BioLogos: The Wolf in Sheep's Clothing

Faith and Science
Religious folk hold a variety of differing views on whether God used evolution in the creation process and if so, how it was used. My personal take on the issue is that of Old Earth Creationism, a view held by Gerald Schroeder and Hugh Ross, who have shared a platform together.
http://www.uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/astronomer-hugh-ross-and-physicist-gerald-schroeder-give-trotter-lecture-tonight-at-tamu/

Both are extremely knowledgeable about both Biblical interpretation and the scientific evidence on how we got here. I recommend viewing as many lectures as possible from both of them. There are also those who believe that all life evolved from a single-celled life form and yet believe that there is good reason to believe that divine intervention was involved. Many of these people fall under the Intelligent Design camp, such as William Dembski and Michael Behe. ID is compatible with universal common descent, and hence can be a type of theistic evolution.

The Odd One Out
There is this one group, BioLogos which rejects any inference to divine design behind the evolutionary process. The model holds to mainstream, secular science regarding the origin and diversity of life, and yet posits God as a metaphysical topping. This approach has drawn the ire of Young-Earth creationist groups:
http://www.answersingenesis.org/articles/am/v6/n4/blurring-the-line

Evangelical Theologians:
http://www.albertmohler.com/2010/11/09/no-pass-from-theological-responsibility-the-biologos-conundrum/

Old Earth Creationist groups:
http://www.reasons.org/blogs/take-two/checking-out-the-menu

The Intelligent Design community:
http://www.evolutionnews.org/2011/09/why_did_one_theistic_evolution050621.html

And even atheists:
http://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com/2013/10/26/biologos-eliminates-reader-comments/

The best explanation as to why both creationists (of all stripes) and the secularist crowd despise BioLogos comes from creation.com.
http://creation.com/biologos-evolutionary-syncretism

Albert Mohler summarizes the issue beautifully:

The BioLogos approach to the issue is now clear. They want to discredit evangelical objections to evolution and to convince the evangelical public that an acceptance of evolution is a means of furthering the gospel. They have leveled their guns at the Intelligent Design movement, at young earth creationism, and against virtually all resistance to the embrace of evolution.

As one Christian blogger noted, the effect is virtually the opposite:

By your compromise, (A) you are not winning them over, but (B) are signalling to them that they are winning you over. They will simply wait you out, until you continue in your process of jettisoning everything the world hates about you as a Christian.

And yet Jerry Coyne disagrees with BioLogos as well. First, one commenter at the BioLogos blog cuts through the smoke and gets to the heart of the problem:

Why has there not been eve one BioLogos column in the past 6 years that directly tackles the question of God's involvement in the evolutionary process? If BioLogos is not interested in producing an account of God's role in evolution that is compatible with the orthodox Christian faith, it has no raison d'etre. The question of how God is involved in the evolutionary process is absolutely central, and more so than any subsidiary question about genomes or fossils. BioLogos has failed to respond to every challenge it has received on that question.

Coyne agrees and then offers this brilliant insight:

All that Templeton money, all those electrons expended in the service of accommodation, and what does BioLogos have to show for it? Have they offered a consensus view on how God works through evolution? (For example, does God make mutations? And why all those extinct species?) Have they brought even one evangelical and creationist Christian around to evolution? In terms of converts per dollar, I suspect that Richard Dawkins is infinitely more efficient than BioLogos.

The reason BioLogos won’t succeed is because they have no consensus view to offer evangelicals: just an array of speculative and untestable options which are in various degrees unpalatable to everyone. Templeton should stop throwing money down this empty well.

Slifkin, Stump, Enns
It's a similar issue with Nathan Slifkin, also known as the Zoo Rabbi. If the goal of these organizations were simply to express a worldview that holds to faith in the Bible and to theistic evolution, that would not be especially problematic. Dinesh D'Souza, for example, is a staunch theistic evolutionist and also a defender of the Christian worldview against secularism.

The question is: why would any of this matter to an Old-Earth Creationist who deals with Jewish apologetics issues? The dirty little secret among these theistic evolution think tanks is that most of them are opposed to apologetics. Not just apologetics against evolution. Apologetics in its entirety.

Let me explain. I have spent a good teal of time in the past year conversing with theistic evolutionists in general and with BioLogos in particular. One conversation with their content director, James Stump was particularly enlightening. I asked about Alvin Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism. Stump said he would be teaching about it at Bethel College in the coming semester, and arguing that evolution is indeed compatible with naturalism. When I asked why, he said that it certainly does seem that we are material beings who evolved through natural selection. I then asked about arguments for the existence of God, which he rejects as well. I then asked about what arguments he would use to show that the Christian worldview is rationally superior to atheism. He said that there are none. Atheism is fully a rational and defensible worldview.

Remember that this is James Stump, a self-professed Evangelical Christian who teaches philosophy at Bethel College, an Evangelical Christian university. He is also an editor for Philosophia Christi, the trade journal of the Evangelical Philosophical Society. In his speech to the EPS, he told the group how he resented the heat which came down on him from the parents of his students. He also complained about the leaders of Bethel College pushing him out of teaching and into a more administrative role, wondering why this is the case.

Another representative of this movement is Peter Enns, who was a Vice President at BioLogos. Enns holds a particularly skeptical position toward the historicity of the Exodus, the invasion of Israel, and the historical reliability of the Tanakh in general. He also calls himself an Evangelical Christian. However, his biggest complaint about Evangelicals is that they allow their theology to influence their view of history. In other words, if secular scholarship holds a certain position on an issue like the historicity of Adam, the Exodus, the Davidic Kingdom, and the like, Christians must accept that view and adjust their theology accordingly.

In fact, as Dr. Mark Sprinkle of BioLogos states their position: "our theology is descriptive, not prescriptive; it is our collective and halting attempt to describe in coherent terms what we know of God by what we have seen of His acts and what we have read in His Word." This is to say that their theology must not, in advance, influence what they believe actually happened in history. That is what it means to be descriptive and not prescriptive.

Would You Hire a BioLogos Lawyer?
Imagine that your son was arrested on charges of murder, theft, battery, and sexual assault on a minor. At the trial, the prosecution gives arguments and evidence that your son is in fact guilty. When it is your side's turn to present evidence, your son's attorney gives the following speech:

I do believe that my client is innocent, but I do not think we can demonstrate them (or discount them) empirically. There are things we are to believe, but they cannot be shown on empirical grounds to be more true. Whether my client committed these crimes is a grand mystery and not open to empirical support.

There are some things, of course, that are open to some sort of empirical support, such as: was my client raised in a good home? was my client guilty of crimes other than the ones that the prosecution is charging?

In other words, some things can be tested and potentially verified through empirical means, but some things cannot. The core of my case cannot be tested that way, in my opinion, and showing empirically that my witnesses spoke of the past in a more story-like than historicisitic way does not in any way neuter the core.

So, how do we "know" my client is innocent? In an evidentialist sense, we don't. But a "knowing" that accesses the whole being--such as the defendant's families understand--is what you call metaphysical, and I would call mystical, i.e., is trans-rational (not anti-rational).

Can I demonstrate empirically that my client is innocent? On some levels, I would say yes, but on a most meaningful level, that my client's innocence is Truth, we demonstrate to others as my client and his family tell us to--die, serve, love, embody his goodness in all we do. Against such things there is no argument.

 This is nearly a verbatim quote from a chat I had with one of the BioLogos folk. The only difference is that instead of the client's innocence, it is the truth of the Christian worldview. Apologists are called to defend the Biblical view in the same way that attorneys are called to defend a set of facts. I hope you would not spend your hard-earned cash on a lawyer who would not even try to argue your son's innocence. So why would anyone who holds to a Biblical worldview do anything to help such an organization?

The Takeaway
 BioLogos desires the same relationship between faith in the private realm and faith in the public sphere that Dan Barker publicly proclaims when he speaks for the Freedom From Religion Foundation.

"If people want to stand on their heads and worship Mother Goose and speak in tongues, I don't care. That is their own private thing, if they want to believe in two gods, or three gods, or the Virgin Mary. But when their actions, coming from their religious teachings, result in consequences that cause avoidable harm, then we as moral people have an obligation, I think, to speak out against those actions."

 This, I think, is the goal of the theistic evolution movement. If you want to believe in God in private, go for it. The problem is when you let your belief in God affect your views on the origin of life and of its diversity. Believe in God in private, but don't think you can use science to argue for your belief. You can believe that God had some metaphysical providence regarding the origin of life, but don't you dare infer that it was an act of special creation. And don't you dare let us catch you using Alvin Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism, either. Theistic evolutionists don't believe in that "scientific apologetics" nonsense.

Additional Objections to the Kalam Cosmological Argument

Do Things Come Into Being?
One might object that things do not come into being. That objection seems bizarre, since it certainly looks like things began to exist. Did my coffee mug always exist? Did the Large Hadron Collider always exist? Did I always exist? It seems that they did. The objector can then try to get out of this problem  by saying that there really are no such things as chairs, coffee mugs, and hadron colliders. There are only particles arranged chair-wise, tree-wise, and coffee mug-wise. This view is called mereological nihilism.

It is difficult to take mereological nihilism seriously. If it is true, then nobody holds to it, because there are no people, only particles arranged person-wise. Why answer the objection if nobody has ever raised it?

If there are no objects composed of parts, but instead are only fundamental particles arranged in different ways, then the following six statements are not just false, but necessarily false:
(1)     The handle is part of the mug.
(2)     This cap is part of my pen.
(3)     The left half is your part of the cake.
(4)     The cutlery is part of the tableware.
(5)     The contents of this bag is only part of what I bought.
(6)     That area is part of the living room.

Another challenge to mereological nihilism is the possibility of gunk. This is not the sort of gunk that you might find on your shoe or in your sink. If something is made of atomless gunk then it divides forever into smaller and smaller parts—it is infinitely divisible. Normal matter is not made of gunk, nor is any known object. The challenge that gunk presents is that if gunk exists anywhere, even outside our universe, then mereological nihilism is false, since gunk cannot be broken down to any sort of fundamental particles or simples. Worse, if gunk is even possible, then it is possible for there to be distinct objects which are composed of parts.

However, abandoning mereological nihilism means we have to accept that new things come into being all the time. We do not simply rearrange particles in different configurations, but actually bring new objects into existence. Every time this happens, we assign causes to it. Hence, we really can cause new things to come into existence.

Quantum Physics
Opponents have objected that quantum physics provides a counterexample. This is simply a misunderstanding of how virtual particles are described. When a Uranium atom (for example) decays, the fact that the atom decayed at that specific time has no known cause. It appears to be a random event. The radiation from the decay does not come into being uncaused. The decay of the atom caused the radiation. Hence, the radiation is caused.

What about virtual particles? David Alpert writes:

Relativistic-quantum-field-theoretical vacuum states — no less than giraffes or refrigerators or solar systems — are particular arrangements of elementary physical stuff. The true relativistic-quantum-field-­theoretical equivalent to there not being any physical stuff at all isn’t this or that particular arrangement of the fields — what it is (obviously, and ineluctably, and on the contrary) is the simple absence of the fields! The fact that some arrangements of fields happen to correspond to the existence of particles and some don’t is not a whit more mysterious than the fact that some of the possible arrangements of my fingers happen to correspond to the existence of a fist and some don’t. And the fact that particles can pop in and out of existence, over time, as those fields rearrange themselves, is not a whit more mysterious than the fact that fists can pop in and out of existence, over time, as my fingers rearrange themselves. And none of these poppings — if you look at them aright — amount to anything even remotely in the neighborhood of a creation from nothing.

Why a Mind?
An objector may ask: why do we need to posit a mind to explain the beginning of time? Furthermore, the objector may press my statement about timeless matter. Why, exactly, can't matter exist timelessly apart from time and then become temporal?

Let's assume there is a universe where there is quiescent matter. The entire universe is static—one timeless state of affairs. On what grounds could such a universe ever become temporal? A set of timeless necessary and sufficient conditions does not produce a temporal result. Water, for example, cannot exist eternally or timelessly in a liquid state and then begin to freeze.

Even random effects still require time. The breakdown of a Uranium atom is controlled by time and functions in time. If it did not, there could be no such thing as a half-life. Besides, it is self-contradictory to say that some object is both unstable and quiescent.

Therefore, we cannot rely on material stuff to transition between a timeless state and a temporal state. Yet, if time had a beginning, there was such a transition.

What about an immaterial mind? Can that do any better? I think so, and so did Muhammad Al-Ghazali. He was responding to the objection by the Aristotelians "Why didn't God create the world sooner?"

The world came to existence whence it did, having the description with which it came to exist, and in the place in which it came to exist, through will, will being an attribute whose function is to differentiate a thing from its similar. If this were not its function, then power would be sufficient. But since the relation of power to to contraries is the same, there would be an inescapable need for a specifying agent that would specify one thing from its similar. . .Hence, someone's statement "Why did the will specifically relate to one of the two similars?" is akin to the statement "Why does knowledge entail as a requirement the encompassing of the object of knowledge as it is?" For one would reply "This is because 'knowledge' stands as an expression for an attribute that has this as a function." Similarly, "Will stands as an expression for an attribute whose function—nay, its essence—is to differentiate a thing from its similar."

In plain English, Ghazali is saying that the world came into being when it did because God has this attribute called "will" which allows a person to act arbitrarily. One might ask why "will" does this, and Ghazali said that such would be like asking why bachelors are unmarried. It is true by definition.
Rival philosophers argued that all action is motivated, and that there is no such thing as "will" as Ghazali described. They invoke a version of the Buridan's Ass paradox.

Affirming an attribute whose function is to differentiate a thing fom its similar is incomprehensible—indeed, contradictory. . .This is shown to be true by the fact that the expression "will" as applied to God is a borrowing from our "will." It is inconceivable of us that we would differentiate through will one thing from its similar. Indeed, if in front of a thirsty person there are two glasses of water that are similar in every respect in relation to his purpose of wanting to drink, it would be impossible for him to take either. Rather, he would take that which he would deem better, lighter, closer to his right side—if his habit was to move the right hand-or some such cause, whether hidden or manifest. Otherwise, differentiating something from its like is in no circumstance conceivable.

They state that no one is capable of genuinely arbitrary action. There is always some reason that someone will choose between two equally good and mutually exclusive options. Ghazali responds that even if this were true of humans, we do not have good reason to say it is true of God.

The first is regarding that your statement that this is inconceivable: do you know this through rational necessity or through theoretical reflection? It is impossible for you to appeal to either of these. Moreover, your using our will as an example constitutes a false analogy that parallels the analogy between human and divine knowledge. God's knowledge differs from human knowledge in matters we have already established. Why, then, should the difference between the divine and human in the case of the will be unlikely?

Furthermore, humans are capable of genuinely arbitrary action.

Even so, in our own human case, we do not concede that the choice between similar things is inconceivable. For we will suppose that there are two equal figs in front of someone gazing longingly at them, unable, however, to take both together. He will inevitably take one of them through an attribute whose function is to render a thing specific, differentiating it from its like. All the specifying things you have mentioned by way of goodness, proximity, and ease of taking we can suppose to be absent, the possibility of taking one yet remaining. You are, hence, left between two alternatives. You could either say that equality in relation to the individual's purpose is utterly inconceivable, which is sheer foolishness (the supposition of this equality being possible), or else, that if the equality is supposed, the man yearning for the figs would ever remain undecided, looking at neither through pure will and choice that are supposedly disassociated from the objective of taking one. This is also impossible, its falsity known by rational necessity.

 This is a complicated way of saying that there are situations where people have to choose between two mutually exclusive options. Furthermore, the paradox holds so long as both options are equally desirable. Very often we are faced with analysis paralysis and it sure seems like we are forced to decide arbitrarily. In absence of some knockdown refutation, that appearance should be assumed to be true.

Back to the beginning of time problem. We have to make a choice regarding why time began. We have three available options placed before us, and need to choose the best one. Randomness will not work, since random occurrence is essentially a function within time. A static physical state will not work, as no set of necessary and sufficient conditions can be both timeless and produce a temporal effect.

That leaves us with an unembodied mind. The idea is certainly coherent. We can conceive of existence as non-physical entities. Many Eastern religions, in fact, believe that the physical world is illusory. It also seems conceivable that a mind can be in a timeless state. People do something close to this in deep meditation. They try to hold their consciousness in as unchanging of a state as possible. Since we have physical bodies that affect our minds, it might not be possible for us to hold a completely unchanging conscious state. But if meditation can get us most of the way there, then it is certainly conceivable that a mind without the burden of a body could go all of the way there. That mind could then arbitrarily change its conscious state, and bring reality into time.

Conclusion: The Conjurer
A final way that someone might object is to define "cause" in a way that does not allow us to talk about something causing something else to come into existence. After all, doesn't the caused object already have to exist before a cause can act upon it?

Imagine a wizard who could conjure up all sorts of things. He waves his hand, does a short incantation, and an object appears. The object comes into existence, and there is no material stuff from which the object came. Is the wizard causing the objects to come into existence?

Furthermore, imagine that this wizard is part of an entire order of wizards, and all of them have this ability. One day, during a parade for the king, one of the wizards (we'll call him Bob) does a chant, waves his hands, and all of a sudden, a dagger appears in the king's back. Bob is gagged and subdued, and put to trial.

Imagine Bob's lawyer at the trial saying that Bob could not have caused that knife to appear in the king's back because it is logically absurd to say that objects can be caused to come into existence. Furthermore, imagine the lawyer arguing that because you cannot bring something into existence out of nothing, there is no basis for saying that Bob is responsible for the knife, rather than any other member of his order. Do you believe the arguments of Bob's lawyer?

The fact that we can describe a scenario like this coherently indicates that the idea of causing something to come into existence is coherent, even if the object did not come from pre-existing material. The fact that we laugh at the arguments of Bob's lawyer shows us that we can assign causes to things that come into existence. We can even have rational grounds for inferring who brought what into existence.

Trivial Objections to the Kalam Argument
An Empiricist Objection to the Kalam Argument

An Empiricist Objection to the Kalam Cosmological Argument

The Objection
On the Reasonable Faith page, Dr. Craig periodically gets this obnoxious objection, not from professional scholars, but from Internet Atheists. These atheists will argue that the reason we believe premise 1 of the Kalam argument is that we see things come into existence all the time. However, everything that we see beginning to exist does not come into being ex nihilo, but comes into being from pre-existing material stuff.

Therefore, the objection goes, we have no experience of things coming into being out of nothing, and therefore have no reason to believe that if something comes into being out of nothing, it has a cause.

Rationalism, Empiricism, and Neo-Kantianism
Before getting into this objection, we need to be clear regarding the different theories of knowledge proposed by philosophers.

Rationalism - Some of the ideas we have are innate, and may even be hardwired.

Empiricism - There is nothing in the intellect that is not first in the five senses.

Neo-Kantianism - The mind is hardwired with a categorical structure, and all sense experience is filtered through it.

Rationalism was the view of Plato and Descartes. Aristotle, Aquinas, and Hume all held to types of empiricism. Modern proponents of Neo-Kantianism include Stuart Hackett and William Lane Craig.

If rationalism is the case, then this objection may not even be relevant. One could state that our knowledge that things need a cause is innate knowledge. This is an objection from an empiricist viewpoint. An empiricist could say that the reason we know that things cannot come into existence without a cause is that we see things come into existence all the time, and always with a cause.

Efficient Cause vs. Material Cause
Aristotle wrote in his works on metaphysics, that there were multiple kinds of causation. For the purpose of this article, we will focus on two: efficient cause and material cause. A material cause is the stuff of which things are made. The bronze of a statue is the statue's material cause. The artisan's act of making the statue is the statue's efficient cause.

The objection to the Kalam argument is that all the reasons we have for positing an efficient cause of the universe apply equally well for a material cause. That objection may seem powerful at first blush.

The first thing one needs to note is that the objection doesn't actually defeat the argument. Even if successful, it would simply mean that we have to posit a material cause for physical reality, in addition to an efficient cause. In that case, we would have to bite the bullet and say that God created the universe Ex Deo instead of Ex Nihilo. There are many problems with an Ex Deo creation, but none are as severe as saying that things came into being by nothing and from nothing.

Such an inference might even be needed if we had no more reason to believe that the physical world lacked a material cause than we had to believe that it lacked an efficient cause. If we discovered that the universe (or multiverse) began to exist, and had no good reason to deny that it had a material cause, we would need to posit a material cause. This is because our experience indicates that when things begin to exist, they have a material cause and an efficient cause.

But do we really have to bite that bullet? I do not think so. Consider that arguments for the second premise of the Kalam argument are also arguments that the material stuff from which the physical world is composed is also finite in the past. The material stuff from which the physical world is composed is never quiescent (unlike an immaterial mind, which conceivably could be). Because of this, one cannot say that the material stuff from which the universe is made existed timelessly apart from the universe and entered into time with the origin of the unvierse. If the material began to exist, it could not have a material cause. This is because any material cause, by definition, is made of that material stuff. The same cannot be said of efficient causes.

This means that we are not on the same footing regarding the two causes. If we do not have any such argument against the existence of an efficient cause, the way that we do have arguments against a material cause. It might be more intuitive to posit a material cause, but the arguments for premise 2 do not allow us to do so. Hence, we are faced with a dilemma. Either:

A. The universe (or multiverse) had an efficient cause and not a material cause
or
B. The universe (or multiverse) had neither a material cause nor an efficient cause

Does our inability to posit a material cause eliminate the warrant we have to posit an efficient cause? I do not think so.

Thought Experiments for Why I Don't Think So
Suppose that you lived on a planet which had numerous periodic electrical storms. Every single time in your life that an electrical storm approached, you would smell the scent of ozone, feel the ground vibrate, see a flash of light in the sky and heard a crack of thunder. Furthermore, no other known thing could possibly produce that kind of smell, ground vibration, flash of light or crack of thunder except an approaching storm. Then, one day, you hear the crack of thunder, feel the ground vibrate, and see the flash of light but do not smell the ozone. Are the crack of thunder, flash of light, and feel of vibration evidence that an electrical storm is approaching?

Suppose you are at a camp. Every time that it is time for dinner. A siren goes out and three beacons flash from the top of the main building. Again, no other known thing produces a siren sound at that pitch or flashes of light at just that frequency. One evening, you hear the siren but only see two of the three beacons flashing. Are you still warranted in thinking it's time for dinner?

Suppose you are part of a primitive tribe. One day, you meet an outsider for the first time. You chat and he gives you a cellular phone to keep in contact and shows you how to use it. Every time the phone vibrates and rings, you receive a call. The phone does not vibrate or ring unless you are receiving a call. One day, you hear the phone ring. Is the ringing alone reason to believe that you are receiving a call?

Suppose that every time you observe something begin to exist, you observe a material cause and an efficient cause. One day, you learn that the world you inhabit began to exist without a material cause. Are you justified in inferring an efficient cause?

Trivial Objections to Kalam 
Additional Objections to Kalam

Trivial Objections to the Kalam Cosmological Argument

The Kalam Cosmological Argument is the most hotly debated argument for the existence of God in the philosophy of religion literature. The argument has gained its current level of popularity because it has recently received scientific confirmation that space itself began to exist. Here is a short introduction to the argument.


1. If something begins to exist, it has a cause of its existence
2. The universe (or multiverse) began to exist
3. Therefore the universe (or multiverse) had a cause

This has generated a lot of press, and with the introduction of the DrCraigVideos YouTube channel, it has taken a lot of criticism by YouTube atheists. Because the scientific evidence for the beginning of the universe is so powerful, Internet atheists have resorted to attacking Premise 1 of the argument.

There are two kinds of objections that I have noticed: non-trivial and trivial, at least in the way I am categorizing it. The philosophy of space and time gives arguments for different views of things like time and beginning to exist. The Kalam argument can be modified fairly easily in order to accommodate different theories. Objections that cannot be defeated by these accommodations are non-trivial. They affect any build of the argument, and hence need to be addressed. Trivial objections, on the other hand, can be handled pretty easily.

This is different than what Dr. Craig calls "stupid" objections to the Kalam argument, which are not in the professional literature but are on YouTube.



The objections addressed in this article are not "stupid" in that sense. They do not betray an amateurish misunderstanding of what is needed to understand Dr. Craig's argument. Instead, trivial objections are pretty easily defeated my modifying non-essential assumptions made by the argument. These trivial objections all have one thing in common: they presuppose the truth of one theory of time, while critiquing a version of the Kalam argument which holds to the opposite view.

Reductionism vs. Platonism
What if one day things everywhere ground to a halt? What if birds froze in mid-flight, people froze in mid-sentence, and planets and subatomic particles alike froze in mid-orbit? What if all change, throughout the entire universe, completely ceased for a period of, say, one year? Is such a thing possible? The answer depends on whether time is reductionist or Platonist. On a reductionist view, time is simply events. This position has been held by Aristotle and others, who have argued that time does not exist independently of the events that occur in time. There is no such thing as time without events or time without changes in the state of affairs. On Platonism, time is like an empty container. Platonism is something closer to the view of Richard Swinburne or Brian Leftow.

Dr. Craig's version of the argument assumes a reductionist view of time, in the tradition of Aristotle and Augustine, as well as Alvin Plantinga. On this view, the universe does not exist within time, but instead, time exists within the universe. This means that time does not contain events. Time does not have to exist in order for an event to occur. Instead, the event and the change in the state of affairs creates time. It is not possible, on reductionism, to argue that time has to exist first in order for an event to occur.

On this view, "x Begins to exist" can be defined as "x exists at time t, and there is no time immediately prior to time t when x exists, and there is no state of affairs when x exists timelessly." That last part is important because until events occur, the state of affairs would be timeless.

So on this model, God exists timelessly, and the existence of time emerges from his act of creation.

Objections to the idea that God could create time assume a Platonic view of time, but the Kalam argument is easily modified to accommodate a Platonic theory. On the Platonic view, time either has a beginning or it does not. If it does, then time does not have to exist in order for events to occur, since the beginning of time would be an event, whether or not it is created. Skeptics may argue that it is incoherent to say that time has to exist in order for God to create time. If that is true, then it is equally true to say that time cannot have a beginning, since the beginning of time is just as much an event as the creation of time.

On Platonism, we can re-define "x Begins to exist" as "x exists at time t, and there is no time immediately prior to time t when x exists."

The definition is simpler. There is only one caveat with this theory of time. Since general relativity describes time according to the reductionist view, (1 second is defined as 9,192,631,770 periods of the radiation corresponding to the transition between the two hyperfine levels of the ground state of the cesium 133 atom.) we then have to posit a metaphysical time within which physical time exists. This metaphysical time cannot be defined in terms of seconds or minutes, and therefore apart from a physical world, it would be meaningless to talk about the passage of minutes and seconds. There would be nothing to differentiate minutes from seconds from centures, and hence it would be gibberish to say something like "why didn't God create the physical world sooner?"

In this view, God creates physical time from within metaphysical time. Since the past does not contain an infinite number of events, but instead only contains an undifferentiated and changeless existence, it is compatible with the arguments against the existence of an actual infinite.

Hence, the Kalam argument is compatible with both the reductionist and the Platonist theories of time.

A-Theory vs. B-Theory
One of the naive theories of time describes time as a train (the present) running along a set of tracks (the timeline). If we pick a point on the timeline, and ask "is this point in the past, present or future."One can answer "When the present has not yet reached that point, it is future. When the present has reached that point, it is present. When the present has passed the point, it is past." The problem with such an answer is that no point can be past and then be present and then be future, since we are talking about the same point in time!

This means that time has to be viewed either as the train, in which case only the present exists (A-Theory), or as the tracks, in which case the passage of time is not an objective feature of reality (B-Theory). Time, on the latter view, is more like space.

The Kalam argument, contra Dr. Craig's claims, is fully compatible with either theory of time. On the A-theory, objects begin to exist in exactly the way we think they do. There is no object, and then there is an object.

The B-Theory is the trickier part. A ruler does not really come into being at a certain point in space. It has a front edge to it. On the B-Theory, time is more like a fourth dimension of space, and objects that are not eternal in the past would have a front temporal edge.

We can then restate the argument:
1. If something has a temporal front edge, it has a cause of its existence
2. The universe (or multiverse) has a temporal front edge
3. Therefore the universe (or multiverse) had a cause

On this view, the denial of premise 1 would have exactly the same wacky consequences as it would on the original version of the argument. The B-Theory has to explain why there is continuity in the timeline. It has to explain why the configuration of reality at one point on the timeline depends on the configuration of reality at previous points on the timeline. There has to be some sort of connection that allows the past to cause the future to happen. In short, the B-Theory needs to explain why the timeline is like a single broomstick and not like pieces of different broomsticks glued together. A denial of premise 1, even on the B-Theory, would violate these explanations.

Hence, the Kalam is just as effective an argument on the B-Theory as it is on the A-Theory.

Continuous vs. Atomistic Time
Time is divisible. We can divide hours into half-hours, and minutes into half-minutes, and so on. The question is: can we continue to divide time, or is there a minimum unit of time? If time is infinitely divisible, then time is continuous. If there is a minimum unit of time, then time is atomistic (or discrete).

Victor Stenger objected to Dr. Craig's view of the big bang singularity because Craig holds that time is continuous, while Stenger's objection assumes that time is atomistic. Dr. Craig rightly noted that the objection is irrelevant to the Kalam argument.

In general relativity, it is assumed that space and time are continuous. Because of this and only because of this can we talk meaningfully about singularities. As space approaches a singularity, its curvature increases without limit. A singularity is not considered part of the spacetime but is considered an edge to the spacetime.

On the standard Big Bang model, one can trace time backwards, approaching the singularity as a backward edge, or stopping point. On atomistic views of space and time (e.g. loop quantum gravity), there can be no singularities. Instead, one simply traces time backward to the first unit, which serves as the beginning of time. As an aside, loop quantum gravity cannot rescue an infinite past, due to an effect called BKL chaos.

The arguments for the beginning of the universe are just as effective on atomistic time as they are on continuous time. The only difference is that the definition of a beginning has a very slight, but ultimately irrelevant difference.

Hence, the Kalam is just as sound an argument on atomistic time as it is on continuous time.

Conclusion
In conclusion, critics of the Kalam argument need to first recognize where they stand on these issues before beginning their critique. An objection to the reductionist version of the Kalam argument from the perspective of a Platonist isn't an objection to the Kalam argument at all. It is an objection to reductionism. Similar principles apply to other areas discussed here.

The Kalam Cosmological Argument is a much stronger argument than one might first think, since it is compatible with so many different views of space and time.

An Empiricist Objection to the Kalam Argument 
Additional Objections to Kalam

Chizuk Emunah Under the Microscope: Chapter 43

Chapter 43 is so short, that I am going to quote this passage in its entirety.

    Some small portion of Christians have reproached the Jews with the disbelief in the Apocryphal books; but such persons have been confuted by scholars of their own creed. The works comprised under the collective title "Apocrypha," were composed at a late period after the dispersion of Israel, when prophecy was totally extinct, and when inspiration no longer elevated the compositions of religious writers. The Apocrypha has, therefore, no claim on our religious reverence. Some of those books may have an historical foundation, others are based on fiction and mere invention; and the whole of the Apocrypha was composed in the Greek language, which language does not bear the stamp of authority in the mind of the Jew; we may therefore dismiss this subject without entering into further detail.

 Troki is absolutely correct, but there are some Christian sects, such as the Eastern Orthodox, who believe that the Apocrypha is canonical. The rest of this post will explain why these sects are wrong, and Troki is correct.

The Jewish tradition speaks of an era of prophecy lasting from Moses to Malachi. Since prophecy did not return until the age of the Apostles, book written in between cannot be inspired Scripture.
http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/14162-synagogue-the-great

One of the key marks of Scripture is its historical authenticity. As archaeology advances, and we learn more and more about the ancient world, our understanding conforms to the Bible's picture of that world. Even books like Daniel are increasingly being shown to be historically accurate regarding the kingdom of Babylon.

Judith, on the other hand, contains a massive historical blunder. "Now in the twelfth year of his reign, Nabuchodonosor king of the Assyrians, who reigned in Ninive the great city, fought against Arphaxad and overcame him (Judith 1:5)."Nebuchadnezzar was neither an Assyrian nor did he rule in Ninevah.

Secondly, books like the Maccabees recognize that the era of prophecy, and hence the era of written Scripture, has ceased. "And there was a great tribulation in Israel, such as was not since the day, that there was no prophet seen in Israel" (1 Maccabees 9:27).

The reference in Luke implies that the Hebrew Scriptures end with 2 Chronicles. "from the blood of Abel to the blood of Zechariah, who perished between the altar and the sanctuary. Yes, I tell you, it will be required of this generation." (Luke 11:51). Abel was the first to be killed in Genesis, and Zechariah the son of Jehoiada was the last to be killed in 2 Chronicles. This implies that the Hebrew Bible ends with 2 Chronicles.

The Jewish traditions all point to an acceptance of the Tanakh, but not to the Apocrypha. The Dead Sea Scrolls feature commentaries on many books from the three divisions of the Tanakh, but not from the Apocrypha. Philo created a commentary on the Pentateuch, citing references from the Torah, Neviim, and Ketuvim. However, the Apocrypha was not cited.

Also, many of the church fathers did not accept the Apocrypha as canon. Jerome as just one example, writes in his introduction to the books of the Kings:

This preface to the Scriptures may serve as a helmeted  introduction to all the books which we turn from Hebrew into Latin, so that we may be assured that what is outside of them must be placed aside among the Apocryphal writings. Wisdom, therefore, which generally bears the name of Solomon, and the book of Jesus the Son of Sirach, and Judith, and Tobias, and the Shepherd are not in the canon.

On Joseph Atwill and Dovid Gottlieb

Larry Hurtado has written a post addressing the crazy claims by conspiracy theorists like Joseph Atwill.
http://larryhurtado.wordpress.com/2013/10/11/flimflam-of-the-month-covert-christianity/
and analyzed by Nick Peters:
http://deeperwaters.wordpress.com/2013/10/14/thoughts-on-joseph-atwill/

While reading through his description of Joseph Atwill and other conspiracy theorists, it struck me how similar this is to Dovid Gottlieb and his Kuzari Principle argument.

Where does this stuff come from?  I just got an email asking about a guy self-described as a “biblical scholar” with a new (to me) notion:  Jesus, Christianity & the NT were all invented by the Roman government for the purpose of quieting the Jews from their interest in militant messianism.  He calls it “Covert Christianity.”

And, no, I haven’t heard of the guy before either (Joseph Atwill), largely because, well, he’s a nobody in the field of biblical studies.  No PhD in the subject (or related subject), never held an academic post, never (so far as I can tell) published anything in any reputable journal that’s peer-reviewed, or in any reputable monograph series, or presented at any academic conference where competent people could assess his claims.  Instead, per the flimflam drill, he directs his claims to the general public, knowing that they are unable to assess them, and so, by sheer novelty of the claim he hopes to attract a crowd, sales, and publicity.  It’s a living, I guess (of sorts).

So, again, for those who care, it’s wise to consider who is making the claims when you hear them made.  Atwill knows he can’t get to first base on his crazy claims with anyone competent in the field.  So, he “goes public”, i.e., dodges the scholarly process by which ideas are tested and challenged before being accepted.  But he’ll probably get a TV programme out of it.  It seems actually to help to propose something kind of weird like this.  And when asked why scholars don’t accept it, you respond (yup, you guessed it) “It’s an academic conspiracy to keep these things from the public.” Sigh!

(Oh well, as a colleague noted, if Jesus was invented by the Romans, then, obviously, he couldn’t have been married to Mary Magdalene!  I love when the weirdo-theories people cancel each other out.)

 Most of these apply just as well to Dovid Gottlieb and his Kuzari argument. None of the Old Testament historians I have met have even heard of him, let alone his argument. He doesn't have a doctorate in a related field (Mathematical Logic is not relevant to Philosophy of History or Ancient History). I could not find any articles in a search of peer-reviewed journals in history or in religion. The only thing I could find was one history article which cites Gottlieb's book as a biased account against which he compared more objective accounts of the event. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23266308

 In saying why he doesn’t bother with it that much, Hurtado says that

It’s not necesssary to engage something so self-evidently unfounded and incompetent. If his press releases at all reflect his stance, it’s not worth the time. We scholars have enough to do engaging work that is by people with some competence. There isn’t time or value in dealing with nonsense. And Atwill and his ilk don’t really want scholarly engagement anyway. Again, let it go.

And when told Atwill would want scholarly engagement Hurtado says

No. He wouldn’t. Otherwise, he wouldn’t avoid the normal scholarly venues to test theories. These people know that they would be shredded by competent scholars.

 The same criticisms can be leveled against Dovid Gottlieb. If he really wanted scholarly engagement, he would not have bypassed the scholarly venues that test theories and tried to hock his theory on the public.

Chizuk Emunah Under the Microscope: Chapter 42

“Seventy weeks are decreed about your people and your holy city, to finish the transgression, to put an end to sin, and to atone for iniquity, to bring in everlasting righteousness, to seal both vision and prophet, and to anoint a most holy place. Know therefore and understand that from the going out of the word to restore and build Jerusalem to the coming of an anointed one, a prince, there shall be seven weeks. Then for sixty-two weeks it shall be built again with squares and moat, but in a troubled time. And after the sixty-two weeks, an anointed one shall be cut off and shall have nothing. And the people of the prince who is to come shall destroy the city and the sanctuary. Its end shall come with a flood, and to the end there shall be war. Desolations are decreed. And he shall make a strong covenant with many for one week, and for half of the week he shall put an end to sacrifice and offering. And on the wing of abominations shall come one who makes desolate, until the decreed end is poured out on the desolator.”
Daniel 9:24-27

Daniel 9 is a common battleground between the church and the rabbis. There is no coherent timeframe which can be assigned as a "week." Even Tovia Singer admitted that his construal of the weeks has a completely arbitrary starting point.

Troki argues that this cannot be about Jesus. He describes the punishment as the exile to Babylon. Troki asserts that according to Chapter 8, Daniel labored under the idea that the state of banishment would last for 2,300 days, which is just over 6 years. The prophecy shall be sealed up, which means it will finally be confirmed, and the epoch of restoration will restore the boon of prophecy.

Troki then connects the prophecies, stating that Cyrus is the anointed one in this passage, who will bring back Israel from exile. He also thinks that the subject of verse 26 is Herod Agrippa II.

The issue here is the conditions that must be fulfilled. Within seventy weeks, there needs to be an end to sin and transgression, an atonement, and the bringing of everlasting righteousness. The starting point appears to be the decree of Cyrus to rebuild the city of Jerusalem. How do we know when the seventy weeks are over? When the city and sanctuary are destroyed, and a flood, war, and desolation come to Jerusalem. This means that the weeks of Daniel's prophecy are over, and that all the conditions have been fulfilled.

The Jerusalem Temple has been destroyed by the armies of Titus in the year 70. This means we have to look in the pre-70 era of history in order to figure out what these prophecies mean. Hebrew has no indefinite article, so a more literal interpretation would state: Messiah (מָשִׁיחַ) will be cut off. The same word is used to describe the prince, and mere priests are not princes. Instead, this anointed one is royalty, and it also looks like the same anointed one as in the previous verse. If so, then it cannot be Cyrus. Besides, Cyrus ascended to the throne years before the decree, and yet the anointed one is supposed to come after it.

Herod Agrippa lived between the years 27 and 100, meaning that he died 30 years after the destruction of the Second Temple. Furthermore, he was not cut off in any meaningful sense of the word during the events of the year 70. Herod Agrippa sided with the Romans, and although being wounded in the Siege of Gamala, he was not cut off from anything. His side prevailed, and Herod Agrippa was rewarded accordingly. So neither of these proposed anointed ones can be the subject of Daniel 9.

Jesus, on the other hand, strongly fits the subject of this passage. He was killed before the destruction of the temple, and yet brought the greatest change the world has ever seen. His sacrifice brought the possibility of regeneration and the anointing of the Holy Spirit. More importantly, he brought an atonement for sin.

Think about it: anyone who believes in the book of Daniel is committed to the truth that God has already put an end to sin, sealed a vision and a prophet, atoned for iniquity, anointed a holy place, and brought about everlasting righteousness. If Messiah has not already come, what is there for Messiah to do but put the final comparatively insignificant touches on God's master plan?

Chizuk Emunah Under the Microscope: Chapter 41

“I saw in the night visions,

and behold, with the clouds of heaven

there came one like a son of man,

and he came to the Ancient of Days

and was presented before him.

And to him was given dominion

and glory and a kingdom,

that all peoples, nations, and languages

should serve him;

his dominion is an everlasting dominion,

which shall not pass away,

and his kingdom one

that shall not be destroyed. (Daniel 7:13-14)

 “Immediately after the tribulation of those days the sun will be darkened, and the moon will not give its light, and the stars will fall from heaven, and the powers of the heavens will be shaken. Then will appear in heaven the sign of the Son of Man, and then all the tribes of the earth will mourn, and they will see the Son of Man coming on the clouds of heaven with power and great glory. And he will send out his angels with a loud trumpet call, and they will gather his elect from the four winds, from one end of heaven to the other. (Matthew 24:29-31)

 But Jesus remained silent. And the high priest said to him, “I adjure you by the living God, tell us if you are the Christ, the Son of God.” Jesus said to him, “You have said so. But I tell you, from now on you will see the Son of Man seated at the right hand of Power and coming on the clouds of heaven.” Then the high priest tore his robes and said, “He has uttered blasphemy. What further witnesses do we need? You have now heard his blasphemy. (Matthew 26:63-65)

 But he remained silent and made no answer. Again the high priest asked him, “Are you the Christ, the Son of the Blessed?” And Jesus said, “I am, and you will see the Son of Man seated at the right hand of Power, and coming with the clouds of heaven.” And the high priest tore his garments and said, “What further witnesses do we need? You have heard his blasphemy. What is your decision?” And they all condemned him as deserving death.(Mark 14:61-64)

Troki disputes that the passage in Daniel is a reference to Jesus, who would later come on the clouds of heaven. He gives several references to clouds being the source for the rain on which Israel depended for its survival, but the term "clouds of heaven" was not mentioned since the expression occurs only once in the Tanakh. Instead, Troki believes that the passage is about Israel.


As Israel is called in Scripture the holy people of the Lord, so on the other hand is the Almighty represented as the Holy One of Israel. See Isaiah 12:6, "For great is the Holy One of Israel in the midst of thee." Ibid, 37:23, "And thou hast lifted up thine eyes against the Holy One of Israel." Ibid. 41:14, "I have helped thee, saith the Lord, and the redeemer, the Holy One of Israel." Jeremiah 50:29, "For he rebelled against the Lord, against the Holy One of Israel." 

The appellation, in Daniel, Most High, which the Christians have endeavoured to appropriate to Jesus, is attributable to Israel, as will be seen on examining, other parts of the Scriptures. See Deuteronomy 26:19, "And to make thee most high above all the nations which He hath made for His praise, for His name, and for His glory; and that thou mayest be a holy people unto the Lord thy God as He hath spoken." Ibid, 28:1, "And the Lord will make thee most high above all people of the earth." 

From all these passages, it is evident that Israel could not yield to any other nation the title given to it in holy writ, and it must be acknowledged that the saints of the Most High God can only be of that people which is declared to be most high among the nations of the earth. 

The prophecies, showing that the wicked Gentiles shall perish, and that the righteous shall unite with Israel, are sufficient evidences to prove, that also the present prophecy relates solely to the chosen people, for surely no expounder could reason away the lucid and simple announcement made by Isaiah 4:3, "And all that shall be left in Zion, and that remain in Jerusalem, shall be called holy." And again in 60:21, "And thy people, altogether righteous, shall inherit thy land for ever." 

Thus we see that Daniel had no other object in view than to represent in his prophecy the final glory of Israel.

Israel indeed enjoyed an exalted status. The term in dispute (עֶלְיֹון)(H5945) is generally translated as high, and is associated with God to mean God most high. 

The term Son of Man is also used in apocalyptic literature, and speaks of a divine judge, not really of Israel. Here are the references in 1 Enoch.

[Chapter 46]
1 And there I saw One who had a head of days, And His head was white like wool, And with Him was another being whose countenance had the appearance of a man, And his face was full of graciousness, like one of the holy angels. 2 And I asked the angel who went with me and showed me all the hidden things, concerning that 3 Son of Man, who he was, and whence he was, (and) why he went with the Head of Days And he answered and said unto me: This is the son of Man who hath righteousness, With whom dwelleth righteousness, And who revealeth all the treasures of that which is hidden,
Because the Lord of Spirits hath chosen him, And whose lot hath the pre-eminence before the Lord of Spirits in uprightness for ever.
4 And this Son of Man whom thou hast seen Shall raise up the kings and the mighty from their seats, [And the strong from their thrones] And shall loosen the reins of the strong, And break the teeth of the sinners.
5 [And he shall put down the kings from their thrones and kingdoms] Because they do not extol and praise Him, Nor humbly acknowledge whence the kingdom was bestowed upon them. 6 And he shall put down the countenance of the strong, And shall fill them with shame.
And darkness shall be their dwelling, And worms shall be their bed, And they shall have no hope of rising from their beds, Because they do not extol the name of the Lord of Spirits.
7 And these are they who judge the stars of heaven, [And raise their hands against the Most High], And tread upon the earth and dwell upon it. And all their deeds manifest unrighteousness, And their power rests upon their riches, And their faith is in the gods which they have made with their hands, And they deny the name of the Lord of Spirits,
8 And they persecute the houses of His congregations, And the faithful who hang upon the name of the Lord of Spirits.

[Chapter 48]
1 And in that place I saw the fountain of righteousness Which was inexhaustible: And around it were many fountains of wisdom: And all the thirsty drank of them, And were filled with wisdom, And their dwellings were with the righteous and holy and elect. 2 And at that hour that Son of Man was named In the presence of the Lord of Spirits, And his name before the Head of Days.
3 Yea, before the sun and the signs were created, Before the stars of the heaven were made, His name was named before the Lord of Spirits.
4 He shall be a staff to the righteous whereon to stay themselves and not fall, And he shall be the light of the Gentiles, And the hope of those who are troubled of heart.
5 All who dwell on earth shall fall down and worship before him, And will praise and bless and celebrate with song the Lord of Spirits.
6 And for this reason hath he been chosen and hidden before Him, Before the creation of the world and for evermore.
7 And the wisdom of the Lord of Spirits hath revealed him to the holy and righteous; For he hath preserved the lot of the righteous, Because they have hated and despised this world of unrighteousness, And have hated all its works and ways in the name of the Lord of Spirits: For in his name they are saved, And according to his good pleasure hath it been in regard to their life.
8 In these days downcast in countenance shall the kings of the earth have become, And the strong who possess the land because of the works of their hands, For on the day of their anguish and affliction they shall not (be able to) save themselves. And I will give them over into the hands of Mine elect: As straw in the fire so shall they burn before the face of the holy: As lead in the water shall they sink before the face of the righteous, And no trace of them shall any more be found. 10 And on the day of their affliction there shall be rest on the earth, And before them they shall fall and not rise again: And there shall be no one to take them with his hands and raise them: For they have denied the Lord of Spirits and His Anointed. The name of the Lord of Spirits be blessed.

 It is also found in 4 Ezra, chapter 13.

1: After seven days I dreamed a dream in the night;
2: and behold, a wind arose from the sea and stirred up all its waves.
3: And I looked, and behold, this wind made something like the figure of a man come up out of the heart of the sea. And I looked, and behold, that man flew with the clouds of heaven; and wherever he turned his face to look, everything under his gaze trembled,
4: and whenever his voice issued from his mouth, all who heard his voice melted as wax melts when it feels the fire. 

 So the cultural background is pretty consistent that there is one like a Son of Man who comes with the clouds of heaven to judge the world. Also, the glory of the Son of Man is much higher than Israel ever would be glorified. While the nation of Israel was wonderful and glorious, it does not make sense to personify Israel as the head of a kingdom. Israel is a kingdom.

It would also be haughty for the nation of Israel to demand praise and adoration of the nations. Indeed, such would border on idolatry. However, if the figure is God in the flesh, then it would be appropriate for the Son of Man to demand that level of adoration.