The Ontological Argument for the Triune God

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The Ontological Argument is a purely a priori logical argument that operates like a mathematical proof. It derives the existence of a perfect being from the laws of modal logic themselves. It's a technical argument for the existence and properties of God. That's why this is my favorite argument for the existence of God, because it goes beyond fallible evidence and when understood correctly, is virtually impossible to argue against.

In the field of philosophical theology, there are two competing definitions of God. In creator theology, God is defined as "the creator of all that is not God." In perfect being theology, God is defined as "A Maximally Great Being" which means that God possesses all great-making, properties such as love, knowledge, and power, and possesses each in a maximal way. He also possesses no flaws, such as immorality. He would be all-powerful, all-loving, and all-knowing. I intend to show you three things about this Maximally Great Being:

This video will present and defend three points:
1. A Maximally Great Being Exists (hence, perfect being theology is correct)
2. Only one Maximally Great Being can possibly exist (hence monotheism is true)
3. A Maximally Great Being must be multipersonal (the being must exist in two or more persons)

Let's start defining things before we get into the argument. First up: possible world. A possible world is basically a hypothetical situation. Calling it a possible world is not to say that such a world actually exists. It's just a description of what reality might be; a way for philosophers to see what ideas are coherent and what ideas are not. If something is possible, then we say that it exists in some possible world.

In metaphysics, the term "possible" has a different meaning than in epistemology. In epistemology, you could look at a difficult math problem and say "it's possible that there is a solution for it" which is like saying "for all I know, there is a solution to this problem." In metaphysics, something is possible if it is logically coherent. For example, my wearing a red shirt is possible, but the existence of square circles is not metaphysically possible.

If something is possible, it exists in a possible world. Rolling a six on a die is one example. If something is necessary, it exists in all possible worlds. The laws of mathematics are examples of this. If something is contingent, it exists in some possible worlds but not in others. If something is impossible, then it exists in no possible worlds. A square circle would be an example of this.

Next up entailment. Entail means "to imply necessarily." For example, shape entails size. If something has a shape, it necessarily has a size. After that: Great-making properties. A great-making property is a property that it is better to have than to lack. A lesser-making property is a property that it is better to lack than to have. A neutral property is one that is neither. Maximal greatness is the state of having all great-making propertries, and to their maximal extent. It also means having no lesser-making properties. One of these properties is necessity. Nothing that exists contingently can be maximally great. This is not to say that something has to exist to be maximally great. Instead, if something maximally great exists, then its existence is either necessary or impossible.

Now one Immanuel Kant's objections to an obsolete version of this argument is that existence is not a property. This is true. And this argument does not assume that it is. It is immune to the classic criticisms of Anselm's ontological argument.

Necessity is a property. Existence is not. Necessity does not entail existence. Necessity just means that if something exists, it exists in all possible worlds. Numbers have this property.

Now on to the Ontological Argument itself. This argument has five premises, which if true, entail the conclusion.

Premise 1: It is possible that a Maximally Great Being (MGB) exists
Premise 2: If it is possible that a MGB exists, then a MGB exists in some possible world
Premise 3: If a MGB exists in some possible world, then a MGB exists in all possible worlds
Premise 4: If a MGB exists in all possible worlds, then a MGB exists in the actual world
Premise 5: If a MGB exists in the actual world, then a MGB exists
Conclusion: A MGB exists.

Premises 2 through 5 are pretty uncontroversial in academia. They are just restatements of the laws of modal logic, accepted by theist and atheist philosophers alike. The controversy is in Premise 1. Is it possible (metaphysically) that a Maximally Great Being exists. I think that on the face of it, we have good reason to believe that it is true. As long as the concept of a Maximally Great Being is coherent, and does not violate any known necessary truths, then Premise 1 is true. A school of philosophy called "natural atheology" has attempted to build arguments against the coherence of a Maximally Great Being, but this project has been all but abandoned. Richard Swinburne explains why in his book: The Coherence of Theism.

But I think we can advance an argument in favor of Premise 1, that will make it airtight. It was developed by Robert Maydole and is called the Modal Perfection Argument. For the sake of this argument, we can go with the following definitions:

Great-making property: A property that an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, and metaphysically necessary being must have.
Lesser-making property: A property that an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, and metaphysically necessary being cannot have.

Here is how it works:

1. If a property is a great-making property, its negation is a lesser-making property
2. Great-making properties do not entail lesser-making properties
3. Maximal Greatness is a great-making property
Hence, Maximal Greatness cannot entail its negation of non-Maximal Greatness.

It is perfectly within the laws of modal logic for a property (which is not a perfection) to entail its negation. If a property is an incoherent (or impossible) property (square-circleness is an example, so we'll call this S), then it's necessary that everything has the negation of S (we'll call this ~S) as a property. That's what it means for a property to be impossible. But if everything has ~S, that means that every property entails ~S. If it didn't, then something could have some other property and not have ~S, which means it would have S, which means S would be a possible property. But if every property entails ~S, then S also entails ~S. This is consistent with the Principle of Explosion, which states that if you assert a contradiction, you can logically infer anything from it.

Hence, if it is impossible that a Maximally Great Being exists, then necessarily, nothing has Maximal Greatness. Hence, all things have non-Maximal Greatness. Hence, all properties entail non-Maximal Greatness, including Maximal Greatness. But we just established that Maximal Greatness cannot entail non-Maximal Greatness.

For the minority of philosophers who deny the principle of explosion, here is another way to view the argument. If Maximal Greatness is an impossible property, then all properties entail non-Maximal Greatness. Hence, no property can be a great-making property. But this is absurd. It would mean that some properties such as goodness, intelligence, and wisdom are not better to have than to lack. So again, there is no way that Maximal Greatness is an impossible property.

But that would mean that its is possible that a Maximally Great Being exists. And therefore such a being exists in some possible world, and therefore in every world, and therefore in this world. And since some of these properties such as omnipotence, omniscience, and moral perfection entail personality, then it follows that this Maximally Great Being must be personal. But that's the definition of a personal God. Hence, perfect being theology is correct.

Let's go through a few of the common objections. The first is Dawkins' own delusional objection. In The God Delusion, Richard Dawkins attempts to use this argument to disprove the existence of God. He says that if God is the greatest possible being, then wouldn't it be greater for God to not exist and still bring the universe into being? But far from undermining the Ontological Argument, it shows its coherence.

To answer Dawkins: Greater? Maybe. Possible? No. For in what possible world does a non-existent being exist?

What about a Maximally Great Pizza or a Maximally Great Bird? The problem with positing anything physical, is that physical things are dependent on space for their existence. And we know from modern cosmology that space once existed as a singularity, and no bird or pizza in such a state would even be a bird or a pizza. So the idea of a necessarily existing physical thing is undercut.

But how do we know that only one Maximally Great Being exists? Some of the properties possessed by a Maximally Great Being cannot exist in more than one being in any possible world. Omnipotence is one example. If multiple beings are omnipotent, then a logical contradiction follows if their wills come into conflict. If one omnipotent being chooses to bring about a state of affairs where a green elephant exists, then such a state of affairs will be actualized. But if another omnipotent being in the same world wants to bring about a state of affairs where a green elephant does not exist, then that state of affairs will be actualized. So in this world, a green elephant would both exist and not exist, but no possible world can contain such a contradictory state of affairs. So no possible world can have multiple omnipotent beings. Hence, there can only be one God.

Alexander Pruss presents the same idea worded differently: "Omnipotence requires perfect freedom and an e fficacious will. But there cannot be two beings with perfect freedom and an e fficacious will. For if they are perfectly free, they will be able to will incompatible propositions to be true, and then one of their wills shall have to fail to be e fficacious. (This argument assumes that we are individuating beings in such a way that distinct beings with will have their own will. If God is a Trinity, the persons of the Trinity do not have distinct wills, and hence will not count as distinct beings in our sense.)"

Robert Maydole's solution is to add the premise:
4. Being Supreme is a great-making property
Since being supreme entails that all other beings are inferior, only one MGB can exist! Again, there can only be one God.

Finally, what about a unitarian or uni-personal God? I'm afraid such a being, too would not be Maximally Great. For at least one of the properties of such a being, love, is problematic. In order to be necessarily loving, God must be loving in all possible worlds. Since all that is not God is subject to the creative and destructive power of the omnipotent one, God can be the only necessarily existing being. This means that there are possible worlds where God alone exists. But is God loving in those worlds? It would make no sense to say that God is loving in a state of affairs where only he exists. Does he love himself? Self-love doesn't sound like love. Love has to be expressed between one person and another in order to be true love. But that means that God must exist in at least two persons, if not more. Hence, unitarianism is false.

I want to remind all my viewers that both of these arguments are logically valid deductive arguments. You cannot avoid the conclusion of this argument without denying at least one of the premises. And in order to justify that denial, you have to show that the negation is more plausible than the premise itself. But I think to any fair-minded individual, all premises presented are pretty obviously true. And with this sequence, we have a logical proof of the existence of God. The Triune God of Scripture lives, and atheism is toast.

Part 2 (The S5 Objection and de re modality) is here!
Part 3: The Greatness Objection

Consistency

When watching, listening to, or reading religious debate, you will need to look for one thing: consistency. It is one of the marks of a good argument. Holding one standard for evidence that supports your view and another standard for evidence that opposes your view is a fallacy so common in bad argumentation that it has its own name: special pleading.

When attacking the New Testament, the anti-missionary will engage in special pleading in a variety of ways. Hyper-literalism, the Bible Difficulties game, accusations of altering and misquoting the Tanakh, raiding the higher criticism of liberal scholars, and finally through the Zeitgeist game, where they try to connect the New Testament to pagan mythology.

On what consistent basis can an anti-missionary reject the inspiration of the New Testament? I have yet to meet a consistent Orthodox anti-missionary, one who is willing to hold one and only one standard of criticism, one set of presuppositions, one level of skepticism to apply to both the Tanakh and the New Testament. It intellectually dishonest to assert without question that the Tanakh is the infallible word of God and then put the New Testament on trial for its life, presuming it guilty until proven innocent. I believe most anti-missionaries are aware of the difference between humanistic and naturalistic scholarship that begins with the assumption that God has not and cannot speak, and scholarship that does not determine what God cannot do right from the start.

If the anti-missionaries want to hold the New Testament to the same standard as the Tanakh, they will be willing to harmonize the text, give flexibility in its interpretation, and give the authors the benefit of the doubt when assessing their motives, as they do with their own Scriptures. If they are unwilling to do so, then we know the anti-missionary position is untenable. Inconsistency is a sign of a failed argument.

If the words of the New Testament are to be contradicted in regards to their validity and historical value, the anti-missionary will have to do more than point out that liberal, secular scholars tend to disagree with works that claim to be inspired. That is a given. Without hard, manuscript evidence that the text has been altered, accusations that certain parts of the New Testament were changed later on remain nothing more than pure speculation.

In attempting to discredit the New Testament, the anti-missionary will apply inconsistent standards being flexible and gracious when interpreting the Tanakh, Talmud, and Rabbinic writings while offering no flexibility when interpreting the New Testament. They will use quotes such as "If your eye causes you to sin, cut it out" or "Give away everything you have" then fault us for not following it. They will suggest that accounts such as the resurrection are hopelessly contradictory and cannot be historical. They will also accuse the New Testament writers of misquoting the Tanakh, and sometimes even deliberately changing the Word of God.

However, all of these issues have parallels in the Tankah itself. The opening chapter of Genesis indicates a 6 day creation process, and the Talmud interprets day as a 24 hour period of time. The Torah declares an eye for an eye, allows slavery and orders the extermination of the Canaanites. How literally do you want to take these passages? If you want some flexibility in interpretation so you are not chopping people's hands off, please give the same courtesy to the New Testament.

As far as the Bible Difficulties game is concerned, placing Samuel and Kings on one side and the Chronicles on the other, an uncharitable interpreter can alledge all sorts of contradictions. Did Jesse have eight sons or seven sons? Did Solomon have 40,000 horses or 4,000? Did Jehoram son of Jehosophat begin his reign before or after Jehoram son of Ahab? It depends on which account you view. In fact, imagine a world in which these books of the Chronicles do not appear in the Tanakh but instead appear in the New Testament. Is there any doubt these would be the focal point of anti-missionary attacks? While I beleive all these issues in the Chronicles are able to be harmonized by a charitable interpreter, the same goes for the New Testament.

Does paraphrasing a text mean that you are maliciously altering it? If you think so, then you will have to throw the Tanakh away as well. 2 Chronicles 25:4 is written slightly differently than Deuteronomy 24:16. Also, remember Matthew's quote "he will be called a Nazarene" Is this evidence of misquoting the prophets? Not unless you are willing to discredit Ezrah 9:10-12 as well.

The Zeitgeist game basically is the assertion that the life of Jesus in general and his resurrection in particular is derived from pagan mythology. This is not a new theory, but is characteristic of the old history of religion school of thought at the beginning of the 20th century. Scholars in comparative literature ransacked pagan mythologies to try to find parallels to Christian beliefs. The movement soon collapsed for two reasons:

1. Scholars realized that the supposed parallels were superficial. The ancient world was filled with mythologies of every kind. When you look at these myths carefully, you find great diversity among them. Some are mythical symbols of the crop cycle, in the case of Tammuz and Osiris and Adonis. Some are apotheosis tales of the assumption of the hero into heaven, as in the case of Hercules. Some are emperor woship stories as is the case with Caesar. None of these are parallel to the Jewish idea of resurrection. None of them are true parallels to the life of Jesus of Nazareth. Describing pagan myths using New Testament vocabulary as we see in conspiracy movies like Zeitgeist is nothing more than pure charlatanism.

2. There is no causal connection between pagan myths and the New Testament writings. Jews found these pagan myths abhorrent. This is why Jewish writers such as Philo and Josephus refused to immortalize or deify Moses. This is why there is no evidence of cults of dying and rising gods in first century Palestine.

What the anti-missionary forgets is that the same line of reasoning was applied to the Tanakh. Scholars such as Joseph Campbell believed that the Pentatuch was borrowed from ancient semitic literature and was reactionary against rival mythologies, such as the stories of Marduk in Babylon as well as the epic of Gilgamesh to name just two. Is the anti-missionary willing to apply that kind of scholarship to the Tanakh? If not, why not?

Aah, but liberal branches of Judaism such as Reform, Conservative, Reconstructionist, and Humanistic Judaism are willing to hold Rabbinic literature and the Tanakh to the same standard of criticism as the New Testament, and have consistency in that area. However, in another area, they are even more inconsistent than the anti-missionaries. A common question Reform rabbis receive is "why don't Jews believe in Jesus" but to me a more interesting question is "why aren't Jews allowed to believe in Jesus" Why is it that members of liberal Jewish congregations lose positions of leadership and even their membership in a movement where belief in God (the first and most important commandment) is usually optional, and is generally forbidden in Humanistic Judaism?

Besides, most of the courses I have taken with Reform and Conservative rabbis have stressed again and again that Judaism is not about what you believe but about action. It is about identifying as part of a people group and adopting a choice of lifestyle, culture, language, food, and cycle of holidays. Christianity, particularly Evangelical Christianity, is not about culture but is mainly about creed. So why can't you adopt the creed of Christianity and place it within the culture of Judaism. How would that be any less legitimate than humanistic Judaism at least? I asked one Modern Orthodox Rabbi, who told me that in Modern Orthodoxy, you can adopt any interpretation of the Bible, and pretty much any theology you want. You just have to follow the lifestyle prescribed by the Rabbis (which now allows being both gay and orthodox), and not believe in the deity of Jesus...or Schneerson. In other words, it's arbitrary. It's inconsistent, and inconsistency is a sign of a failed argument.

Finally, it is important that we Christian apologists be as consistent as possible when we criticize other religions. In future videos when I criticize Talmudic Judaism, I will not give liberal critics of Rabbinic writings such as Jacob Neusner a free pass when they apply higher criticism to these texts. I am more than willing to allow for harmonization of the texts, and demand hard manuscript evidence whenever higher criticism asserts that the writings changed over time. Arguments that cut both ways and prove too much aren't of much use to anyone.

So in conclusion, when you hear an anti-missionary attacking the New Testament, you need to ask yourself "Would he be willing to do the same thing to his own scriptures?"