Wednesday, May 30, 2012
The Incoherence of Compatibilism
One disturbing trend I have found within Christendom is what I call the "New Calvinism." Advocates of this view, such as James White, believe that all human behavior is determined, meaning that no one has a will autonomous of God's will. They also believe that we have free choice, and that determinism is compatible with free will. I find this trend very disturbing, and I want to see it stopped. Here is an argument against compatibilism, based on an argument by Peter Van Inwagen. However, this version of the argument avoids the flaws found in earlier editions of Inwagen's argument, and thus improves upon it. First, let's begin by defining two things.
Free choice: Something is a free choice if it is up to us. If some fact is up to us, we have the ability to render it false. For example, the fact "Drew is wearing a white shirt" is up to me because I can render it false (such as, by taking it off).
Entailment: The relationship between two sentences where the truth of one (X) requires the truth of the other (Y). If X entails Y, then if X is true, Y must be true. If Y is false, X must be false.
Theistic Determinism: The idea that all things are determined by the decree of God. The divine decree entails all facts.
Now on to the argument:
If theistic determinism is true, then here are the following implications:
1. The eternal decree of God is not up to us.
2. The fact that the eternal decree of God entails all future facts is not up to us.
The theistic determinist would gladly assent to these two premises. To them, God's will is autonomous, and ours is not. This leads us to premise 3 of my argument.
3. If some fact X is not up to us, and X entails some fact Y, then Y is not up to us.
or stated more simply:
3'. If something is not up to us, anything it entails is not up to us.
which means:
3''. If we cannot render a certain fact false, then we cannot render something that the fact entails false.
From premises 1, 2, and 3 we get:
4. No future facts are up to us.
But Compatibilism states:
5. There are future facts entailed by the eternal decree of God that are up to us.
Therefore
6. Compatibilism is false.
Premise 3 is to say that if we cannot render some fact X false, and X entails Y, then we cannot render Y false (modus ponens). This is logically equivalent to saying that if we can render Y false, then we can render X false (modus tollens).
Let's plug in some examples to illustrate this point.
If the fact that the sun is yellow is not up to us, and the fact that the sun is yellow entails the fact that the sun has a color, then the fact that the sun has a color is not up to us. Or stated more simply,
If the fact that the sun is yellow is not up to us, then the fact that the sun has a color is not up to us.
or
If the fact that President Lincoln was assassinated was not up to us, then the fact that President Lincoln was killed was not up to us.
or
If the fact that the moon orbits the Earth is not up to us, then the fact that something orbits the Earth is not up to us.
Premise 3 should seem obviously true, yet I have discussed this with compatibilists who think it is false. So are there any additional arguments we can make for this premise? Well, let's assume that the premise is false.
Let's assume there is some fact X that is not up to us, and X entails some fact Y, but Y is up to us.
we could restate this as:
Some fact Y is up to us, X entails Y, but X is not up to us.
which means:
We can render some fact Y false, X entails Y, but we cannot render X false.
This is to say that X entails Y, and Y is false while X is true, which is a contradiction.
Here is an example to illustrate, the fact that you are wearing a shirt entails the fact that you are not naked. If premise 3 is false, it would lead to situations where you could be naked but not shirtless (for example). This is incoherent. If the fact that you are wearing a shirt entails that you are not naked, then you cannot be both naked and wearing a shirt.
If premise 3 is false, it leads to a contradiction. Therefore, Premise 3 cannot be false.
And hence, compatibilism is false.
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Drew,
ReplyDeleteI think that you are primarily arguing against Determinism rather than Compatibilsm. I hold to Compatibilsm because Libertarian Freedom as specifically defined by the ability to do the opposite is dubious at best and Determinism is akin to Fatalism.
And I don't understand why you reject a Reformed Compatibilist paradox and affirm Maimonides' Compatibilist paradox?
The bone of contention in the definition of Libertarian Free Will is the stipulation that the agent could have done otherwise. The key issue is not simply the choice between two options but between opposite or opposing options. More specifically the choice between negative and positive options, i.e. bad or good, to sin or not to sin. If this is part of the Free Will definition than God is ineligible, for, due to His nature, it is impossible for God to sin and hence God does not have free will!
- Mike Ranieri,
Toronto, Canada
Compatibilism is the view that determinism and free will are compatible. Libertarian free will is nothing more than free will that follows neither determinism nor simple (random) indeterminism.
ReplyDeleteIf this is your definition of Libertarian free will than I have no quarrel with you, and your view is compatible with the Reformed view of free will.
ReplyDelete- Mike
Drew,
ReplyDeleteThe primary difference between Libertarain free will and Compatiblist free will is an understanding of the ability to do otherwise. As I have stated, the Libertarain view would exclude God from having free will. I think you need to address this issue.
- Mike
Why would God be excluded from libertarian free will? Do you not think he could have acted other than he does? For example, couldn't he have refrained from creating?
DeleteYes He could. But He is only capable of choosing the good and not the otherwise. He is incapable of sin. While Libertarain freedom allows man to choose to sin or not to sin.
ReplyDeleteReformists make the mistake of speaking of sovereignty as it pertains to all facts (God's decrees cause all events and facts to their utmost detail), but speaking of free will only as it pertains to soteriology (ie: a sinner can't attain righteousness of their own behavior, therefore even if they could hypothetically refrain from raping or manslaughter by drunk driving, it doesn't save them and their motives are still sinful, thus, soteriologically they have no free will). The trouble comes when the first concept (theistic determinism) is combined with the idea that no one who is regenerate is free to behave against their nature, yet they freely demonstrate their behavior without coercion... you get compatiblism. This utterly ignores what we all experience at times when we are psychologically indecisive. My ability to want two different things for selfish reasons demonstates that the effect (whether I save a drowning man due to the desire to feel heroic, or because I feel guilty if I don't is a selfish motive, while not saving him due to fear or ambivalence is also a selfish motive). These are both options not determined by being unregenerate or not, but the result is qualitatively different. Either God determined I should save him due to decreeing every fact and aspect of my life and nature... OR he didn't, in which case I can genuinely choose a different outcome based on conflicting feelings in my sinful nature regardless of wether these behaviors make any soteriological difference. Note: libertarianism doesn't necessitate self determination soyeriologically, or without any limits. In libertarianism, factors can be influenced, inspired or even determined, and our natures (which are imprinted with various influences) can be determinative in a variety of situations, but libertarianism only stipulates that uncoerced and genuinely potentially different outcomes are possible. I would go so far as to say that God deteministically creates scenarios and factors in our natures which give us genuinely meaningful forks in the road, but that all factors and outcomes are known and factored at all times since before creation.
ReplyDelete