Pascal's Wager Against Calvinism

One of the more inventive arguments for the existence of God is an argument invented by Blaise Pascal. At the end of his life, Pascal wrote out various thoughts on the big questions of life, such as whether or not God exists. His pragmatic argument, known as Pascal's Wager, is an argument for people who have heard his arguments for the Christian faith and were still indecisive about it.

Pascal asked his audience to construct a chart, labeling one axis objective and another subjective. Label one "God exists" and the other "God does not exist" On the subjective axis, label one "follow God" and the other "do not follow God"

If you choose to follow God, then you have infinite to gain if you are right and only finite loss if you are wring. If you choose not to follow God, you have finite to gain if you are right and infinite loss if you are wrong.

The main objection to this argument is the trickster deity approach. The trickster deity will send you to heaven if you are an atheist and to hell if you are a theist. Does this refute Pascal's Wager?

Hardly.

In order for this objection to work, the trickster god has to be as likely to exist as the God of the Bible. However, I have given arguments for the existence of an omniperfect God, which if successful exclude the possibility of a trickster god. Even if those arguments fail, Pascal's Wager gives the unbeliever a very heavy burden of proof. That unbeliever has to give arguments for the existence of the trickster god that are at least as strong as arguments for the God of theism. Otherwise, one can argue that since there are better arguments for God than for the trickster deity, theism is more likely to be true and therefore is the wiser bet.

All of this is well and good, but how does it apply to Calvinism? I'm glad you asked. One of the key prooftexts for Calvinism is Romans 9:16, which in the ESV states "So then it depends not on human will or exertion, but on God, who has mercy." History has given a myriad of interpretations regarding what exactly "it" is. It could be national election, or election to service, or the circumstances in which you are born, or God's criteria as to which people get saved. Also, some of the "not...but" verses in the Bible, such as John 6:27 (Do not work for the food that perishes, but for the food that endures to eternal life) do not exclude the "not" section but merely de-emphasize it.

However, Calvinists insist that Romans 9:16 states that the salvation of individuals does not depend in any way on human will or exertion. Can we come up with a practical argument to reinforce other arguments? No. But we don't have to, because Pascal already has. Assume that salvation either does or does not involve human will, and assume that we can choose either to believe it or not to believe it.

If it does involve human will and we believe it, our belief bolsters our evangelism and apologetics efforts and more people receive salvation.
If it does not involve human will and we believe that it does, our belief bolsters our evangelism and apologetics efforts and no fewer people receive salvation.
If it does involve human will and we do not believe that it does, our belief harms our evangelism and apologetics efforts and fewer people receive salvation.
If it does not involve human will and we do not believe that it does, our belief harms our evangelism and apologetics efforts and no fewer people receive salvation.

From a practical standpoint, we should believe that salvation does involve human will and exertion. We have everything to gain if we are right, and little to lose if we are wrong.

How might the Calvinist respond to these charges? The first is that belief that human will affects salvation robs God of his glory. Even if true, this objection hardly defeats the argument. Would you rather risk robbing God of some of his glory for a finite period of time (until you go to heaven and God corrects you), or risk souls spending eternity in hell for an infinite period of time?

Another objection is that practical arguments should not shape our beliefs. However, no one lives this way. If you see a lump on your skin, and there's only a 10% chance that it is a malignant tumor, and a 90% chance that it is benign, should you then assume on the basis of probability that it is benign and simply ignore it? Another example is the insurance industry. There is only a small chance that your home will be destroyed by a natural disaster, but does that justify not getting insurance? Because the payoffs are unequal, a prudent individual will seek to minimize risk and maximize reward. Similarly, practical-minded individuals will assume that libertarian free will plays a role in salvation and will bias his thinking in favor of it. They will assume free will, and give the free will position every benefit of the doubt.

Similarly, if the God of the Bible is more likely to exist than trickster deities, then prudent individuals should give theism every benefit of the doubt.

James Galyon objects to an older version of the argument, declaring that the Synod of Dort states that evangelism makes a difference in the salvation of the evangelized. Much of his argument is based on a misunderstanding of this wager, and I will admit his misunderstanding is my fault. The original version of this argument was a bit vague. My argument is not that Calvinist denominations ignore the call to evangelism and apologetics. Indeed, James White, a borderline hyper-Calvinist is perhaps the best counter-cult apologist in the Western world.

My argument is that (1) if salvation does not depend on human will or exertion, it is logically impossible that any human choice (including evangelism) could make any difference in anyone's salvation (if it could, then election would be conditional), and (2) how we do evangelism and apologetics is hugely impacted by our views on this issue. If we believe that people can be argued into or out of the right beliefs through reason and evidence, then we would put a lot more effort into those areas.

Beliefs very much affect our behaviors and motivations. As Alvin Plantinga said: "I would not go to the refrigerator to get a beer if I believed that beer did not exist." Similarly, the consequences of our actions do impact human behavior, whether or not they ideally should do so. Digging a ditch only to fill it again is demoralizing, and a vicious form of punishment. If Americans believed that visiting the moon again would lead to enormous scientific breakthroughs, I guarantee that NASA would not be hurting for funding the way it is now. Our beliefs about the consequences of our actions significantly affect our actions and motivations.

The mere mandate to proclaim the gospel to all simply does not have the motivating power as the belief that how we present, how we argue, whether our apologists win debates, and the skill of our salesmanship all make a difference in the salvation of others.