Additional Objections to the Kalam Cosmological Argument

Do Things Come Into Being?
One might object that things do not come into being. That objection seems bizarre, since it certainly looks like things began to exist. Did my coffee mug always exist? Did the Large Hadron Collider always exist? Did I always exist? It seems that they did. The objector can then try to get out of this problem  by saying that there really are no such things as chairs, coffee mugs, and hadron colliders. There are only particles arranged chair-wise, tree-wise, and coffee mug-wise. This view is called mereological nihilism.

It is difficult to take mereological nihilism seriously. If it is true, then nobody holds to it, because there are no people, only particles arranged person-wise. Why answer the objection if nobody has ever raised it?

If there are no objects composed of parts, but instead are only fundamental particles arranged in different ways, then the following six statements are not just false, but necessarily false:
(1)     The handle is part of the mug.
(2)     This cap is part of my pen.
(3)     The left half is your part of the cake.
(4)     The cutlery is part of the tableware.
(5)     The contents of this bag is only part of what I bought.
(6)     That area is part of the living room.

Another challenge to mereological nihilism is the possibility of gunk. This is not the sort of gunk that you might find on your shoe or in your sink. If something is made of atomless gunk then it divides forever into smaller and smaller parts—it is infinitely divisible. Normal matter is not made of gunk, nor is any known object. The challenge that gunk presents is that if gunk exists anywhere, even outside our universe, then mereological nihilism is false, since gunk cannot be broken down to any sort of fundamental particles or simples. Worse, if gunk is even possible, then it is possible for there to be distinct objects which are composed of parts.

However, abandoning mereological nihilism means we have to accept that new things come into being all the time. We do not simply rearrange particles in different configurations, but actually bring new objects into existence. Every time this happens, we assign causes to it. Hence, we really can cause new things to come into existence.

Quantum Physics
Opponents have objected that quantum physics provides a counterexample. This is simply a misunderstanding of how virtual particles are described. When a Uranium atom (for example) decays, the fact that the atom decayed at that specific time has no known cause. It appears to be a random event. The radiation from the decay does not come into being uncaused. The decay of the atom caused the radiation. Hence, the radiation is caused.

What about virtual particles? David Alpert writes:

Relativistic-quantum-field-theoretical vacuum states — no less than giraffes or refrigerators or solar systems — are particular arrangements of elementary physical stuff. The true relativistic-quantum-field-­theoretical equivalent to there not being any physical stuff at all isn’t this or that particular arrangement of the fields — what it is (obviously, and ineluctably, and on the contrary) is the simple absence of the fields! The fact that some arrangements of fields happen to correspond to the existence of particles and some don’t is not a whit more mysterious than the fact that some of the possible arrangements of my fingers happen to correspond to the existence of a fist and some don’t. And the fact that particles can pop in and out of existence, over time, as those fields rearrange themselves, is not a whit more mysterious than the fact that fists can pop in and out of existence, over time, as my fingers rearrange themselves. And none of these poppings — if you look at them aright — amount to anything even remotely in the neighborhood of a creation from nothing.

Why a Mind?
An objector may ask: why do we need to posit a mind to explain the beginning of time? Furthermore, the objector may press my statement about timeless matter. Why, exactly, can't matter exist timelessly apart from time and then become temporal?

Let's assume there is a universe where there is quiescent matter. The entire universe is static—one timeless state of affairs. On what grounds could such a universe ever become temporal? A set of timeless necessary and sufficient conditions does not produce a temporal result. Water, for example, cannot exist eternally or timelessly in a liquid state and then begin to freeze.

Even random effects still require time. The breakdown of a Uranium atom is controlled by time and functions in time. If it did not, there could be no such thing as a half-life. Besides, it is self-contradictory to say that some object is both unstable and quiescent.

Therefore, we cannot rely on material stuff to transition between a timeless state and a temporal state. Yet, if time had a beginning, there was such a transition.

What about an immaterial mind? Can that do any better? I think so, and so did Muhammad Al-Ghazali. He was responding to the objection by the Aristotelians "Why didn't God create the world sooner?"

The world came to existence whence it did, having the description with which it came to exist, and in the place in which it came to exist, through will, will being an attribute whose function is to differentiate a thing from its similar. If this were not its function, then power would be sufficient. But since the relation of power to to contraries is the same, there would be an inescapable need for a specifying agent that would specify one thing from its similar. . .Hence, someone's statement "Why did the will specifically relate to one of the two similars?" is akin to the statement "Why does knowledge entail as a requirement the encompassing of the object of knowledge as it is?" For one would reply "This is because 'knowledge' stands as an expression for an attribute that has this as a function." Similarly, "Will stands as an expression for an attribute whose function—nay, its essence—is to differentiate a thing from its similar."

In plain English, Ghazali is saying that the world came into being when it did because God has this attribute called "will" which allows a person to act arbitrarily. One might ask why "will" does this, and Ghazali said that such would be like asking why bachelors are unmarried. It is true by definition.
Rival philosophers argued that all action is motivated, and that there is no such thing as "will" as Ghazali described. They invoke a version of the Buridan's Ass paradox.

Affirming an attribute whose function is to differentiate a thing fom its similar is incomprehensible—indeed, contradictory. . .This is shown to be true by the fact that the expression "will" as applied to God is a borrowing from our "will." It is inconceivable of us that we would differentiate through will one thing from its similar. Indeed, if in front of a thirsty person there are two glasses of water that are similar in every respect in relation to his purpose of wanting to drink, it would be impossible for him to take either. Rather, he would take that which he would deem better, lighter, closer to his right side—if his habit was to move the right hand-or some such cause, whether hidden or manifest. Otherwise, differentiating something from its like is in no circumstance conceivable.

They state that no one is capable of genuinely arbitrary action. There is always some reason that someone will choose between two equally good and mutually exclusive options. Ghazali responds that even if this were true of humans, we do not have good reason to say it is true of God.

The first is regarding that your statement that this is inconceivable: do you know this through rational necessity or through theoretical reflection? It is impossible for you to appeal to either of these. Moreover, your using our will as an example constitutes a false analogy that parallels the analogy between human and divine knowledge. God's knowledge differs from human knowledge in matters we have already established. Why, then, should the difference between the divine and human in the case of the will be unlikely?

Furthermore, humans are capable of genuinely arbitrary action.

Even so, in our own human case, we do not concede that the choice between similar things is inconceivable. For we will suppose that there are two equal figs in front of someone gazing longingly at them, unable, however, to take both together. He will inevitably take one of them through an attribute whose function is to render a thing specific, differentiating it from its like. All the specifying things you have mentioned by way of goodness, proximity, and ease of taking we can suppose to be absent, the possibility of taking one yet remaining. You are, hence, left between two alternatives. You could either say that equality in relation to the individual's purpose is utterly inconceivable, which is sheer foolishness (the supposition of this equality being possible), or else, that if the equality is supposed, the man yearning for the figs would ever remain undecided, looking at neither through pure will and choice that are supposedly disassociated from the objective of taking one. This is also impossible, its falsity known by rational necessity.

 This is a complicated way of saying that there are situations where people have to choose between two mutually exclusive options. Furthermore, the paradox holds so long as both options are equally desirable. Very often we are faced with analysis paralysis and it sure seems like we are forced to decide arbitrarily. In absence of some knockdown refutation, that appearance should be assumed to be true.

Back to the beginning of time problem. We have to make a choice regarding why time began. We have three available options placed before us, and need to choose the best one. Randomness will not work, since random occurrence is essentially a function within time. A static physical state will not work, as no set of necessary and sufficient conditions can be both timeless and produce a temporal effect.

That leaves us with an unembodied mind. The idea is certainly coherent. We can conceive of existence as non-physical entities. Many Eastern religions, in fact, believe that the physical world is illusory. It also seems conceivable that a mind can be in a timeless state. People do something close to this in deep meditation. They try to hold their consciousness in as unchanging of a state as possible. Since we have physical bodies that affect our minds, it might not be possible for us to hold a completely unchanging conscious state. But if meditation can get us most of the way there, then it is certainly conceivable that a mind without the burden of a body could go all of the way there. That mind could then arbitrarily change its conscious state, and bring reality into time.

Conclusion: The Conjurer
A final way that someone might object is to define "cause" in a way that does not allow us to talk about something causing something else to come into existence. After all, doesn't the caused object already have to exist before a cause can act upon it?

Imagine a wizard who could conjure up all sorts of things. He waves his hand, does a short incantation, and an object appears. The object comes into existence, and there is no material stuff from which the object came. Is the wizard causing the objects to come into existence?

Furthermore, imagine that this wizard is part of an entire order of wizards, and all of them have this ability. One day, during a parade for the king, one of the wizards (we'll call him Bob) does a chant, waves his hands, and all of a sudden, a dagger appears in the king's back. Bob is gagged and subdued, and put to trial.

Imagine Bob's lawyer at the trial saying that Bob could not have caused that knife to appear in the king's back because it is logically absurd to say that objects can be caused to come into existence. Furthermore, imagine the lawyer arguing that because you cannot bring something into existence out of nothing, there is no basis for saying that Bob is responsible for the knife, rather than any other member of his order. Do you believe the arguments of Bob's lawyer?

The fact that we can describe a scenario like this coherently indicates that the idea of causing something to come into existence is coherent, even if the object did not come from pre-existing material. The fact that we laugh at the arguments of Bob's lawyer shows us that we can assign causes to things that come into existence. We can even have rational grounds for inferring who brought what into existence.

Trivial Objections to the Kalam Argument
An Empiricist Objection to the Kalam Argument