Answering Critics: Resurrection Proves Christianity?

Recently, I saw a video by YouTuber Omedyashar (a.k.a. Yosef), a former Christian who converted to Orthodox Judaism. In his video, he responds to the following question:

"In the New Testament, Jesus' ascension into heaven was witnessed by many people. As you place great emphasis on the importance of witnesses and witnessing an event as proof, for example Mount Sinai where God speaks and everybody hears, what is your understanding of how so many people may have witnessed such an event if it either did not happen or could not happen due to Jesus being a false Messiah?"

The question has a great deal of merit, but can be made even stronger. If we give secular historians the benefit of the doubt, what information can we glean about Jesus of Nazareth? I will go through three passages believed by the majority of New Testament historians to be historically authentic.

First, Jesus' claim in Matthew 11. Jesus says: "All things have been handed over to me by my Father, and no one knows the Son except the Father, and no one knows the Father except the Son and anyone to whom the Son chooses to reveal him." This passage is considered historically authentic because Jesus is claiming to be unknowable. Yet, the post-Easter church taught that you can know Jesus. Therefore, this passage is very unlikely to have been fabricated. In this passage, Jesus is claiming to have a unique relationship to the Father, superior to all of humanity, and to be the only way to know the Father.

Second, Jesus' parable of the tenants in the vineyard in Mark 12. In this parable, the landowner goes away on a long journey and leaves a group of tenants in charge. During the harvest, the owner sends a series of servants to collect payment, and each time, the wicked tenants kill the servant. Finally, the owner sends his own son to collect payment, and the tenants kill him as well. The landowner represents God the Father. The servants represent the prophets of Israel. The son represents Jesus, and the land represents the land of Israel. The point of the parable is that because of the disobedience of the people of Israel, God would strip the land from the Jews and give it to the gentiles, at least for a time. In this parable, Jesus portrays himself as superior to all the prophets.

Third is Jesus' saying in Matthew 24: "But concerning that day and hour no one knows, not even the angels of heaven, nor the Son, but the Father only." Here, Jesus places himself in a position on an ascending scale. He sees himself as superior to humanity, and even above the angels in heaven. Historians consider ths passage almost indisputably authentic, because the church would not invent a passage where Jesus ascribes ignorance to himself (the knowledge was suppressed in his subconscious). Indeed, the manuscript evidence shows that many copyists tried to remove the phrase "nor the son" from the passage.

However, there is also strong evidence for the historicity of Jesus' resurrection. The passage recording the appearance of Jesus to more than 500 people at one time comes from 1 Corinthians 15. 1 Corinthians is one of the best attested books in the New Testament, considered by secular historians as authentically Pauline, and written around the year 56 of the Common Era. The passage I am about to quote, however, is considered, even by atheists like Gerd Ludemann, a piece of oral tradition that dates back to within 5 years of the crucifixion. Here it is.

For I delivered to you as of first importance what I also received: that Christ died for our sins in accordance with the Scriptures, that he was buried, that he was raised on the third day in accordance with the Scriptures, and that he appeared to Cephas, then to the twelve. Then he appeared to more than five hundred brothers at one time, most of whom are still alive, though some have fallen asleep. Then he appeared to James, then to all the apostles. Last of all, as to one untimely born, he appeared also to me.
(1 Corinthians 15:3-8 ESV)

Yosef's video response, far from answering this challenge, shows just how indefensible Rabbinical Judaism is against evidential arguments. First, let's get the quick answers to his questions out of the way.

Q. Why is James not considered among the twelve?
A. Because it was a separate appearance to James the brother of Jesus, who was not one of the twelve apostles.

Q. Why didn't Paul refer to this appearance to 500 when he preached to the people of Antioch in Acts chapter 13?
A. He didn't need to. He made mention of Jesus' repeated appearances to many people over many days. The people of Antioch were convinced by Paul's teaching, and by the next Sabbath, huge crowds came to listen to the preaching of Paul and Barnabas.

Q. Couldn't an imposter have posed as the resurrected Jesus for the 500?
A. Conspiracy theory hypotheses to explain the belief in Jesus' resurrection have been universally rejected from the professional historical journals since the 18th century. The conspiracy hypothesis implies that the disciples suffered torture and died for something they knew firsthand to be a lie. Worse than that, the hypothesis is deeply anachronistic. The idea of a crucified Messiah was as absurd to Second Temple Judaism as the idea of a married bachelor, and Jewish expectations of the day precluded anyone experiencing resurrection before the general resurrection at the end of the world. No one was expecting Jesus to come back from the dead.

Q. Jesus wasn't the firstfruits of the resurrection.
A. The Tanakh teaches about resurrection in Isaiah 26, Ezekiel 37, and Daniel 12. So I am glad that he affirms that God can raise the dead. However, resurrection is not merely the return of the soul to a lifeless body.

The Second Temple belief in resurrection is stated well in Daniel 12:2. "Those who sleep in the dust of the earth shall awaken; some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt." Resurrection was defined as something that happens at the end of the age, where the dead will be brought back to life and transformed supernaturally into an immortal state, where they will then be judged by God.

Therefore, it is incorrect to think of Lazarus and others raised from the dead as resurrected. A better term would be resuscitation. They were brought back to life, but in the same weak, frail, mortal bodies in which they died, and they all died at a later date. Jesus was the first and only so far to be resurrected into the supernaturally powerful and immortal state as predicted by Daniel. Hence, he is the first of the resurrected dead.

Q. Didn't Jesus abolish the law, which would make him a false prophet under Deuteronomy 12?
A. Jesus did not abolish the law. He reinterpreted it so that it became an internal moral guide. Even the Rabbis agree that the Law of Moses makes no sense unless it is interpreted. After the destruction of the second temple, the vast majority of the Mosaic commands simply could not be followed, and required reinterpretation in order to be followed. The only difference I have with Rabbinical Judaism is that I believe that it is Jesus who has the ultimate authority over interpreting the Torah, and not the Rabbis.

Except for the last one, these types of questions betray a deep ignorance of the New Testament. An undergraduate in any decent seminary could have answered them.

With that out of the way, we can get to the real heart of the issue: the Rabbinic dismissal of evidence. Historically, the Rabbis have been somewhat paranoid of evidence that might undermine their claims to absolute authority over the Jewish people. No example better illustrates this than the Akhnai Oven in tractate Bava Metzia of the Talmud:

It is taught: On that day R. Eliezer brought forward every imaginable argument, but the Sages did not accept any of them. Finally he said to them: "If the Halakhah (religious law) is in accordance with me, let this carob tree prove it!" Sure enough the carob tree immediately uprooted itself and moved one hundred cubits, and some say 400 cubits, from its place. "No proof can be brought from a carob tree," they retorted.

And again he said to them "If the Halakhah agrees with me, let the channel of water prove it!" Sure enough, the channel of water flowed backward. "No proof can be brought from a channel of water," they rejoined.

Again he urged, "If the Halakhah agrees with me, let the walls of the house of study prove it!" Sure enough, the walls tilted as if to fall. But R. Joshua, rebuked the walls, saying, "When disciples of the wise are engaged in a halakhic dispute, what right have you to interfere?" Hence in deference to R. Joshua they did not fall and in deference to R. Eliezer they did not resume their upright position; they are still standing aslant.

Again R. Eliezer then said to the Sages, "If the Halakhah agrees with me, let it be proved from heaven." Sure enough, a divine voice cried out, "Why do you dispute with R. Eliezer, with whom the Halakhah always agrees?" R. Joshua stood up and protested: "The Torah is not in heaven!" (Deut. 30:12). We pay no attention to a divine voice because long ago at Mount Sinai You wrote in your Torah at Mount Sinai, `After the majority must one incline'. (Ex. 23:2)"

Besides the misquote of Exodus 23:2, which says do not go with the majority, the deeper problem here is that the Rabbis simply refuse to admit any evidence that clashes with their beliefs. God himself must submit to the will of the Rabbis.

I actually agree with one atheist blogger when he said: "One simply cannot presuppose the truths of disputable historical events prior to investigating whether or not those events actually took place and keep a straight face."

It is very hard to take someone seriously who holds a position on historical events and absolutely refuses to allow evidence to change his mind. The idea that the Rabbis today have an uncorrupted and authoritative tradition that comes from Moses on Sinai is a historical claim and is subject to historical investigation. If you do not allow your views on this matter to be falsified by evidence, you risk delusion.

You become like the man who went to his doctor believing that he was a dead corpse. The doctor argued to the patient's satisfaction that corpses have no pulse and cannot bleed. The doctor then pricked the finger of the man, and blood came out. The man looked at his bleeding finger and concluded "I guess corpses can bleed." The man, like the Rabbis, was not open to evidence. And what better evidence is there against the Rabbinic tradition, than the evidence for the radical self-image and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth. If the Rabbis were correct, then the last thing one would expect is for the God of Israel to resurrect from the dead a man who saw himself as the great divine judge of humanity as prophesied in Daniel 7.

So again I ask: on what consistent basis can the Rabbis accept the historicity of the Exodus while rejecting the historicity of the radical self-image and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth? And if your religion cannot handle this evidence, I suggest you get yourself a new religion.

For further reading on this subject, the Resurrection of the Son of God by N.T. Wright is a thorough, scholarly work on the subject. Wright is one of the world's leading scholars on late Second Temple Judaism and provides a very detailed account on the people, culture, and idea of resurrection during that time period. Wright also does ground-clearing work, refuting every major alternative hypothesis to the resurrection.

Pascal's Wager Against Calvinism

One of the more inventive arguments for the existence of God is an argument invented by Blaise Pascal. At the end of his life, Pascal wrote out various thoughts on the big questions of life, such as whether or not God exists. His pragmatic argument, known as Pascal's Wager, is an argument for people who have heard his arguments for the Christian faith and were still indecisive about it.

Pascal asked his audience to construct a chart, labeling one axis objective and another subjective. Label one "God exists" and the other "God does not exist" On the subjective axis, label one "follow God" and the other "do not follow God"

If you choose to follow God, then you have infinite to gain if you are right and only finite loss if you are wring. If you choose not to follow God, you have finite to gain if you are right and infinite loss if you are wrong.

The main objection to this argument is the trickster deity approach. The trickster deity will send you to heaven if you are an atheist and to hell if you are a theist. Does this refute Pascal's Wager?

Hardly.

In order for this objection to work, the trickster god has to be as likely to exist as the God of the Bible. However, I have given arguments for the existence of an omniperfect God, which if successful exclude the possibility of a trickster god. Even if those arguments fail, Pascal's Wager gives the unbeliever a very heavy burden of proof. That unbeliever has to give arguments for the existence of the trickster god that are at least as strong as arguments for the God of theism. Otherwise, one can argue that since there are better arguments for God than for the trickster deity, theism is more likely to be true and therefore is the wiser bet.

All of this is well and good, but how does it apply to Calvinism? I'm glad you asked. One of the key prooftexts for Calvinism is Romans 9:16, which in the ESV states "So then it depends not on human will or exertion, but on God, who has mercy." History has given a myriad of interpretations regarding what exactly "it" is. It could be national election, or election to service, or the circumstances in which you are born, or God's criteria as to which people get saved. Also, some of the "not...but" verses in the Bible, such as John 6:27 (Do not work for the food that perishes, but for the food that endures to eternal life) do not exclude the "not" section but merely de-emphasize it.

However, Calvinists insist that Romans 9:16 states that the salvation of individuals does not depend in any way on human will or exertion. Can we come up with a practical argument to reinforce other arguments? No. But we don't have to, because Pascal already has. Assume that salvation either does or does not involve human will, and assume that we can choose either to believe it or not to believe it.

If it does involve human will and we believe it, our belief bolsters our evangelism and apologetics efforts and more people receive salvation.
If it does not involve human will and we believe that it does, our belief bolsters our evangelism and apologetics efforts and no fewer people receive salvation.
If it does involve human will and we do not believe that it does, our belief harms our evangelism and apologetics efforts and fewer people receive salvation.
If it does not involve human will and we do not believe that it does, our belief harms our evangelism and apologetics efforts and no fewer people receive salvation.

From a practical standpoint, we should believe that salvation does involve human will and exertion. We have everything to gain if we are right, and little to lose if we are wrong.

How might the Calvinist respond to these charges? The first is that belief that human will affects salvation robs God of his glory. Even if true, this objection hardly defeats the argument. Would you rather risk robbing God of some of his glory for a finite period of time (until you go to heaven and God corrects you), or risk souls spending eternity in hell for an infinite period of time?

Another objection is that practical arguments should not shape our beliefs. However, no one lives this way. If you see a lump on your skin, and there's only a 10% chance that it is a malignant tumor, and a 90% chance that it is benign, should you then assume on the basis of probability that it is benign and simply ignore it? Another example is the insurance industry. There is only a small chance that your home will be destroyed by a natural disaster, but does that justify not getting insurance? Because the payoffs are unequal, a prudent individual will seek to minimize risk and maximize reward. Similarly, practical-minded individuals will assume that libertarian free will plays a role in salvation and will bias his thinking in favor of it. They will assume free will, and give the free will position every benefit of the doubt.

Similarly, if the God of the Bible is more likely to exist than trickster deities, then prudent individuals should give theism every benefit of the doubt.

James Galyon objects to an older version of the argument, declaring that the Synod of Dort states that evangelism makes a difference in the salvation of the evangelized. Much of his argument is based on a misunderstanding of this wager, and I will admit his misunderstanding is my fault. The original version of this argument was a bit vague. My argument is not that Calvinist denominations ignore the call to evangelism and apologetics. Indeed, James White, a borderline hyper-Calvinist is perhaps the best counter-cult apologist in the Western world.

My argument is that (1) if salvation does not depend on human will or exertion, it is logically impossible that any human choice (including evangelism) could make any difference in anyone's salvation (if it could, then election would be conditional), and (2) how we do evangelism and apologetics is hugely impacted by our views on this issue. If we believe that people can be argued into or out of the right beliefs through reason and evidence, then we would put a lot more effort into those areas.

Beliefs very much affect our behaviors and motivations. As Alvin Plantinga said: "I would not go to the refrigerator to get a beer if I believed that beer did not exist." Similarly, the consequences of our actions do impact human behavior, whether or not they ideally should do so. Digging a ditch only to fill it again is demoralizing, and a vicious form of punishment. If Americans believed that visiting the moon again would lead to enormous scientific breakthroughs, I guarantee that NASA would not be hurting for funding the way it is now. Our beliefs about the consequences of our actions significantly affect our actions and motivations.

The mere mandate to proclaim the gospel to all simply does not have the motivating power as the belief that how we present, how we argue, whether our apologists win debates, and the skill of our salesmanship all make a difference in the salvation of others.

Maydole's Temporal Contingency Argument

In 2009, Blackwell publishing release the Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, which is the gold standard on arguments for the existence of a personal God. Since the book was written for professional philosophers, you should not get frustrated if the book seems challenging to read. Just a fair warning.

The book delivers a series of
1. cosmological arguments - arguments that the nature of the physical world requires an ultimate being
2. teleological arguments - arguments that the design in our world requires a designer
3. moral and axiological arguments - arguments that objective value, beauty, and obligation requires an ultimate being
4. ontological arguments - arguments from the definition of God to his existence

I believe there are sounds arguments for God in all of these categories. The one argument in this book that really piqued my interest, since it blends the strongest parts of different cosmological, axiological, and ontological arguments. Let me show you the argument first and then I'll go through it. The argument comes in two parts: the first section with all the T statements are premises with T15 as the conclusion. The second half of the argument is the full, technical version, which I will translate into plain English and explain in the rest of this post.



Here is what's going on: Robert Maydole is using a version of Thomas Aquinas' Third Way, his third argument for the existence of God, but Maydole is updating it to accommodate advances in both science and philosophy. It uses alethic S5 Modal logic, which is used to derive metaphysical truths. This is the system Alvin Plantinga uses in his works, such as in The Nature of Necessity. In order to understand the argument, you will need to be familiar with some of the terms such as being, necessity, possibility, sufficient reason, possible world, and the like, so here goes.

Being - anything that exists. Examples of beings include chairs, keyboards, phones, atoms, quarks, photons, cars, people, souls (if they exist), God (if he exists), books, computers, space, stars, galaxies, the universe, and your mom. Basically, the two criteria for a being are: (1) does it exist? and (2) can you name it?

Necessity and Possibility - Maydole uses Alvin Plantinga's definition of broad logical possibility and broad logical necessity. This is expressed in what's called possible worlds semantics. A possible world is a way reality might be or might have been. the actual world is the way reality is. A statement is possibly true if there is a possible world where the statement is true. A statement is necessarily true if it is true in all possible worlds. What's strange and confusing about this argument is that it uses BOTH metaphysical necessity AND temporal necessity, which are different terms entirely. Maydole does a good job of keeping the terms separate. He does not confuse the two and I will try my best to avoid mixing them as well.

Without limitations - It appears that, according to Maydole's use, a being is without limitations if it is the metaphysical ultimate. That is, the greatest metaphysically possible being. If we could describe a being greater than the metaphysical ultimate, then THAT would be the metaphysical ultimate. Such a being would have to be, at minimum, omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent in all possible worlds. This means that it would have to exist in all possible worlds. This means that a being without limitations would exist necessarily.

One objection to possible worlds semantics is that it is inconsistent with actualism. Acutalism is the belief that everything that exists is actual, and therefore merely possible worlds do not really exist. This is not a problem, however, as most actualists, such as Alvin Plantinga, still use possible worlds semantics, so there is no inconsistency here.

Sufficient reason - The principle that everything that exists has an explanation for its existence. This principle is not as controversial as it might at first seem. Science presupposes this principle, that there are reasons why the physical world works the way it does. It is also impossible to accept this principle for some things and reject it for others. Events without an explanation cannot be governed by probability so anyone who denies this principle cannot even say that unexplainable things are possible but improbable.

Equivalence - "A is equivalent to B" is the same as saying it is true that ("If A, then B" and "If B, then A")

The universe - for the sake of this argument, "the universe" means "all of physical reality" so if there are multiverses or other universes or other planes of existence, all of physical reality in its entirety is being defined, for the sake of this argument, under the title "the universe."

Remember that the premises of the argument are the 14 T statements (T15 is the conclusion) at the top of the chart. Every other step of the argument is a logically airtight deductive argument. If you want to deny the conclusion, you have to dispute at least one of the premises. But the real power of the argument lies in the following: because this is a modal argument, as long as there is ANY possible world where the 14 premises are true, even if it is not the actual world, then the argument is sound. Let me repeat that: as long as the 14 premises are even POSSIBLE, then the argument goes through.

The first part of the argument lays out the first 7 premises (T1 through T7)

1. (premise) Something presently exists
2. (premise) Only finitely many things (or beings) have existed to date
3. (premise) For every x, if x is temporally contingent, x begins to exist at some time and ceases to exist at some time
4. (premise) For every x, if x begins to exist at some time and ceases to exist at some time, then x exists for a finite period of time
5. (premise) for every x, if x exists for a finite period of time and only finitely many things have existed to date, then there was a time when nothing existed
6. (premise) if there was a time when nothing existed, then nothing presently exists
7. (premise) for every x, "x is temporally necessary" is equivalent to "x is not temporally contingent"
8. suppose that for every x, x is temporally contingent
9. then if the universe is temporally contingent, it begins to exist at some time and ceases to exist at some time
10. suppose the universe is temporally contingent
11. then the universe began to exist at some time and will cease to exist at some time
12. if the universe began to exist at some time and will cease to exist at some time, then the universe exists for a finite period of time
13. so the universe exists for a finite period of time
14. then for every x, x exists for a finite period of time
15. then everything exists for a finite period of time and only finitely many things have existed to date
16. therefore, there was a time (or state of affairs) where nothing existed
17. therefore, nothing presently exists
18. but something does presently exist!
19. therefore, it is not the case that for every x, x is temporally contingent
20. therefore there is something that is not temporally contingent
21. let's call this being that is not temporally contingent THE NECESSARY BEING (TNB).

This first section is basically Aquinas' section of the argument. Objects (or beings) either begin to exist or they do not. Also, there are either an infinite number of objects that have existed in the past or there are not. Since the existence of an actual infinite number of objects would violate the laws of set theory (you would be able to perform invalid operations such as subtraction and division of actual infinites), it follows that there are only a finite number of objects in the past.

If everything that exists began to exist, and there are a finite number of objects, then it follows logically that there was some state of affairs where there was not anything that existed. However, such a state of affairs would lack even the potential for something to exist, so that nothing could ever come into existence. But something did come into existence. Hence, there is at least one object (or being) that did not begin to exist.

22. "TNB is temporally necessary" is equivalent to "TNB is not temporally contingent"
23. therefore, if something is temporally necessary, it is not temporally contingent, and vice versa
24. therefore, if TNB is not temporally contingent, TNB is temporally necessary
25. hence, TNB is temporally necessary
26. therefore, TNB exists

This conclusion may seem to jump out at you. How did we established that a TNB exists? Maydole made the assumption that all beings are temporally contingent, showed that it leads to a contradiction. If not everything is temporally contingent, then something is temporally necessary and 22 through 26 just show the coherence of such a concept.

The next section is going to add the rest of the premises.

27. (premise) for every x, there exist a y such that y is a sufficient reason for x
28. (premise) if for every x, there exists a y such that y is a sufficient reason for x, then there exists a z such that [z is a sufficient reason for x and z is a sufficient reason for z]
29. (premise) for every x and for every y, if x is temporally necessary and y is a sufficient reason for x, then y is temporally necessary
30. (premise) for every y, if y is temporally necessary and y is a sufficient reason for y, then y is without limitations
31. (premise) for every y, if y is without limitations then necessarily [for every z, if z is not y, then y is greater than z]
32. (premise) it is not possible that there is a y such that y is greater than itself
33. (premise) necessarily, for every x and every y, if x is greater than y, then y is not greater than x

Most of these premises are pretty uncontroversial. 27 is just a statement of the principle of sufficient reason, which needs to be presupposed in order to make sense of empirical investigation. 28 states that explanations are not circular. Hence, something has to be self-explanatory. 30 states that only an ultimate being i.e. a being without any limitations could explain why it exists.

34. therefore, there exists a y such that y is a sufficient reason for TNB
35. therefore, if there exists a y such that y is a sufficient reason for TNB then there exists a z such that such that z is a sufficient reason for TNB and is a sufficient reason for z (z is a sufficient reason for itself)
36. therefore, there exists a z such that z is a sufficient reason for TNB and z is a sufficient reason for z
37. hence, there exists TNB such that TNB is a sufficient reason for TNB and TNB is a sufficient reason for itself

To prevent an infinite regress, which would render everything inexplicable, there needs to be some sort of explanatory stopping point. That stopping point cannot be a temporally contingent being, because it could not explain any temporally necessary beings.

38. if TNB is temporally necessary and is a sufficient reason for itself, then it is not temporally contingent
39. TNB is a sufficient reason for itself
40. TNB is temporally necessary and is a sufficient reason for itself
41. TNB is not temporally contingent
42. "TNB is temporally necessary" is equivalent to "TNB is not temporally contingent"
43. if TNB is temporally necessary then TNB is not temporally contingent, and if TNB is not temporally contingent, then TNB is temporally necessary
44. if TNB is not temporally contingent, then TNB is temporally necessary
45. so TNB is temporally necessary
46. hence, TNB is a sufficient reason for itself

I may have messed up the interpretation here. 39 and 46 seem to be identical, but I am not sure if there is a distinction in the formula between v and v1.

47. TNB is temporally necessary and is a sufficient reason for itself
48. if TNB is temporally necessary and is an explanation for itself, then TNB is without limitations

Only the metaphysical ultimate, or that than which nothing greater can be conceived can serve as the ultimate explanatory stopping point.

49. if TNB is without limitations, then necessarily, for every z, if z is not TNB, then TNB is greater than z
50. therefore, necessarily, for every z, if z is not TNB, then TNB is greater than z
51. necessarily, for every z, either z is not TNB or TNB is greater than z
52. necessarily, for every z, either z is not TNB or it is not the case that TNB is not greater than z

If TNB is the metaphysical ultimate, and therefore the greatest possible being, then any other object you pick cannot be greater than TNB.

53. necessarily, for every z, it is not the case that [z is not TNB and TNB is not greater than z]
54. necessarily, it is not the case that there is a z such that [z is not TNB and TNB is not greater than z)
55. therefore, it is not possible that there is a z such that [z is not TNB and TNB is not greater than z]

These steps deliver implications from 49, that all other objects besides TNB are inferior to TNB.

56. necessarily, there is no y such that y is greater than y
57. therefore, necessarily, for every y, it is not the case that y is greater than y
58. for every y, y is not greater than y
59. it is not the case that the universe is greater than the universe
60. either the universe is not greater than the universe or TNB is not the universe
61. either TNB is not the universe or the universe is not greater than the universe

60 and 61 are the same statement in reverse order. This is to set up the next steps of the argument.

62. if TNB is the universe, then the universe is not greater than the universe
63. if the universe is TNB, then TNB is the universe
64. if TNB is the universe, then the universe is not greater than TNB
65. for every y, if y is not greater than y, then here is what follows: [if the universe is TNB, then the universe is not greater than TNB]
66. necessarily, for every y, y not being greater than y implies that if the universe is TNB then the universe is not greater than TNB
67. necessarily, if the universe is TNB, then the universe is not greater than TNB

Here comes the hard part. It is technical and hard to understand, but I will state it and then explain it.

68. necessarily, for every x and for every y, if x is greater than y, then y is not greater than x, also, for every z, if z is not TNB, then TNB is greater than z
69. "necessarily, for every x and for every y, if x is greater than y, then y is not greater than x, also, for every z, if z is not TNB, then TNB is greater than z" implies that "necessarily, for every x and every y, if x is greater than y, then y is not greater than x, also, for every x, if z is not TNB, then TNB is greater than z"
70. necessarily, for every x and every y, if x is greater than y, then y is not greater than x, also, for every z, if z is not TNB, then TNB is greater than z
71. necessarily, the fact that "for every x and every y, if x is greater than y, then y is not greater than x, also, for every z, if z is not TNB then TNB is greater than z" implies that if the universe is not TNB, then the universe is not greater than TNB
72. necessarily, if the universe is not TNB, then the universe is not greater than TNB

So we've established the dilemma. Look at 72 and 67. The universe is not greater than TNB, regardless of whether or not the universe is TNB. This seems obvious just by looking at the two statements, but Maydole is thorough and will prove this deductively in steps 73 through 79.

73. necessarily, if the universe being identical with TNB means that the universe is not greater than TNB and if necessarily the universe not being identical with TNB means that the universe is not greater than TNB, then necessarily, the fact that either the universe is TNB or is not TNB means that necessarily, the universe is not greater than TNB
74. necessarily, the universe being identical with TNB means that the universe is not greater than TNB, and necessarily, the universe not being identical with TNB means that the universe is not greater than TNB
75. necessarily, whether or not the universe is TNB, the universe is not greater than TNB
76. necessarily, the universe either is or isn't TNB
77. therefore, necessarily, either the universe is not greater than TNB or the universe is not greater than TNB (damned if you do or damned if you don't)
78. therefore necessarily, the universe being either not greater than TNB or not greater than TNB means that the universe is not greater than TNB
79. therefore, necessarily, the universe is not greater than TNB

Now we go into the home stretch. we have established that the universe is not greater than The Necessary Being and cannot be greater than The Necessary being. Maydole will also establish that TNB has nothing greater than it and also has no equal. Something that has no equal and nothing greater is by definition supreme.

80. for every z, necessarily, no z is greater than TNB
81. if, for every z, necessarily there is no z greater than TNB, then necessarily, for every z, z is not greater than TNB

81 uses the Barcan formula, which is somewhat controversial. Graham Oppy has objected to it in the journal Philo. Yet I do not think his objections apply to this version of the argument. Both the if and then statements in 81 are basically the same thing re-worded. They both state that it is a necessary truth that nothing is greater than TNB.

82. necessarily, for every z, z is not greater than TNB
83. necessarily, there is no z that is greater than TNB
84. therefore, it is not possible that there is a z such that Z is greater than TNB
85. therefore, it is not possible that there is a z such that z is greater than TNB, and it is not possible that there is a z such that [z is not TNB and TNB is not greater than z]

This is the same as saying that it is not possible for anything to be greater than or even equal to TNB. The second half of 85 was derived from 55.

86. therefore TNB is supreme
87. Therefore, there exists a being that is supreme

Therefore, some being is supreme. It is either the universe or something distinct from the universe. This commits us to either theism or pantheism, and I think the latter is indefensible. If the universe is God (the metaphysical ultimate) then it follows with logical certainty that the universe cannot be improved upon, as it is the greatest conceivable being. This would mean that evil and any other deficiencies in the universe are illusory, and that the universe is temporally necessary. This would mean that the universe never began to exist, and will never go out of existence.

Hence, God exists, and is distinct from the universe.