Necessary Synthetic Truths

A few years ago, I posted an article called The Ontological Argument for the Triune God. Basically, I stated that:

1. If it is possible (metaphysically) that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great beings exists.

2. It is possible (metaphysically) that a maximally great being exists.

Conclusion: A maximally great being exists.

One of the objectors argued that possibility and necessity only applies to the definitions of words rather than to the properties of objects. The definitions of words are what we call analytic truths. The fact that a bachelor is an umarried male is an analytic truth. Once you know what a bachelor is, you realize that "bachelor" is simply defined as an umarried male.

Another kind of truth is a synthetic truth. Synthetic truths deal with the way reality is configured. The fact that I have a keyboard in front of me is a synthetic truth.

The question then becomes: are there necessary synthetic truths? Let me resort to the tactic of the rabbis by answering a question with a question.

Could reality have been configured differently than it is configured? Or to put it another ways: could the state of affairs be different than it it?

If the answer is no, then all synthetic truths are necessary truths.

If the answer is yes, then:

Necessarily, reality could not have been configured differently.

Synthetic truths deal with the way reality is configured, and therefore either answer is a necessary synthetic truth.