An Empiricist Objection to the Kalam Cosmological Argument

The Objection
On the Reasonable Faith page, Dr. Craig periodically gets this obnoxious objection, not from professional scholars, but from Internet Atheists. These atheists will argue that the reason we believe premise 1 of the Kalam argument is that we see things come into existence all the time. However, everything that we see beginning to exist does not come into being ex nihilo, but comes into being from pre-existing material stuff.

Therefore, the objection goes, we have no experience of things coming into being out of nothing, and therefore have no reason to believe that if something comes into being out of nothing, it has a cause.

Rationalism, Empiricism, and Neo-Kantianism
Before getting into this objection, we need to be clear regarding the different theories of knowledge proposed by philosophers.

Rationalism - Some of the ideas we have are innate, and may even be hardwired.

Empiricism - There is nothing in the intellect that is not first in the five senses.

Neo-Kantianism - The mind is hardwired with a categorical structure, and all sense experience is filtered through it.

Rationalism was the view of Plato and Descartes. Aristotle, Aquinas, and Hume all held to types of empiricism. Modern proponents of Neo-Kantianism include Stuart Hackett and William Lane Craig.

If rationalism is the case, then this objection may not even be relevant. One could state that our knowledge that things need a cause is innate knowledge. This is an objection from an empiricist viewpoint. An empiricist could say that the reason we know that things cannot come into existence without a cause is that we see things come into existence all the time, and always with a cause.

Efficient Cause vs. Material Cause
Aristotle wrote in his works on metaphysics, that there were multiple kinds of causation. For the purpose of this article, we will focus on two: efficient cause and material cause. A material cause is the stuff of which things are made. The bronze of a statue is the statue's material cause. The artisan's act of making the statue is the statue's efficient cause.

The objection to the Kalam argument is that all the reasons we have for positing an efficient cause of the universe apply equally well for a material cause. That objection may seem powerful at first blush.

The first thing one needs to note is that the objection doesn't actually defeat the argument. Even if successful, it would simply mean that we have to posit a material cause for physical reality, in addition to an efficient cause. In that case, we would have to bite the bullet and say that God created the universe Ex Deo instead of Ex Nihilo. There are many problems with an Ex Deo creation, but none are as severe as saying that things came into being by nothing and from nothing.

Such an inference might even be needed if we had no more reason to believe that the physical world lacked a material cause than we had to believe that it lacked an efficient cause. If we discovered that the universe (or multiverse) began to exist, and had no good reason to deny that it had a material cause, we would need to posit a material cause. This is because our experience indicates that when things begin to exist, they have a material cause and an efficient cause.

But do we really have to bite that bullet? I do not think so. Consider that arguments for the second premise of the Kalam argument are also arguments that the material stuff from which the physical world is composed is also finite in the past. The material stuff from which the physical world is composed is never quiescent (unlike an immaterial mind, which conceivably could be). Because of this, one cannot say that the material stuff from which the universe is made existed timelessly apart from the universe and entered into time with the origin of the unvierse. If the material began to exist, it could not have a material cause. This is because any material cause, by definition, is made of that material stuff. The same cannot be said of efficient causes.

This means that we are not on the same footing regarding the two causes. If we do not have any such argument against the existence of an efficient cause, the way that we do have arguments against a material cause. It might be more intuitive to posit a material cause, but the arguments for premise 2 do not allow us to do so. Hence, we are faced with a dilemma. Either:

A. The universe (or multiverse) had an efficient cause and not a material cause
or
B. The universe (or multiverse) had neither a material cause nor an efficient cause

Does our inability to posit a material cause eliminate the warrant we have to posit an efficient cause? I do not think so.

Thought Experiments for Why I Don't Think So
Suppose that you lived on a planet which had numerous periodic electrical storms. Every single time in your life that an electrical storm approached, you would smell the scent of ozone, feel the ground vibrate, see a flash of light in the sky and heard a crack of thunder. Furthermore, no other known thing could possibly produce that kind of smell, ground vibration, flash of light or crack of thunder except an approaching storm. Then, one day, you hear the crack of thunder, feel the ground vibrate, and see the flash of light but do not smell the ozone. Are the crack of thunder, flash of light, and feel of vibration evidence that an electrical storm is approaching?

Suppose you are at a camp. Every time that it is time for dinner. A siren goes out and three beacons flash from the top of the main building. Again, no other known thing produces a siren sound at that pitch or flashes of light at just that frequency. One evening, you hear the siren but only see two of the three beacons flashing. Are you still warranted in thinking it's time for dinner?

Suppose you are part of a primitive tribe. One day, you meet an outsider for the first time. You chat and he gives you a cellular phone to keep in contact and shows you how to use it. Every time the phone vibrates and rings, you receive a call. The phone does not vibrate or ring unless you are receiving a call. One day, you hear the phone ring. Is the ringing alone reason to believe that you are receiving a call?

Suppose that every time you observe something begin to exist, you observe a material cause and an efficient cause. One day, you learn that the world you inhabit began to exist without a material cause. Are you justified in inferring an efficient cause?

Trivial Objections to Kalam 
Additional Objections to Kalam