Why Calvinism Cannot Solve the Problem of Evil

The problem of evil is a long standing problem in philosophy of religion. If God is perfectly powerful and good, how is it that evil can exist in this world? Since Calvinist theology affirms what is called theistic determinism (that God not only allows evil to exist, but causes evil to exist), the Calvinist is committed not only to the existence of evil, but also to God being the direct cause of it. Hence, a Calvinist cannot argue that the existence of free will removes any guarantee that an omnipotent God will be able to prevent creatures from disobeying. According to Calvinism, God actively determines everything, including acts such as child molestation.

 The Calvinist will then try to defend this by resorting to a defense called instrumentalism.

Instrumentalism: The denial of evil's ultimate character as evil, and the assertion that it is an instrument of good.

James White, a Calvinist, argues that there is no libertarian free will for humans. That is to say that there are no choices made my humans that are not already determined by God. Hence, when challenged on issues of human wickedness, he said that evil needs to exist in this world in order to maximize God's glory and so that we can have an appreciation for the good.

The question then becomes: Do the benefits of these actions outweigh the costs? If not, then the problem remains as to why a perfect God would ordain them. If they do, then instrumentalism collapses into what is called illusionism.

Illusionism: The denial of evil's existence.

Here is how instrumentalism is reducible to illusionism.

Evil, if it is defined in any meaningful sense, is a violation of a moral ought. If someone ought to tell the truth about why he is late to an event, but instead lies about it, then he is saying something other that he ought to be saying. There is a difference between what he is doing and what he ought to do, and therefore the act is evil.

Instrumentalism states that evil is really an instrument for realizing the ultimate good. For example, one needs to see evil in order to appreciate the good. If this is the case, then evil (what ought not to be) is necessary for achieving the good (what ought to be).

This is the same as saying that the instruments for achieving the ultimate good ought not to be.

This is the same as saying that the good ought not to be.

Unless we deny the reality of good itself, then evil, as an instrument for the good, must be good itself. But this is to say that evil is good, and therefore evil is illusory. This is the same as denying the existence of evil.

What about the Calvinist who bites the bullet and states that there is no such thing as evil, so defined?

That is to go out of the frying pan and into the fire. First, we seem to have this belief that evil (what ought not to be) exists. If we have this belief, and it is not true, then that belief is mistaken, and ought not to be. Furthermore, if no evil exists, then why is this explanation offered in the first place? If there is not evil, then no explanation is required. If it does not exist, then it is not illusory, for even the illusion of evil is itself evil.

The problem is that the illusion of evil is just as problematic as the existence of evil itself. Evil then possesses at least an illusory reality, just as the mirage on the road is real as a mirage. And just as the mirage is not explained by calling it a mirage, neither is evil explained by calling itself an illusion.