Presuppositionalism Under the Microscope: A Rejoinder to Critics

In this post, I wanted to offer a quick response to critics of my Presuppositionalism argument. One critic believed that when I accused presuppositionalists of circular reasoning, I failed to draw a distinction between vicious and innocuous circularity. My response is that no such distinction exists. ALL circular reasoning is vicious, because it is reducible to bare assertion.

An example of this circularity would be something like asserting that miracles are impossible because they never happen, and that they never happen because they are impossible. This does not actually explain anything, and is no different than merely asserting that miracles are impossible, period.

One response is that not all forms of circular reasoning are fallacious instances of begging the question. This is true. Circular reasoning sometimes requires begging the question, but not always. Circular logic, regardless of whether it begs the question, cannot prove a conclusion because, if the conclusion is doubted, the premise which leads to it will also be doubted.

 Begging the question: Basing a conclusion on an assumption that is as much in need of proof or demonstration as the conclusion itself.

Someone can try to get around this by stating that some forms of circular reasoning are not fallacious.

Douglas Walton states: Circular sequences of questions and answers are not always fallacious instances of begging the question in all contexts of dialogue.

Suppose I ask you, ‘Why does Bruno like Betty?,’ and you reply, ‘Because Betty likes Bruno.’ This sequence is circular, but it need not be fallacious as an explanation of human behavior…. Whether circular reasoning is fallacious or not depends on the context of the dialogue in which the circular argumentation was used.

The problem here is that the argument is not yet circular, and drawing it in a circle does not prove anything.

The problem is the misunderstanding of "because" statements. If I say "the car is wet because it is raining outside" the statement is equivalent to the following chain of inference:

1. If it's raining outside, the car is wet
2. It's raining outside
3. Therefore, the car is wet.

The argument would be circular if (and only if) the only reason I have for believing 1 or 2 (it doesn't matter which one) is that I already believe 3. The Betty & Bruno statement "Betty loves Bruno because Bruno loves Betty" can be rephrased as:

1. If Bruno loves Betty, then Betty loves Bruno
2. Bruno loves Betty
3. Therefore, Betty loves Bruno

The argument, again, is only circular if the only reason I have for believing one of the premises is that I already believe the conclusion. I see no more reason to think that about the Bruno and Betty argument than I do about the wet car argument.

In fact, language is not defined circularly. The definitions of words in the dictionary are not really definitions, but descriptions. We have experience and ideas associated with these words, and the job of the dictionary is to bring those ideas to the surface. Very few words can be defined exhaustively in terms of other words. Richard Swinburne explains:



With no successful counterexamples, I would like to revisit what my opponents would need to show in order to shoot down my criticism. My hypothesis is that there is no distinction between innocuously circular reasoning and viciously circular reasoning. All that my opponents would need to show is some set of criteria by which they can distinguish the two. So any counterargument would need to take the following form:

1. A circular argument or epistemology is not viciously circular if it meets criteria x, y, and z.
2. Here is why Van Til meets criteria x, y, and z.
3. So, Van Til's epistemology is not viciously circular.

Any attempt to refute me that does not contain such an argument simply cannot affect my hypothesis. Furthermore, the burden of proof rests fully on the presuppositionalist.


Presuppositionalists might go for a "tu quoque" response, stating that if circularity is irrational, then all reasoning is irrational. The problem is that any claim, and any argument to support that claim requires that we have the rational reasoning to come to any sort of a reliable conclusion. Any argument that undercuts the reliability of reason will equally undercut the reasoning which led to that conclusion. Hence, any argument that all reasoning is ultimately circular is self-refuting, and can be immediately dismissed without further argument.

This is similar to people's theories of language and truth. Any worldview that denies absolute and objective meaning or absolute and objective truth is going to be self-refuting, and hence is not worth investigating. In fact, the impossibility of the contrary proves absolute truth and absolute meaning, even if we can give no further account, description, or explanation as to how or why  it is the case. The impossibility of the contrary is sufficient.