunderstanding of this wager, and I will admit his misunderstanding is my fault. The original version of this argument was a bit vague. My argument is not that Calvinist denominations ignore the call to evangelism and apologetics. Indeed, James White, a borderline hyper-Calvinist is perhaps the best counter-cult apologist in the Western world.

My argument is that (1) if salvation does not depend on human will or exertion, it is logically impossible that any human choice (including evangelism) could make any difference in anyone's salvation (if it could, then election would be conditional), and (2) how we do evangelism and apologetics is hugely impacted by our views on this issue. If we believe that people can be argued into or out of the right beliefs through reason and evidence, then we would put a lot more effort into those areas.

Beliefs very much affect our behaviors and motivations. As Alvin Plantinga said: "I would not go to the refrigerator to get a beer if I believed that beer did not exist." Similarly, the consequences of our actions do impact human behavior, whether or not they ideally should do so. Digging a ditch only to fill it again is demoralizing, and a vicious form of punishment. If Americans believed that visiting the moon again would lead to enormous scientific breakthroughs, I guarantee that NASA would not be hurting for funding the way it is now. Our beliefs about the consequences of our actions significantly affect our actions and motivations.

The mere mandate to proclaim the gospel to all simply does not have the motivating power as the belief that how we present, how we argue, whether our apologists win debates, and the skill of our salesmanship all make a difference in the salvation of others.

Maydole's Temporal Contingency Argument

In 2009, Blackwell publishing release the Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, which is the gold standard on arguments for the existence of a personal God. Since the book was written for professional philosophers, you should not get frustrated if the book seems challenging to read. Just a fair warning.

The book delivers a series of
1. cosmological arguments - arguments that the nature of the physical world requires an ultimate being
2. teleological arguments - arguments that the design in our world requires a designer
3. moral and axiological arguments - arguments that objective value, beauty, and obligation requires an ultimate being
4. ontological arguments - arguments from the definition of God to his existence

I believe there are sounds arguments for God in all of these categories. The one argument in this book that really piqued my interest, since it blends the strongest parts of different cosmological, axiological, and ontological arguments. Let me show you the argument first and then I'll go through it. The argument comes in two parts: the first section with all the T statements are premises with T15 as the conclusion. The second half of the argument is the full, technical version, which I will translate into plain English and explain in the rest of this post.



Here is what's going on: Robert Maydole is using a version of Thomas Aquinas' Third Way, his third argument for the existence of God, but Maydole is updating it to accommodate advances in both science and philosophy. It uses alethic S5 Modal logic, which is used to derive metaphysical truths. This is the system Alvin Plantinga uses in his works, such as in The Nature of Necessity. In order to understand the argument, you will need to be familiar with some of the terms such as being, necessity, possibility, sufficient reason, possible world, and the like, so here goes.

Being - anything that exists. Examples of beings include chairs, keyboards, phones, atoms, quarks, photons, cars, people, souls (if they exist), God (if he exists), books, computers, space, stars, galaxies, the universe, and your mom. Basically, the two criteria for a being are: (1) does it exist? and (2) can you name it?

Necessity and Possibility - Maydole uses Alvin Plantinga's definition of broad logical possibility and broad logical necessity. This is expressed in what's called possible worlds semantics. A possible world is a way reality might be or might have been. the actual world is the way reality is. A statement is possibly true if there is a possible world where the statement is true. A statement is necessarily true if it is true in all possible worlds. What's strange and confusing about this argument is that it uses BOTH metaphysical necessity AND temporal necessity, which are different terms entirely. Maydole does a good job of keeping the terms separate. He does not confuse the two and I will try my best to avoid mixing them as well.

Without limitations - It appears that, according to Maydole's use, a being is without limitations if it is the metaphysical ultimate. That is, the greatest metaphysically possible being. If we could describe a being greater than the metaphysical ultimate, then THAT would be the metaphysical ultimate. Such a being would have to be, at minimum, omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent in all possible worlds. This means that it would have to exist in all possible worlds. This means that a being without limitations would exist necessarily.

One objection to possible worlds semantics is that it is inconsistent with actualism. Acutalism is the belief that everything that exists is actual, and therefore merely possible worlds do not really exist. This is not a problem, however, as most actualists, such as Alvin Plantinga, still use possible worlds semantics, so there is no inconsistency here.

Sufficient reason - The principle that everything that exists has an explanation for its existence. This principle is not as controversial as it might at first seem. Science presupposes this principle, that there are reasons why the physical world works the way it does. It is also impossible to accept this principle for some things and reject it for others. Events without an explanation cannot be governed by probability so anyone who denies this principle cannot even say that unexplainable things are possible but improbable.

Equivalence - "A is equivalent to B" is the same as saying it is true that ("If A, then B" and "If B, then A")

The universe - for the sake of this argument, "the universe" means "all of physical reality" so if there are multiverses or other universes or other planes of existence, all of physical reality in its entirety is being defined, for the sake of this argument, under the title "the universe."

Remember that the premises of the argument are the 14 T statements (T15 is the conclusion) at the top of the chart. Every other step of the argument is a logically airtight deductive argument. If you want to deny the conclusion, you have to dispute at least one of the premises. But the real power of the argument lies in the following: because this is a modal argument, as long as there is ANY possible world where the 14 premises are true, even if it is not the actual world, then the argument is sound. Let me repeat that: as long as the 14 premises are even POSSIBLE, then the argument goes through.

The first part of the argument lays out the first 7 premises (T1 through T7)

1. (premise) Something presently exists
2. (premise) Only finitely many things (or beings) have existed to date
3. (premise) For every x, if x is temporally contingent, x begins to exist at some time and ceases to exist at some time
4. (premise) For every x, if x begins to exist at some time and ceases to exist at some time, then x exists for a finite period of time
5. (premise) for every x, if x exists for a finite period of time and only finitely many things have existed to date, then there was a time when nothing existed
6. (premise) if there was a time when nothing existed, then nothing presently exists
7. (premise) for every x, "x is temporally necessary" is equivalent to "x is not temporally contingent"
8. suppose that for every x, x is temporally contingent
9. then if the universe is temporally contingent, it begins to exist at some time and ceases to exist at some time
10. suppose the universe is temporally contingent
11. then the universe began to exist at some time and will cease to exist at some time
12. if the universe began to exist at some time and will cease to exist at some time, then the universe exists for a finite period of time
13. so the universe exists for a finite period of time
14. then for every x, x exists for a finite period of time
15. then everything exists for a finite period of time and only finitely many things have existed to date
16. therefore, there was a time (or state of affairs) where nothing existed
17. therefore, nothing presently exists
18. but something does presently exist!
19. therefore, it is not the case that for every x, x is temporally contingent
20. therefore there is something that is not temporally contingent
21. let's call this being that is not temporally contingent THE NECESSARY BEING (TNB).

This first section is basically Aquinas' section of the argument. Objects (or beings) either begin to exist or they do not. Also, there are either an infinite number of objects that have existed in the past or there are not. Since the existence of an actual infinite number of objects would violate the laws of set theory (you would be able to perform invalid operations such as subtraction and division of actual infinites), it follows that there are only a finite number of objects in the past.

If everything that exists began to exist, and there are a finite number of objects, then it follows logically that there was some state of affairs where there was not anything that existed. However, such a state of affairs would lack even the potential for something to exist, so that nothing could ever come into existence. But something did come into existence. Hence, there is at least one object (or being) that did not begin to exist.

22. "TNB is temporally necessary" is equivalent to "TNB is not temporally contingent"
23. therefore, if something is temporally necessary, it is not temporally contingent, and vice versa
24. therefore, if TNB is not temporally contingent, TNB is temporally necessary
25. hence, TNB is temporally necessary
26. therefore, TNB exists

This conclusion may seem to jump out at you. How did we established that a TNB exists? Maydole made the assumption that all beings are temporally contingent, showed that it leads to a contradiction. If not everything is temporally contingent, then something is temporally necessary and 22 through 26 just show the coherence of such a concept.

The next section is going to add the rest of the premises.

27. (premise) for every x, there exist a y such that y is a sufficient reason for x
28. (premise) if for every x, there exists a y such that y is a sufficient reason for x, then there exists a z such that [z is a sufficient reason for x and z is a sufficient reason for z]
29. (premise) for every x and for every y, if x is temporally necessary and y is a sufficient reason for x, then y is temporally necessary
30. (premise) for every y, if y is temporally necessary and y is a sufficient reason for y, then y is without limitations
31. (premise) for every y, if y is without limitations then necessarily [for every z, if z is not y, then y is greater than z]
32. (premise) it is not possible that there is a y such that y is greater than itself
33. (premise) necessarily, for every x and every y, if x is greater than y, then y is not greater than x

Most of these premises are pretty uncontroversial. 27 is just a statement of the principle of sufficient reason, which needs to be presupposed in order to make sense of empirical investigation. 28 states that explanations are not circular. Hence, something has to be self-explanatory. 30 states that only an ultimate being i.e. a being without any limitations could explain why it exists.

34. therefore, there exists a y such that y is a sufficient reason for TNB
35. therefore, if there exists a y such that y is a sufficient reason for TNB then there exists a z such that such that z is a sufficient reason for TNB and is a sufficient reason for z (z is a sufficient reason for itself)
36. therefore, there exists a z such that z is a sufficient reason for TNB and z is a sufficient reason for z
37. hence, there exists TNB such that TNB is a sufficient reason for TNB and TNB is a sufficient reason for itself

To prevent an infinite regress, which would render everything inexplicable, there needs to be some sort of explanatory stopping point. That stopping point cannot be a temporally contingent being, because it could not explain any temporally necessary beings.

38. if TNB is temporally necessary and is a sufficient reason for itself, then it is not temporally contingent
39. TNB is a sufficient reason for itself
40. TNB is temporally necessary and is a sufficient reason for itself
41. TNB is not temporally contingent
42. "TNB is temporally necessary" is equivalent to "TNB is not temporally contingent"
43. if TNB is temporally necessary then TNB is not temporally contingent, and if TNB is not temporally contingent, then TNB is temporally necessary
44. if TNB is not temporally contingent, then TNB is temporally necessary
45. so TNB is temporally necessary
46. hence, TNB is a sufficient reason for itself

I may have messed up the interpretation here. 39 and 46 seem to be identical, but I am not sure if there is a distinction in the formula between v and v1.

47. TNB is temporally necessary and is a sufficient reason for itself
48. if TNB is temporally necessary and is an explanation for itself, then TNB is without limitations

Only the metaphysical ultimate, or that than which nothing greater can be conceived can serve as the ultimate explanatory stopping point.

49. if TNB is without limitations, then necessarily, for every z, if z is not TNB, then TNB is greater than z
50. therefore, necessarily, for every z, if z is not TNB, then TNB is greater than z
51. necessarily, for every z, either z is not TNB or TNB is greater than z
52. necessarily, for every z, either z is not TNB or it is not the case that TNB is not greater than z

If TNB is the metaphysical ultimate, and therefore the greatest possible being, then any other object you pick cannot be greater than TNB.

53. necessarily, for every z, it is not the case that [z is not TNB and TNB is not greater than z]
54. necessarily, it is not the case that there is a z such that [z is not TNB and TNB is not greater than z)
55. therefore, it is not possible that there is a z such that [z is not TNB and TNB is not greater than z]

These steps deliver implications from 49, that all other objects besides TNB are inferior to TNB.

56. necessarily, there is no y such that y is greater than y
57. therefore, necessarily, for every y, it is not the case that y is greater than y
58. for every y, y is not greater than y
59. it is not the case that the universe is greater than the universe
60. either the universe is not greater than the universe or TNB is not the universe
61. either TNB is not the universe or the universe is not greater than the universe

60 and 61 are the same statement in reverse order. This is to set up the next steps of the argument.

62. if TNB is the universe, then the universe is not greater than the universe
63. if the universe is TNB, then TNB is the universe
64. if TNB is the universe, then the universe is not greater than TNB
65. for every y, if y is not greater than y, then here is what follows: [if the universe is TNB, then the universe is not greater than TNB]
66. necessarily, for every y, y not being greater than y implies that if the universe is TNB then the universe is not greater than TNB
67. necessarily, if the universe is TNB, then the universe is not greater than TNB

Here comes the hard part. It is technical and hard to understand, but I will state it and then explain it.

68. necessarily, for every x and for every y, if x is greater than y, then y is not greater than x, also, for every z, if z is not TNB, then TNB is greater than z
69. "necessarily, for every x and for every y, if x is greater than y, then y is not greater than x, also, for every z, if z is not TNB, then TNB is greater than z" implies that "necessarily, for every x and every y, if x is greater than y, then y is not greater than x, also, for every x, if z is not TNB, then TNB is greater than z"
70. necessarily, for every x and every y, if x is greater than y, then y is not greater than x, also, for every z, if z is not TNB, then TNB is greater than z
71. necessarily, the fact that "for every x and every y, if x is greater than y, then y is not greater than x, also, for every z, if z is not TNB then TNB is greater than z" implies that if the universe is not TNB, then the universe is not greater than TNB
72. necessarily, if the universe is not TNB, then the universe is not greater than TNB

So we've established the dilemma. Look at 72 and 67. The universe is not greater than TNB, regardless of whether or not the universe is TNB. This seems obvious just by looking at the two statements, but Maydole is thorough and will prove this deductively in steps 73 through 79.

73. necessarily, if the universe being identical with TNB means that the universe is not greater than TNB and if necessarily the universe not being identical with TNB means that the universe is not greater than TNB, then necessarily, the fact that either the universe is TNB or is not TNB means that necessarily, the universe is not greater than TNB
74. necessarily, the universe being identical with TNB means that the universe is not greater than TNB, and necessarily, the universe not being identical with TNB means that the universe is not greater than TNB
75. necessarily, whether or not the universe is TNB, the universe is not greater than TNB
76. necessarily, the universe either is or isn't TNB
77. therefore, necessarily, either the universe is not greater than TNB or the universe is not greater than TNB (damned if you do or damned if you don't)
78. therefore necessarily, the universe being either not greater than TNB or not greater than TNB means that the universe is not greater than TNB
79. therefore, necessarily, the universe is not greater than TNB

Now we go into the home stretch. we have established that the universe is not greater than The Necessary Being and cannot be greater than The Necessary being. Maydole will also establish that TNB has nothing greater than it and also has no equal. Something that has no equal and nothing greater is by definition supreme.

80. for every z, necessarily, no z is greater than TNB
81. if, for every z, necessarily there is no z greater than TNB, then necessarily, for every z, z is not greater than TNB

81 uses the Barcan formula, which is somewhat controversial. Graham Oppy has objected to it in the journal Philo. Yet I do not think his objections apply to this version of the argument. Both the if and then statements in 81 are basically the same thing re-worded. They both state that it is a necessary truth that nothing is greater than TNB.

82. necessarily, for every z, z is not greater than TNB
83. necessarily, there is no z that is greater than TNB
84. therefore, it is not possible that there is a z such that Z is greater than TNB
85. therefore, it is not possible that there is a z such that z is greater than TNB, and it is not possible that there is a z such that [z is not TNB and TNB is not greater than z]

This is the same as saying that it is not possible for anything to be greater than or even equal to TNB. The second half of 85 was derived from 55.

86. therefore TNB is supreme
87. Therefore, there exists a being that is supreme

Therefore, some being is supreme. It is either the universe or something distinct from the universe. This commits us to either theism or pantheism, and I think the latter is indefensible. If the universe is God (the metaphysical ultimate) then it follows with logical certainty that the universe cannot be improved upon, as it is the greatest conceivable being. This would mean that evil and any other deficiencies in the universe are illusory, and that the universe is temporally necessary. This would mean that the universe never began to exist, and will never go out of existence.

Hence, God exists, and is distinct from the universe.

The Madness of Wikipedia

Just a brief update before my next real post and video. I want to warn users on the use of Wikipedia. Wikipedia is a good source of information if the issues you are researching are relatively uncontroversial. As long as the task for the Wikipedia entry is simply to gather information, such as related to general historical information, chemistry, food, and mathematics, Wikipedia does an excellent job.

When the task is to present information on a controversial issue, however, Wikipedia is a terrible source of information, as we can observe from the article on Dr. William Lane Craig.


Not only is the article biased, but any attempt to change the article to make it more informative, objective, and relevant, but it is under the control of several of Dr. Craig's intellectual opponents, who want to make Dr. Craig look as bad as possible.

The webcomic XKCD makes great fun of our excessive trust in Wikipedia:

Wikipedia may be useful, but please take its information with a hefty bit of salt.

Happy Hanukkah Everybody!!

Why No Theist Should be a Compatibilist

Theologians often ask the question: if God is sovereign over all creation, is it possible for humanity to be free? And if so, how? One of the recent attempts to reconcile divine sovereignty with human freedom is called the compatibilist approach, whereby determinism and free will are considered compatible. This approach is embraced mainly by theologians in Reformed Protestant or Calvinist denominations, such as John Frame and James White. Compatibilism is not the view of Augustine and may not even be the view of John Calvin. I intend to explain why no one who believes in an omniperfect God should ever take a compatibilist view under any circumstances.

The arguments presented here are ripped from Volume 1 of the 2011 Philosophia Christi, which is the trade journal of the Evangelical Philosophical Society. This video will be about free will, which is the view that people are capable of making choices and being held responsible for those choices.

First, let's define our terms:

Determinism - Determinism is the view that all events are governed by laws, which are statements of conditions under which certain effects must occur. For a determinist, Conditions + Laws = Decision.

Simple Indeterminism - Simple Indeterminism is the view that a part of human choice is randomly determined, much like rolling dice or spinning a roulette wheel. Some interpretations of quantum physics view subatomic particles as exhibiting this type of random behavior. For a simple indeterminist, Conditions + Laws + Random Variables = Decision.

Compatibilism - is the view that all events are governed by laws, which are statements of conditions under which certain effects must occur. This is the same definition as determinism, except that the compatibilist believes that such decisions can be considered free choices of which we can be held responsible. For a compatibilist, Conditions + Laws = Decision (which we can call a free choice).

Libertarian Free Will - This is sometimes called self-determinism. Libertarian free will is the position that humans are agents who are able to self-determine some of their behaviors. The libertarian holds that for an action to be free it must be caused by the agent who performs it, and must be done in such a way that no antecedent conditions determine the act. A libertarian agent who makes a choice in a situation could have chosen otherwise, even in the same circumstances. For a libertarian, Conditions + Laws + Agency = Decision.

I will be arguing for libertarian free will and and against compatibilism on two grounds:

1. Reasoning can only be done by an agent with libertarian free will.
2. The problem of evil cannot be resolved without libertarian free will.

One series of arguments against libertarian free will that I have read over the year is the argument that libertarian free will is incoherent or unintelligible. If God exists, then there has to be at least one agent who has libertarian free will, and, presumably, is able to reason. Here's why. Theism is the belief that there is an omniperfect God who is distinct from the physical world, and from all creation. If God did not have libertarian free will, then he would not be sovereign, but would be controlled by outside forces. Hence, one must believe in a God with libertarian free will in order to be a theist. Therefore, no theist can ever argue that libertarian free will is an incoherent idea. That would be inconsistent.

First argument: Reasoning can only be done by an agent with libertarian free will. Compatibilists will argue that reason does not require free will, but can be performed by anything with rational causes. To the compatibilist, what matters is not whether or not you are being controlled (that is a given), what matters is what controls you. If you are pumped full of drugs and it causes you to have a certain set of beliefs, those beliefs are not considered rational. However, if a persuasive philosopher delivers arguments and it causes you to have a certain set of beliefs, that is considered a free and reasonable choice.

One problem with compatibilist theories of reason is that they do not tell why some reasoning belongs to a particular agent. Because compatibilists deny the existence of autonomous agents, they cannot argue that reasoning belongs to an agent if that reasoning comes from that agent's autonomous will. Instead, the compatibilist usually argues that an agent is reasoning if that agent is reasons responsive. This does not really work. A mathematician's notepad may be responsive to the reasoning of a mathematician, and is being controlled by a rational agent. Are we then to say that the notepad is reasoning? A computer is responsive to a rational programmer's instructions, but the machine is not reasoning. Using someone else's reasoning is not the same as reasoning for yourself.

Compatibilists will respond to these types of manipulation arguments by altering their definition of what it means to be rational. They say that subjects are responsible for their decisions when they issue from a mechanism that is moderately reasons-responsive and is also the agent's own mechanism. An agent is moderately reasons-responsive if that agent has two things:
1. A regular pattern of reasons receptivity. This means that the pattern of receptiveness to reasons forms a coherent and intelligible pattern.
2. The agent must at least sometimes act based on his or her best reasons.
A Mechanism is the agent's own if the agent takes responsibility for the mechanism by seeing himself as the one that made the decision.

Suppose Jill, a logic professor and also a neuroscientist who is frustrated with her student Dan, plants a logic chip in his brain. The chip causes Dan to form beliefs based on logic that he otherwise would not have formed himself. For example, if Dan comes into class very tired, and is shown that A=B and B=C, he does not reason that A=C. The chip, however, registering that Dan has A=B and B=C as beliefs, causes Dan to believe that A=C. If the chip caused the belief to form in Dan, can we say that Dan reasoned to that belief? Is Dan responsible for that belief, even though it was caused by the logic chip? Suppose that the logic chip causes Dan to think that he made the decision and that he (Dan) is responsible for praise and blame. Does that even make any difference? I think not. For suppose that Jill programmed an error into the chip, and instead of forming the true belief that A=C in Dan's head, the chip's malfunction causes Dan to believe that A≠C. Can we say that Dan is the one who committed those mistakes? Can we hold Dan responsible for that false belief? The above scenario fulfills all the compatibilist criteria for reason, yet no one would say that Dan is responsible for the beliefs formed by the chip in Dan's head.

Compatibilists may also argue that reasons are causes and that a person's behavior is determined by the best and strongest reasons. If compatibilism is true, and then the bundle of reasons that support a decision must also compel a decision in an irresistible way. However, we know that people do not always make the reasonable decision. People reject conclusions that their best arguments support.

Here is an example: Suppose James came to believe that if reason requires libertarian free will, then compatibilism is false. After reading a number of books, James now believes the antecedent of this argument. He doesn't want to conclude that compatibilism is false, so he converts the modus ponens into a modus tollens. He claims to have learned from the undeniable truth of compatibilism that reason must be redefined so as to exclude the need for libertarian free will. The fact that we can reject a conclusion that our best reasons support is powerful evidence that reasons do not compel a conclusion.

The compatibilist account of reason fails to distinguish between compulsive actions that are occurring within the brain from reasoning that the agent does. Compatibilists have tried to get around it by altering the definition of reason. These new definitions fail because they either attribute reason to inanimate objects such as a notepad, or they deny reason to human beings. Without a distinction between free choices and compulsive acts, there can be no such thing as human reasoning. Compatibilism cannot make such a distinction, and therefore cannot account for human reasoning.

Second argument: The problem of evil cannot be resolved without libertarian free will. The definition of God is "that than which nothing greater can be conceived." God is the metaphysical ultimate, and is by definition an omniperfect being. Such an omniperfect being would be omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. Any being that lacks these attributes would be deficient, and therefore would not be God.

The classical objection to the existence of God is called the problem of evil. Evil is by definition a violation of a moral ought, and therefore a deficiency. God is perfect and can have no evil in him, yet our world is filled with evil. How can an omniperfect God co-exist with a non-omniperfect creation? The traditional free will defense of this view, supported by Augustine, has to find some way of severing God's omniperfect desires from the morally imperfect desires of created beings.

Any solution to this problem, short of denying the existence of moral evil, will require that the morally deficient wills of the creatures be autonomous from the omniperfect will of God. If it is better for some creatures with autonomous wills to enter relationship with God than it is for an entire universe to be free of evil, then we may have an explanation as to why evil exists in the first place. The very definition of autonomy restricts which possible worlds are created by God. Such is not in any way a restriction on God's omnipotence, as omnipotence is defined as maximum ability to actualize different states of affairs. To say that God could make an autonomous creature freely choose to act differently than the creature would have acted is as incoherent as saying that God should be able to make a square circle.

Compatibilism, on the other hand, faces one insurmountable obstacle which Jerry Walls calls CI.

CI: If freedom and determinism are compatible, God could have created a world in which all persons freely did only the good at all times.

This world wouldn't just be some logically possible world, uncreatable due to creaturely freedom, but a fully actualizable and creatable world. I will be arguing that any being who would not prefer to create such a world cannot be omnibenevolent. I agree with Antony Flew when he said: "Certainly it would be monstrous to suggest that anyone, however truly responsible in the eyes of men, could fairly be called to account and punished by the God who has rigged his every move. All the bitter words which have ever been written against the wickedness of the God of predestination--especially when he is also thought of as filling Hell with all but the elect--are amply justified." Jerry Walls illustrates this by asking us to imagine the following scenario:

Suppose a preschool is run by a woman who is a master of psychology, neuroscience, and human manipulation. Unbeknownst to their parents, she deliberately conditions the children who attend her preschool. Some of the children she conditions to behave virtuously and live productive lives. Some of the children she conditions to behave in a wicked manner, and sometimes even to become thieves, rapists, and murderers. Let us assume that she succeeds perfectly in her project and each child turns out exactly as she intends.

She avoids detection, and leaves the preschool to go to law school, become a lawyer, and eventually become a judge. One day, a man who once attended her preschool is brought to trial on child molestation charges. Sure enough, overwhelming evidence is brought in, including a confession by the man that he did in fact molest many children. The judge condemns him as a menace to society and sentences him to life in prison with no possibility for parole.

In prison, the man realizes that the judge was his preschool teacher and that she deliberately conditioned him to be a child molester. She could have just as easily conditioned him to be a well-adjusted person and an upstanding citizen. How could we possibly avoid concluding that this woman is evil and directly responsible for the evil acts of these former students? I do not think there is any way. If compatibilism is true, then the situation parallels our situation with God. If humans commit acts of evil, and there is no autonomous will, how can we avoid declaring God evil for making humans act in such a way?

The compatibilist might object that God needs evil to exist in order for him to be maximally great. If we do not sin, how can God show forgiveness? This view makes God dependent on creation in order to be a maximally great (omniperfect) being. If this is the case, then God is dependent on creation, and his creative decree was not a free act, but a necessary act. If God is dependent upon creation, and if his creative decree is not a libertarian free act, then classical theism is false. Such a view is not classical theism, but more of a pantheism, as it closely resembles the theology of Baruch Spinoza.

The compatibilist might fire back that evil needs to exist in order for conscious creatures to appreciate the good. This is nonsense. First, experiencing evil is not necessary to appreciate the good. Otherwise, God himself could not appreciate the good until he experiences evil.

On compatibilism, God is the great puppeteer, and there is no autonomous will. God could either instill with a sense of appreciation anyone who thinks of the good. Another option is for God to hardwire us with an appreciation of the good, the way we are hardwired to believe in other minds, to believe in the reality of the past, and to believe that objects that go out of sight continue to exist when we are not observing them. In either case, God can just make people appreciate the good. Evil is not needed to do that.

In conclusion then, we have two reasons that no one can consistently believe in God and in compatibilism. First, libertarian free will is necessary to account for human reasoning. Second, libertarian free will is necessary to reconcile God's morally perfect will from our morally imperfect wills. Moses Maimonides said that anyone who believes in God must believe in both God's sovereignty and in libertarian free will, even if that person cannot explain how both can be true. It might be explainable, or it might be a divine mystery beyond human comprehension. One thing, however, is for certain. No theist can rationally believe in compatibilism. It simply is not an option for anyone who believes in God.

Yad L'Achim = Frum Hamas?

I have been reading about anti-missionary terrorist organizations like Yad L'Achim in Israel, who harass and sometimes murder fellow Jews should they ever come to believe in Jesus. If you think about the excuses Yad L’Achim makes for its actions, the reasoning is also pretty ridiculous. It goes something like this:

Messianics are a threat to Israel. Their presence in Israel is a corrupting influence on our society. They come to the area on false pretensions and attempt to Christianize us, undermining our values, our communities, and stealing our children’s souls. We have a right to defend our beliefs and act against those who would destroy them. Their very existence in our land is a threat to us. It would not have bothered us of those Messianics had lived anywhere else, but their encroachment into our territory is an act of aggression and must be stopped by any means necessary.

This sounds familiar for some reason. What happens if we replace Messianics with Jews, Israel with The Middle East, and Christianize with Westernize?

Jews are a threat to the Middle East. Their presence in the Middle East is a corrupting influence on our society. They come to the area on false pretensions and attempt to Westernize us, undermining our values, our communities, and stealing our children’s souls. We have a right to defend our beliefs and act against those who would destroy them. Their very existence in our land is a threat to us. It would not have bothered us of those Jews had lived anywhere else, but their encroachment into our territory is an act of aggression and must be stopped by any means necessary.

Wow. That sounds like the exact same reasoning that Palestinian terrorist organizations use to justify their actions! I guess that explains a lot.

Answering Tovia Singer: Was There a Conspiracy?

One of Singer's most effective techniques is his use of conspiracy theory reasoning. Specifically, the central claim of his Let's Get Biblical series is that the New Testament authors deliberately and maliciously changed the Tanakh so that they could paint Jesus into it. Singer also claims that the New Testament writers altered and fabricated events in the life of Jesus in order to strengthen the case for his messiahship, and that the church conspired to cover it all up. Seeing how conspiracy theories seem to be all the rage these days, it is no surprise to me why Tovia Singer is the most successful of the anti-missionaries.

Conspiracy theorists make heavy use of three techniques:

Technique #1. Arguing from coincidence. Conspiracy theorists love to exploit the phenomenon called pareidolia. Pareidolia is what happens when our minds impose patterns on randomness. Ink blot tests are an example of this, so is our tendency to see faces in rocks, trees, and clouds. Did a politician cancel a flight at the last minute, right before a disaster such as 9/11? There are a lot of politicians and they tend to travel a lot. Flight cancellations are not that uncommon, so it could be a coincidence. But not if you're a conspiracy theorist! No. That cancellation is proof positive that the politician is deeply involved in an elaborate conspiracy of evil masterminds!

Technique #2. Use of explanatory gaps as proof of their theory. Conspiracy theorists recognize that almost any explanation will have "errant data" i.e. facts or alleged facts that do not fit the official explanation. Errant data are the currency of conspiracy theorists, the proof that their pet theory is correct. The problem with this technique is that it often fails to properly weigh the criteria for justifying historical explanations.

The fact that a conspiracy theory perfectly fits all the errant data, and fills all the holes left by the official explanation is not in itself proof, or even strong evidence that the theory is correct. Explanations are judged by a wide range of criteria, primarily the ability to explain future discoveries. Other criteria include the ability to imply other statements describing present, observable data, as well as how ad hoc the explanation is (it must include fewer new suppositions which are not already implied to some extent by existing beliefs). Conspiracy theories tend to have strong explanatory scope, but also tend to be very ad hoc, or contrived.

Technique #3. Exploiting the audience's ignorance. I love speakers who ask questions. It helps to engage the audience. It makes the audience feel they are part of a two-way dialogue. It helps the audience take interest in the subject, and feel that they are the ones arriving at the speaker's conclusion. All of this is good. What is not so good is when a speaker abuses this technique to derive his or her own conclusions from the often ill-informed assumptions of the audience members.

Here is a series of errors that conspiracy theorists often make, all of them ripped from Dr. Jeremy Goodenough of the University of East Anglia.

Error #1. Moving from the accepted fact that X once lied to the belief that nothing X says is trustworthy. This is a favorite of Holocaust deniers. If there is just one demonstrable mistake in for instance a witness statement, the whole statement is rejected as a forgery. The deniers argue that since there are several historical interpretations of the Holocaust, therefore it never happened. In other words: If one historian suggests that only 4 million Jews fell victim to the Nazi persecution, and another historian suggests 7 million, it means the Holocaust must be a false construction.

Error #2. An inability to make rational or proportional means-end judgments. Conspiracy theorists argue that some group of conspirators has been acting to further some aim or to prevent some action taking place, but often fail to ask whether such a group of conspirators could further their aim in some easier or less expensive or less risky fashion.

Error #3. Treating evidence against the theory as evidence for it. Conspiracy theorists do not just argue that the evidence could point toward a different conclusion. Rather, they claim that the evidence supporting the official verdict is suspect, fraudulent, faked or coerced. And because this fraudulent evidence exists, that further proves that the conspiracy theory is right!

Error #4. The classic logical fallacy of post hoc ergo proper hoc (after this, therefore because of this). The conspiracy theorist claims that because event B occurred after, or even as a result of event A, therefore, event A was caused to bring about event B. For example: The First World War happened after the death of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and there is clearly a sense in which it happened because of his death: there is a causal chain leading from the death of the Archduke to the first World War. Though these effects of the assassination may now appear obvious, that is no indication that such a progression was obvious to the people involved in these events at that time. There is no evidence that the people who assassinated the Archduke had any clue that it would bring about a world war. Hindsight is overwhelmingly clearer than foresight.

We observe these techniques and errors all the time in Singer's tape series. For example, he commits error #1 when he argues that the New Testament accounts contradict each other in certain details, and therefore cannot be trusted to represent history. Quite the contrary. Livy and Polybius give two irreconcilable accounts of Hannibal's campaign as he crossed the Alps and invaded Rome. Yet no historian doubts that Hannibal did mount such a campaign.

Singer dismisses the Septuagint as a church invention. Singer claims as his evidence that that in the book of Acts (Acts 7:14, to be exact), Stephen described the entrance of the patriarchs into Egypt, but Stephen got the number wrong, claiming that seventy-five souls went down from Canaan to Egypt rather than 70, which is stated by the Masroetic text in Genesis 46:27, Exodus 1:5, and Deuteronomy 10:22.

Singer then makes the claim that the church altered the Septuagint so that the text in those three locations would fit Stephen's speech! The Septuagint, or at least the Pentateuch, was translated from Hebrew into Greek under Ptolemy Philadelphus around 250 years before the birth of Jesus. Singer claims that the church changed the numbers to cover Stephen's error. How does he deal with the fact that the Septuagint still reads seventy souls in Deuteronomy? Obviously the church blundered when the altered the text and missed it. How is it we have no manuscript evidence of the alleged tampering, such as ancient fragments that read "seventy" in all three places? The church was powerful and thorough in covering its tracks.

This argument utilizes technique #2, where Singer concocts his elaborate tale of fraud and conspiracy. He then goes to the text to imply that the textual evidence perfectly fits his theory's predictions. In reality, he looked at the differences in the texts, and contrived a story to fit. In his argument, Singer commits errors #2 and 3. It would be a lot easier for the church to cover Stephen's alleged error by altering his speech in the book of Acts, over which the church had far greater control than it had over the Greek Pentateuch. He also paints the church as an entity crafty, organized, and powerful enough to obliterate all manuscript evidence of its alterations, and yet careless enough to forget to alter Deuteronomy.

By the way, the Dead Sea Scrolls at Qumran agree with the Septuagint, so Stephen might have been quoting a variant of the text. Regardless, Singer's explanation is one of the Rube Goldberg variety. It is woefully and unnecessarily fanciful.

One of the best ways to prepare yourself for dealing with people like Tovia Singer, is to learn the methods and fallacies behind conspiracy theorists by reading the articles in the links below:

A Quick Introduction:
http://www.fontcraft.com/idiotwars/?p=8

A List of Conspiracy Theorist Fallacies:
http://warp.povusers.org/grrr/conspiracytheories.html

Critical Thinking About Conspiracies (long, but worth it):
http://www.uea.ac.uk/~j097/CONSP01.htm

Answering Tovia Singer: Did God Create Evil?

In page 395 of his study guide, Let's Get Biblical, Tovia Singer answers a question about the Rabbinic doctrine of Satan. The questioner asks how a God who is good and holy can possibly be the author of evil, not just in the sense of allowing for evil to exist, but in the sense that God actively creates evil.

Singer responds that God placed both good and evil into the world. He cites two verses the first is Deuteronomy 30:15 which states:

"See, I [God] have set before thee this day life and good, and death and evil."

The second is Isaiah 45:7 which states:

"I form the light, and create darkness; I make peace, and create evil; I the Lord do all these things."

Singer then goes on to attack Christian doctrine.

The two verses, Isaiah 45:7 and Deuteronomy 30:15, however, pose a serious theological problem for Christians who maintain that God did not create Satan, the angel of evil. According to Christian doctrine, as you suggest in your question, Satan was the highest-ranking angel who, through is own act of spiritual defiance and outright disobedience, became the chief adversary and slanderer of God and the embodiment of evil in this world. In Christian theology God never created evil; He is only the author of righteousness and perfection, as you maintained in your question. Therefore, God could never create something as sinister as the devil himself. Rather, Satan's unyielding wickedness is the result of his own spiritual rebellion.

Singer then compares the Christian view of good and evil to the dualism of Zoroastrianism, where the God Ahura Mazda has two equal manifestations, Spenta (good) and Angra (evil). Singer then states that angel means "messenger," and that no angel in the Tanakh ever opposes God's will, Satan included.

Singer then mentions the book of Job, where Satan appears before God to test the faithfulness of Job. God allows Satan to do so as long as the latter does not kill Job. According to Singer "Satan obediently follows his Creator's instructions" a statement which implies that God actually ordered Satan to torment Job, rather than giving Satan permission. Then Singer states:

Still, by the end of this unparalleled biblical narrative, Job's virtue prevails over Satan's unyielding torment. While in Christian terms Job's personal spiritual triumph is a theological impossibility, in Jewish terms it stands out as the embodiment of God's salvation program for mankind.

Singer then goes on to attack the NIV translation as a skewed understanding that conceals Isaiah's original message in order to preserve a Christian doctrine that contradicts what the Jewish scriptures so clearly teach.

I have to give Rabbi Singer points for rhetoric. When read by an average individual, his argument implies that the NIV translators deliberately mistranslated Isaiah 45, that Deuteronomy 30:15 states that God actively creates evil (and therefore we have two passages to support the claim instead of merely one verse), that the King James translates Isaiah 45:7 as moral evil, and that God actively ordered Satan to torment Job. When pressed by an apologist on these claims, Singer can rightly say that he never explicitly stated any of them. Pretty clever, huh?

First off, a little background about the book of Job. Christian theology does not state that God and Satan are in any way equals or counterparts. All angels, including Satan, are inferior created beings who are as helpless to resist God's omnipotence as we are. This is why Satan has to ask permission in order to torment God's servant Job.

The narrative then continues where Satan destroys Job's entire estate, kills his family, and if that was not enough, inflicts plagues and illnesses upon the poor man. Job's friends try to comfort him by offering Job a theodicy, an explanation as to why a good God is allowing Job to suffer.

After Job continues to complain, God finally appears, rebukes Job and his friends, and then tells Job that God does not owe anyone an explanation to why they suffer. We do not have God's vast perspective and extraordinary knowledge. We were not there at the creation of the world. We are weak, short-lived creatures who may not even be able to comprehend God's reasons for his actions.

The focus of Job is the problem of evil. The fact that we have no explanation for why a good God allows evil to exist and may never have such an explanation does not in any way indicate that there is no explanation.

God does restore Job's fortunes at the end of the book, but there is no indication that this is a reward for Job's faithfulness. In fact, it probably isn't, considering what Job says at the beginning of the chapter:

“I know that you can do all things,
and that no purpose of yours can be thwarted.
‘Who is this that hides counsel without knowledge?’
Therefore I have uttered what I did not understand,
things too wonderful for me, which I did not know.
‘Hear, and I will speak;
I will question you, and you make it known to me.’
I had heard of you by the hearing of the ear,
but now my eye sees you;
therefore I despise myself,
and repent in dust and ashes.”
(Job 42:2-6)

In Deuteronomy 30:15, the text seems to indicate that Israel is given two options: be faithful, loyal and good, and you will have life and prosperity. Be apostate, disloyal and evil, and you will have death and ruin. Where is the indication that God actively created evil? I can't find any, but maybe Tovia is drawing his ideas from the Rabbinic tradition. What does said tradition say about this verse?

R'Yochanan said of this verse: From the day that God made this declaration, goodness and evil did not emanate from His mouth; rather, evil comes of its own accord to one who does evil, and good comes to one who does good.

What about Isaiah 45:7 where God states that he creates evil? The word "evil" has more than one meaning, and those alternate (non-moral) meanings were in greater use during the time that the King James Bible was written. I was curious which definition of evil Tovia meant in this context. Here are five definitions of evil I found in the dictionary.

1. that which is evil; evil quality, intention, or conduct: to choose the lesser of two evils.
2. the force in nature that governs and gives rise to wickedness and sin.
3. the wicked or immoral part of someone or something: The evil in his nature has destroyed the good.
4. harm; mischief; misfortune: to wish one evil.
5. anything causing injury or harm: Tobacco is considered by some to be an evil.

Is this talking about evil in a moral sense, or in one of the non-moral senses? Let's look at the Hebrew to see if it helps us:

יֹוצֵר אֹור וּבֹורֵא חֹשֶׁךְ
עֹשֶׂה שָׁלֹום וּבֹורֵא רָע
אֲנִי יְהוָה עֹשֶׂה כָל־אֵלֶּה

Forming light and creating darkness
establishing peace and creating ra,
I, the LORD create all these

The word in question is: רָע (ra, Strong's H7451) which can mean bad, evil, distress, misery, injury, or calamity. Basically, it's the same as our English word "bad" and carries a lot of the same meanings. Which meaning? Let's look at the context. The verse features two parallel lines, each line comparing two opposite ideas. God creates light, and its opposite, darkness. God establishes peace, and its opposite, chaos.

The next question is: is this just my interpretation, or is there Rabbinic support of this? I found one comment from Redak in the Judaica Press Tanach, who stated that in this context, רָע means "the opposite of peace, war with Babylon." Redak seems to indicate that this isn't a statement that God creates moral evil, but a statement that God creates peace and breaks peace, or that he both calms and agitates.

Oh, I almost forgot. Singer complains that some Christians believe Isaiah 14:12 is about Satan. I will admit that the oracle delivered by Isaiah is addressed to Nebuchadnezzar, but there is one part of this oracle that seems different:

How you are fallen from heaven,
O Day Star, son of Dawn!
How you are cut down to the ground,
you who laid the nations low!
You said in your heart,
"I will ascend to heaven;
above the stars of God
I will set my throne on high;
I will sit on the mount of assembly
in the far reaches of the north;
I will ascend above the heights of the clouds;
I will make myself like the Most High."
But you are brought down to Sheol,
to the far reaches of the pit.
(Isaiah 14:12-15)

I'm not sure if you can apply this to Nebuchadnezzar. What pagan king, after all, tried to supplant God's rule over heaven, only to fall from it?

Answering Tovia Singer: An Introduction

Today, we begin our answering the anti-missionaries series. I intend to focus on specific anti-missionaries, give their backgrounds, and show you their arguments and rhetorical tricks, so that you can better debate them.

Perhaps the most famous anti-missionary is Tovia Singer. He is a charming and charismatic speaker, sort of the Rabbinic version of Ahmed Deedat. Neither is much of a scholar, but both are fantastic showmen, able to stir up crowds with their golden-tongued rhetoric.

I heard from a Messianic Rabbi who apparently was a long-time friend of Rabbi Singer, that Singer at one point in his life almost became a Messianic Jew. After rejecting this option, its seems that Singer decided to pursue a career to keep his fellow Jews away from Jesus at any cost. He is now the director of Outreach Judasim. He has his own radio show in Israel and his own tape series and study companion, both titled Let's Get Biblical.

As Michael Flanigan gives in his testimonial for Singer's book: "Check all the references to Strong's Driver and Briggs, or any other resource you have." I couldn't agree more. Two resources I recommend for a more in-depth study are biblos.com which has the Bible in almost every conceivable language, interlinear versions, and Strong's numbers for further research. The other is the Blue Letter Bible, which gives you access to word study tools. Both are completely free, and don't even require you to register!

In fact, I recommend that every Biblical apologist go through Singer's material with a Bible study group. Nearly all the apologetics disasters come from Lone Ranger apologists.

That said, go slowly through Singer's tapes and his study guide and thoroughly research answers to his objections. This will take a lot of time, a matter of years. Be patient and keep plugging along, because if you can finish this monstrous series, you will be prepared to obliterate almost any Biblical skeptic in debate.

For the rest of you who do not want to engage in such a humongous chore, you can just cheat. James Trimm has released an audio series with a lot of the answers to Singer's objections in his Let's Get Truthful audio series. Michael Brown has also released his own audio series called Countering the Counter-Missionaries. He also gives even more detailed responses in his five volume book series Answering Jewish Objections to Jesus.

My series will not attempt to provide any sort of an exhaustive answer to Tovia Singer's objections, which may at first glance seem overpowering, but take heart. Singer is a powerful speaker, but a weak Biblical scholar who makes a lot of basic errors. I intend to not only expose some of his errors but I also intend to bring something unique to the table: an explanation of how Tovia uses his rhetorical skills to make a relatively weak argument sound much, much stronger than it actually is. So yes, Tovia. Let's get Biblical.

Abusing Sources: Tovia Singer on Biblical Hebrew

On my list of least favorite anti-missionaries, I think Tovia Singer ranks #1, at least right now. The guy has a charming personality and is a great speaker, no doubt. But he also reminds me a lot of a used car salesman. He will butter you up, tell funny stories, and get you to like him. If you are a Jew, he is out to get you by hook or by crook.

One of Tovia's favorite tricks is his arbitrary use of translations. If the English helps his case, he will us that. He will say something like, "The King James Bible, which is not the slightest bit sympathetic to Judaism, says such and such." When the Hebrew is more convenient, he uses the Hebrew. Generally, he prefaces it with "You don't read Hebrew very well, do you?"

What's worse is when he uses the fact that he knows Hebrew and his audience does not, so that he can give a sort of argument from authority. Here is an example:

In his answers to audience questions section of his book: Let's Get Biblical (page 283), Singer responds to a question regarding Isaiah 53:10. The questioner asks about the phrase: "his days will be prolonged" and wonders why this phrase cannot apply to Jesus. Since Jesus was raised from the dead into an immortal body, and is technically still incarnate (as he will be when he returns), he has been alive as a human for about 2000 years. Were his days not prolonged?

After bellyaching about Christian misinterpretation of the Psalm which represents Israel, and after mentioning that the Hebrew word זָ֫רַע (zera, Strong's 2233) means only literal children and never metaphorical children, such as in Isaiah 57:4:
"Are you not children of transgression,
the seed [ זָ֫רַע (zera)] of deceit," (oops)

and of course before his attack on Nicaea and the divinity of Jesus, there is a paragraph where he gives a response to the question that is actually being asked!

This response, however, does little to relieve their problem. To begin with, the Hebrew words יַאֲרִיךְ יָמִים (ya'arich yamim), meaning "long life" in this verse do not mean or refer to an eternal life which has no end, but rather a lengthening of days which eventually come to an end. These Hebrew words are therefore never applied in Tanach to anyone who is to live forever. In fact, the words ya'arich yamim appear in a number of places throughout the Jewish scriptures, including Deuteronomy 17:20, Deuteronomy 25:15, Proverbs 28:16, and Ecclesiastes 8:13. In each and every verse where this phrase appears, these words refer to an extended mortal life, not an eternal one. When the Jewish scriptures speak of an eternal resurrected life, as in Daniel 12:2, the Hebrew words לְחַיֵּי עֹולָם (l'chayai olam) are used.

This is a butchery of grammar. The term יַאֲרִיךְ יָמִים (ya'arich yamim) does not mean long life, as the word יַאֲרִיךְ (ya'arich) is not an adjective. It is the imperfect tense or prefixed conjugation of the verb אָרַך (arach, Strong's 748). So the term יַאֲרִיךְ יָמִים (ya'arich yamim) does not mean "long life" but "will prolong [his/her/its] days." It means exactly the same thing in Hebrew as it does in English. It means that the days will be made longer. How much longer? Generally, when the term is used in English it refers to a lengthening of days which eventually come to an end. It is very rarely the term we use in English to mean "make someone live forever." Generally we use the term "give eternal life" or perhaps "immortalize" to mean that.

When someone has an extra year to live, we say their life has been prolonged. When someone has an extra ten years to live, we say their life has been prolonged more, right? So if God wanted to prolong someone's days to the maximum extent, what would he do? He would give the person eternal life, right?

Besides, if Tovia Singer is right and Isaiah 53 is about Israel, does this mean that Israel is supposed to experience a lengthening of days which eventually come to an end? I hope not.

Abusing Sources: Benjamin Blech on the New Testament

Today, we are going to be looking at a section of Understanding Judaism by Benjamin Blech. Most of the book is a decent introduction to Orthodox Judaism. I say decent because there are better books out there on the subject. If you want an introduction to Orthodox Judaism, To Be A Jew by Hayim Donin is the best one on that subject. Now back to our topic. Understanding Judaism takes the occasional jab at Christian doctrines. However, near the end of the book, the author goes seemingly into a rage, accusing Jesus of desecrating and abrogating the laws of Moses.

One technique the anti-missionaries (and conspiracy theorists and college professors) use is called smuggling assumptions. In a normal presentation about a controversial topic, the presenter will first introduce the issue with statements that are generally undisputed by all sides of the debate. The presenter will then tell his or her side of the argument and respond to objections. The less honest presenter, however, will smuggle statements that are in fact disputed by the other sides into his or her introduction statements, which are assumed to be uncontroversial. See how many smuggled assumptions you can catch in the following passage.

It was Jesus who, when walking with his disciples on a Sabbath through the wheat fields, allowed his companions to pick and eat ears of wheat. When rabbis censured them for desecration of the Sabbath law, Jesus replied, "The son of man is master of the Sabbath" (Matthew 12:1-8). This was not a case of mortal danger legitimizing the violation of the Sabbath. There was no emergency, and yet Jesus permitted the desecration of the Sabbath. The old law could be replaced with the new. The Old Testament would be dismissed as secondary and nonbinding in light of the New Testament, which stressed faith over law.

There is an unresolved discrepancy between Jesus' practice and his claim "Do not suppose that I have come to do away with the law or the prophets. I have not come to do away with them but to enforce them. For I tell you, as long as Heaven and earth endure, not one dotting of an 'i' or crossing of a 't' will be dropped from the law until it is all observed. Anyone, therefore, who weakens one of the slightest of these commands, and teaches other to do so will be ranked lowest in the kingdom of Heaven; but anyone who observes them and teaches others to do so will be ranked high in the kingdom of heaven" (Matthew 5:17-19).

When Jesus and his disciples failed to observe a fast, the justification was: "No one sews a new patch of unshrunken cloth on an old coat; for if he does, the patch tears away, the new from the old, and makes the hole worse than ever, and no one pours new wine into old wine skins; for if he odes, the wine bursts the skins. New wine has to be put into fresh skins" (Mark 2:21-22). The law was the old, and had to be done away with. If it had any justification, it was only for sinners: "I agree that the law is excellent--provided it is legitimately used, with the understanding the law is not intended for upright men, but for the lawless and disorderly, the Godless and irreligious, the irreverent and profane, men who kill their fathers or mothers, murderers, immoral people, men sexually perverted, kidnappers, liars, perjurers, or whatever else is contrary to sound teaching, as set forth in the glorious good news of the blessed God with which I have been entrusted" (1 Timothy 1:8-11). The righteous of faith do not need law. The dietary laws could be disregarded: "All foods are clean" (Mark 7:19). Clearly stated biblical laws could be disregarded: "They [the Jews] were told, 'Anyone who divorces his wife must give her a Certificate of Divorce,' but I tell you that anyone who divorces his wife on any ground except unfaithfulness, makes her commit adultery, and anyone who marries her after she is divorced commits adultery" (Matthew 5:31f).

The list is long. The facts are incontrovertible. The one who claimed he came not to do away with the law or the prophets acted contrary to this assertion. By his deeds he taught that what God had said long ago could be revised, amended, and improved.

Blech then quotes anachronistically from Maimonedes, who, having Jesus in mind when he wrote this, said that the Mosaic law as understood and interpreted by the Rabbis is eternal and absolutely unchangeable. If anyone challenges the Rabbinic understanding of the Mosaic law, no matter how many miracles he conjures up to support his claims, is a false prophet.

In short, Blech's case is that Jesus violated the law of Moses, knew that he was violating the law of Moses, and then made excuses for his disobedience afterward. The main smuggled assumption in this section is that all sides agree that Jesus did violate the laws of Moses, and the debate is over whether his reasons for violating the law was justified. But did Jesus even violate the Mosaic law?

First, let's take a look at different Rabbinical views of this issue. Remember that Benjamin Blech's objection is not that Jesus' view is inconsistent within the Christian system. His objection is that it is inherently wrong to abrogate the law of Moses or to violate it in any way outside of a life-or-death emergency.

When I was listening to a presentation by a Kollel Rabbi regarding the rulings in tractate Eruvin of the Talmud, page 13B. In it, the sages discuss what to do with contradictory rulings. Their solution was eilu v' eilu, both are the word of God.
To solve the problem of eilu v' eilu, one of the sages says this: Torah was given on 98 different levels. That means there are different levels in Torah. At each level, the practical manifestation will be different. If there is an argument between the house of Hillel and the house of Shammai, in 49 levels up there, the halacha follows Shammai. In 49 levels, we do like Hillel, and all levels are 100% right. We can only follow one of those 98 levels at any given time, but those other rulings and interpretations are not wrong. They are just attached to a different level.

So even according to the Rabbis, there are many different, coherent bodies of law. That way, Israel can follow one set of rulings in one age and another set of rulings in another age. If this is the case, what is the problem with Jesus interpreting the law of Moses? On this system, perhaps Jesus' rulings are one of those levels. So I don't even see why a Rabbi would even give such an objection.

What about the idea that all of the "forever" laws in the Pentatuch are eternal and immutable? Let's take a look at the Bible.

It shall be a statute forever throughout your generations, in all your dwelling places, that you eat neither fat nor blood.
(Leviticus 3:17)

And the context does not restrict this to the priestly class, either. This is a command for all of Israel. No cholent for you!

But of course, we have to ask the question. Did Jesus even resort to something as drastic as changing the law? Let's examine the claims in order.

First up, Matthew 12. The passage says nothing about whether or not Jesus gave his disciples permission to pluck the heads of grain, but just that the disciples did so. No explicit violation of the Mosaic law has occurred. Instead the disciples are violating a Pharisaic interpretation of the law, and not the law itself. Also, nobody is stealing from the fields. Leviticus 19 allows people to take the grain from the edges of the fields.

In Mark 2, there is no indication that it was a fast day on the Jewish calendar. Mark states that the Pharisees and disciples of John were fasting, not the whole of Israel. This was a voluntary fast. No law was broken here.

In Mark 7, Jesus is declaring that it is not food that makes someone spiritually unclean, but wicked speech. The side comment that Jesus declared all foods clean is Mark's interpretation, if it was even in the original text at all (and there is strong reason to doubt this). Even if it was, it could easily be interpreted as Mark's suggestion to his gentile readership that they need not follow the Jewish dietary laws, which would have cut these gentiles off from their families and communities.

And besides, Midrash Tehillim 146:4 asks: "What is meant by '[The Lord] frees the prisoners'?" The answer given is: "Some say that every creature that is considered unclean in the present world, the Holy one blessed be He will declare clean in the age to come." So the idea of changing the dietary laws is not foreign to the Rabbis themselves. Remember that Blech's objection is not that changing the dietary laws is inconsistent within the Christian system. Blech's objection is that it is inherently wrong to change the dietary law. And to any follower of Rabbinic tradition, this objection is untenable.

The reference to 1 Timothy is an attack on Paul, not Jesus, and it misunderstands Paul's view of the law. Here is the whole paragraph:

Now we know that the law is good, if one uses it lawfully, understanding this, that the law is not laid down for the just but for the lawless and disobedient, for the ungodly and sinners, for the unholy and profane, for those who strike their fathers and mothers, for murderers, the sexually immoral, men who practice homosexuality, enslavers, liars, perjurers, and whatever else is contrary to sound doctrine, in accordance with the gospel of the glory of the blessed God with which I have been entrusted.
(1 Timothy 1:8-11)

Paul did not hate the law. He explicitly said that the law is good. He also mentioned that the laws of Moses, as well as law in general, exists because of human wickedness. If we were all perfectly righteous, perhaps life would be more like it was in Eden, where a very simple body of law was all that was needed.

When you read passages such as the long passage I cited in Understanding Judaism, remember that the Rabbis and skeptics alike take a lot of creative liberty, quoting short passages and adding a whole lot of their own personal commentary, until the passage they are quoting doesn't even resemble its original meaning in the context of the New Testament. Watch out for this when reading Rabbinic literature.

Internet Infidels Cannot Argue Consistently

In a previous video, I argued that Jewish anti-missionaries often argue inconsistently, holding the New Testament to a level of skepticism to which they would never hold their own writings.

At least the Internet Infidels do not have the same problem. They are willing to hold any religious text to the same level of scrutiny. Yet I still think that these skeptics are just as inconsistent, and deceptively so, as the anti-missionaries.

Skeptic John Loftus loves to bash Christian apologists for doing what he calls a "retreat to the possible." Instead of offering an answer to the skeptic's objection, the apologist will instead insist that as long as a solution to the problem is possible (e.g. the problem of evil), then the objection fails.

This complaint, I believe, is unwarranted. It confuses two different types of possibility: epistemic possibility and metaphysical possibility. If something is epistemically possible, then for all we know, it could be true. If something is metaphysically possible, then it is both logically coherent and does not contradict a known necessary truth. If our retreat to the possible is a retreat to epistemic possibility, then I agree that this may very well be an argument from ignorance. If it is a retreat to metaphysical possibility, then the argument is not from ignorance. It is a demonstration that two concepts (e.g. God and evil) are not logically incompatible.

However, many skeptics will give the same argument from ignorance, a retreat to the epistemically possible, of which they accuse Christian apologists. Just think with me a minute about some of the arguments for God. There's the Leibnizian Cosmological Argument, where everything needs an explanation for its existence, and demonstrates that God's existence is self-explanatory while the physical world's existence is not. There's the Kalam Argument where the physical world's origin entails its cause. There is the Teleological Argument where the fine-tuning of the constants and quantities at the beginning of the universe point to design. There are moral, aesthetic and is-ought arguments which demonstrate that certain values that we have to believe in to live out our lives are both mind-dependent and objective. Hence, only an eternal and perfect mind can explain them. There are entire families of epistemic arguments which show that our beliefs in inductive reasoning, the reliability of our mental faculties, and the reliability of our sense perception are unjustified without God. Finally, there is the Ontological Argument, of which I have made two videos, which shows that our modal intuitions entail the existence of God.

Alvin Plantinga's Two Dozen or so Theistic Arguments

The responses from skeptics are numerous. They object to the fact that the second law of thermodynamics gives us a finite past, by arguing that someone might hypothetically be able to construct a perpetual motion machine based on Brownian motion. They object to the expansion of the universe entailing its beginning by appealing to wildly speculative scenarios based on certain variations of string theory. They argue that teleological arguments are invalid because you cannot calculate the probability of an event after it has occurred. They argue that moral values are either not mind-dependent after all, or that they they are not objective. All of these objections seem to be pretty desperate and implausible. the question is: how do we show the absurdity of these objections?

I think the solution is simple: Ask the skeptic if he or she would accept the same line of reasoning for Young Earth Creationism. This is not to knock Young Earth Creationism (although I myself am an Old Earth Creationist), but to use it as an example. Because if there is one thing that atheists and other "non-prophets" hate, it is Young Earth Creationism!

If the skeptic says that the physical world came into existence uncaused and not out of anything and just happened to have the fine-tuning of values such as the expansion, argue that perhaps the world came into existence 6,000 years ago, uncaused and out of nothing. Or perhaps our solar system came into existence 6,000 years ago as a result of a random collision of particles. The probability that our solar system formed this way is not zero. If they object and say that the universe or the world looks older, tell them that all possible configurations are unlikely, the way any given hand in poker is as unlikely to be dealt to you as a royal flush. Besides, you cannot calculate the probability of an event after it has occurred.

Some skeptics in response to the scientific evidence for the beginning of the universe will say that it's possible that we may one day come up with a new model that proves the eternality of the universe. Well, science is always changing. It's also possible that scientists may one day come up with a discovery that proves the universe is 6,000 years old and that all species were created in their current form.

If they object to the existence of objective moral values, saying that they are mere instincts, tell them you intend to convince your family and friends of Young Earth Creationism by any means necessary. Who cares if you intend to be less than honest in giving all the facts? Our ideas of morality are just evolved instincts, anyway. It's not like they are obligatory.

One skeptic objected to the Ontological Argument by stating that I have not proven beyond a doubt that my premises are true. He argued that the premises need to be known with certainty in order for the Ontological Argument to be a sound argument. This is a terrible misunderstanding of the nature of arguments.

In a valid deductive argument, it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false, therefore it is irrational to believe the premises and deny the conclusion. You do not need to be certain of the premises in order for the argument to be sound. If certainty was the criterion for a good argument, there would be almost no good arguments. Instead, the premises of the argument merely need to be more plausible than their negations. As long as you believe the premises, you cannot deny the conclusion.

Always ask yourself whenever you face a skeptic's objection: what if it was the other way around? Would they tolerate this kind of reasoning if it was used against them? If not, then their objection is untenable, as inconsistency is a sure sign of a failed argument.