History of the Ontological Argument

Introduction

Most arguments will point to evidence in the world around us and conclude from that evidence that the best explanation is God. There is also a series of epistemic arguments which argue that one must posit God in order for humans to have true knowledge of anything. Ontological arguments, on the other hand, argue that non-theistic worldviews are incoherent, i.e. that asserting atheism is a bit like asserting that square circles exist.

The argument is subtle, not only with variations between the different authors, but variations in how the individual authors expressed this argument. Even the older versions of this argument are quite a bit stronger than modern philosophers realize, since the “canonical” critiques often overlook subtle and yet critical distinctions in the argument. This paper will first look at the argument through the eyes of Anselm, and through its development up to the version proposed by Alvin Plantinga. It will then look at the argument’s historical critics, and then evaluate the contributions of each person toward the development of the ontological argument.

Anselm

            The original version of the ontological argument goes back to Anselm of Canterbury, specifically to his Proslogion. Anselm thought of God not just as the creator of the universe, but as a being so great, that no one could even think of something that is greater than God.[1] If someone could think of something greater than God, then the creature would pass judgment upon the creator.[2]God either exists in the thought alone, the way that unicorns exist only in the thought, or God exists both in thought and reality. If God only existed in thought, then we could imagine something greater: a God that exists in both thought and reality. Therefore, Anselm concludes, God cannot be thought of as not existing.[3]
            Anselm also cuts off a potential objection. He notes that the Psalmist states “The fool has said in his heart, ‘there is no God.’” If God cannot even be thought of as not existing, then how is it that anyone could fail to believe that God exists? Anselm responds. “A thing is thought of one way which words signifying it are thought. It is quite a different way when the thing is itself understood.”[4]One can assert the words that there is no God, yet this is different than believing in the concept of a godless reality. “Those who say that God does not exist will give the words some other meaning or no meaning. God is greater than which none can be thought. Whoever understands this also understands that God exists in such a way that one cannot even think of him as not existing.”[5]Anselm draws a distinction between the words and that which the words designate. Anselm argues that it is the object that we call God that we cannot even think of as non-existent.

Descartes

            Descartes gives a version of the ontological argument, introducing it in his Discourse on Method and then presenting it fully in his Meditations. In his Discourse, Descartes explains how he came upon the method that would lead to his Meditations. He wondered if he could think of anything more perfect than himself, and said that the fact that he doubted meant that he could not be the most perfect being. He concluded that this idea of a perfection greater than himself could not have been generated internally, and therefore had to be placed in him by a more perfect being.[6]

            In his Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes gives a more detailed explanation in his third meditation. Descartes moves from belief in the self to belief in God. Descartes had been doubting his own existence, and after establishing that, wondering whether his own reasoning and sense experience were valid. He called in God as a guarantor of his sense experience, reasoning from the idea of God to the existence of God. Descartes argued that “something more perfect cannot proceed from that which is less perfect”[7]Even if one could imagine that such a being does not exist, one cannot imagine that his idea represents nothing real.[8]Descartes concludes “I perceive that the objective being of an idea cannot be produced by a being that exists potentially only, which properly speaking is nothing, but only by a being which is formal or actual.”[9]Perhaps as a result of intuition, Descartes infers the existence of a perfect being from its idea.

            Descartes further clarified his position in the introduction to the Meditations. He said that people often object that the idea of something more perfect than oneself entails that the idea is more perfect, much less that it represents an external object. Descartes replied that such an objection commits the fallacy of equivocation. If it is taken as an act of understanding, it cannot be said that the understanding is more perfect than him. If it is taken objectively, as that object which is represented by the act, would be more perfect.[10]

Leibniz

            In his New Essays, Leibniz gives a few of his opinions on the ontological argument as formulated by Descartes. In his opinion, the ontological argument is sound, but has hidden premises in it. It assumes that the idea of a perfect being is a coherent notion, that it does not imply a contradiction, and that such a being possibly exists. He mentions that we can conceive of a perpetual motion machine. We could describe such a device, even though such a device is impossible. Still, Leibniz concludes that “we are entitled to assume the possibility of any being, and above all of God, until someone proves the contrary.”[11]This seems a bit like a Moorean Shift, stating that the possibility that God exists seems more plausible prima facieand demanding that those who argue otherwise give an account for their view.

Gödel

            Kurt Gödel was one of the greatest mathematicians of the 20^th century, and also had his own ontological argument for the existence of God. Godel gave a short logical proof of the existence of God. He argued as his premises that a property is either positive, or its negation is positive, and if two properties are positive, then the conjunction of the two properties is positive. God is defined as that which has every positive property. He also stipulated that all positive properties are necessarily positive, and that necessary existence is positive. Furthermore, all essences of something are necessarily equivalent. He also calls a positive property, one that is positive in the moral aesthetic sense, and as an objective feature of reality.[12]From these premises and axioms, it follows logically that all positive properties can be instantiated in the same thing, and that there is some being that has all these properties, which is what we mean by God.

Plantinga

            Plantinga’s argument uses modal logic with the possible worlds semantics invented by Saul Kripke. Plantinga bases his version of the argument from Norman Malcolm’s version.

Even if an essence entailing is maximally great in W is exemplified, it does not so far follow that this essence entails is maximally great in α. For all we have shown so far, this being might be at a maximum in some world W, but be pretty insignificant in α, our world. So the argument does not show that there is a being that enjoys maximal greatness in fact; it shows at most that there is a being that in some world or other has maximal greatness.[13]

What Plantinga is arguing is that there is a difference between stating that a maximally great being has necessary existence, and that a maximally great being has the properties of omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence in every possible world. Perhaps such a being would be omniperfect in one world, and impotent in another. It would have the properties stipulated by Malcolm, and yet would fail to demonstrate that such a being exists in this world. Plantinga modifies this argument by stating that the property of being omniperfect can be called “maximal excellence” and that the property of maximal greatness is to possess maximal excellence in every possible world.[14]This gets around the flaw in Malcolm’s version.

            Plantinga then advances the argument as follows:

1.      The property has maximal greatnessentails the property has maximal excellence in every possible world.

2.      Maximal excellence entails omnipotence, omniscience, and moral perfection.

3.      Maximal greatness is possibly exemplified.

This shows that there is some possible world where a being has maximal greatness, which then means that such a being has maximal excellence in every possible world. He argues that it might be a weak argument, since there is not much warrant for believing that maximal greatness is possibly exemplified unless one already believes that a maximally great being exists.

Gaunilo

            Gaunilo was Anselm’s first critic. Despite being pious himself, he found difficulties, not so much with Anselm’s perfect being theology, but in his use of it to demonstrate the existence of God. Gaunilo gives a reductio argument against Anselm. The former argues that we often talk about nonexistent things. Perhaps God exists in the mind only in the sense that the fool understands what Anselm is saying. A picture first exists in the painter’s mind, and then in reality. There needs to be a distinction between entertaining an idea in the mind and understanding that the corresponding object exists, and Gaunilo argues that Anselm’s argument can be reduced to absurdity because it fails to take that into account. Furthermore, there seems to be no point in arguing that God exists if it is impossible to imagine that God does not exist. “For if God cannot be thought not to exist, then what is the point of launching this whole argument against someone who might deny that something of such a nature actually exists?”[15] Gaunilo hints that the ontological argument might be self-refuting.

            Finally, Gaunilo parodies the argument with his idea of a most perfect island, which cannot be imagined not to exist. Does this imply that such an island exists? Gaunilo also draws a distinction between objects that cannot fail to exist and objects that cannot be imagined not to exist. He says that he is not sure if he can imagine himself as non-existing, even though he thinks of himself as a contingent being.

            Anselm replies to Gaunilo. The painting is a bad analogy, since objects that begin to exist are contingent objects. “Whatever can be thought of yet does not actually exist, could, if it did come to exist, not existence again in reality and in the mind.”[16]This reply seems a bit different from the other reply, since it appears to be asserting that if God exists, he exists necessarily. This is different than saying that the concept of God entails his existence.

Aquinas

            Thomas Aquinas is one of the most eminent critics of Anselm’s ontological argument, responding in his Summa Theologiae.

[H]e who hears the name "God" may perhaps not know that it signifies "something greater than which cannot be conceived," since some people have thought of God as a body. Granting, however, that someone should think of God in this way, namely as "that being a greater than which cannot be conceived, "it does not follow on this account that the person must understand what is signified to exist in the world of fact, but only in the mind. Nor can one argue that it exists in fact unless one grants that there actually exists in fact something a greater than which cannot be conceived. It is, however, precisely this assertion the atheist denies.[17]

Aquinas did not believe that the ontological argument was helpful in establishing the existence of God. It, according to Aquinas, seems to beg the question against the atheist. Aquinas also argues that we seem to have a muddled and confused knowledge of God. It is one thing to know that someone is approaching, and another to know who is approaching. The fact that people have some innate sense of God does not mean that people have innate knowledge of an accurate view of God.

Hume

            Hume attacks several species of argument for the existence of God in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.

Nothing exists without a cause; and the original cause of this universe (whatever it be) we call God; and piously ascribe to him every species of perfection. Whoever scruples this fundamental truth, deserves every punishment which can be inflicted among philosophers, to wit, the greatest ridicule, contempt, and disapprobation. But as all perfection is entirely relative, we ought never to imagine that we comprehend the attributes of this divine Being, or to suppose that his perfections have any analogy or likeness to the perfections of a human creature. . . But let us beware, lest we think that our ideas anywise correspond to his perfections, or that his attributes have any resemblance to these qualities among men. He is infinitely superior to our limited view and comprehension; and is more the object of worship in the temple, than of disputation in the schools.[18]

Hume attacks the doctrine that God should even be seen as the most perfect being. His attack is twofold: first, that the arguments for God fall far short of establishing God as a perfect being; second, there is no reason to think that what humans believe to be attributes of a perfect being are in fact the actual attributes that would comprise a most perfect being. This is because Hume’s starting point is that “our ideas reach no further than our experience.”[19]We can know nothing a priori.[20]Since the ontological argument is an a priori argument, this objection would immediately dismiss all types of ontological arguments.

            Hume then attacks the ontological argument directly. Again, he asserts his empiricism before his analysis of the argument itself.          

Nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies a contradiction. Nothing, that is distinctly conceivable, implies a contradiction. Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non-existent. There is no being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a contradiction. Consequently there is no being, whose existence is demonstrable.[21]

This is more of an assertion than an actual argument, but Hume buttresses this with an additional explanation. According to Hume, we could always conceive of the non-existence of any existing thing. The mind need not, and indeed has no justification, of believing that something that currently exists cannot cease to exist. Hume concludes that the term “necessary being” is either meaningless or at least cannot be given a consistent definition.[22]

Kant

            The Critique of pure Reason was a turning point in the history of philosophy. Kant’s key point is that the necessity of judgments is not the same is the necessity of things.[23]It may be necessary to think that a triangle is defined as that which has three sides. It is different to infer from this anything about reality. Kant argues that contradiction arises when we cancel a predicate that a subject needs in order to maintain its identity. Kant says that one can instead cancel the subject, no contradiction arises. If one cancels the idea of a triangle, the property of having three angles will be cancelled with it.[24]“To posit a triangle and cancel its three angles is contradictory; but to cancel the triangle together with its three angles is not a contradiction. It is exactly the same with an absolutely necessary being. If you cancel its existence, then you cancel the thing itself with all of its predicates; where is the contradiction supposed to come from?”[25]

            Kant then argues that God as a necessary and existing being is either analytic or synthetic. If it is analytic, then the argument becomes a tautology. Existence is conflated with possibility, and then inferred from possibility. If all positing is called “reality” then all one does by positing God is saying that one is positing what one is positing. Existence adds nothing to one’s thought of the object. If the property of divine existence is synthetic, then one can cancel existence without contradiction, since contradiction only arises when cancelling analytic properties.[26]“Being is obviously not a real predicate, i.e., a concept of something that could add to the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing or of certain determinations in themselves.”[27]This is the crux of Kant’s argument. He states that being, or existence, is not a property of anything. If it was, then the thing as it exists in the understanding would be different than the thing that is instantiated in reality. If that were the case, then we could never say that the thing in our concept has been instantiated in reality. Kant then states that if we were to make existence one of Kant’s a prioricategories, then we would not be able to distinguish it from mere possibility. Kant states again that we cannot obtain possibility through anything other than the synthetic cognition. Kant concludes that “a human being can no more become richer in insight from mere ideas than a merchant could in resources if he wanted to improve his financial state by adding a few zeroes to his cash balance.”[28]

Hegel

            In the spirit of continental philosophy, Hegel gives his thoughts on the matter. He opens by mentioning the Notion of God, which is meant as a sort of conception that we have regarding a perfect being, whereby Being is part of the conception.[29]Hegel also argues that the concept of God is how he seems to us in the finite spirit.[30] “The Notion of God is that of something boundless, not boundless in the bad sense, but rather as representing what has at the same time the most determinate character possible, pure self-determination.”[31]Unlike other arguments which proceed from the finite world to an infinite God, the ontological argument begins with this Notion.

            Hegel then begins his criticism of the ontological argument. “If God is defined as the Substance of all realities, then Being does not belong to Him, for Being is no reality. It makes no difference to the Notion or conception whether it exists or does not exist, it remains the same.”[32]He then states that in the ontological argument, the Notion of God and the existence of God form a single identity, so that God cannot be conceived without existing. “What is unsatisfactory in this view is that we have here a presupposition, and this means that the Notion measured by this standard of hypothetical necessity must be something subjective.”[33]Hegel argues that subjectivity is inherently finite, which is contradictory to the Notion of God as the infinite.

Observations

            The ontological argument has shown great resiliency to criticism, which explains its longevity. Anselm’s original version of the argument has merit, and would be worth pursuing in natural theology, even if later philosophers had not improved upon it. Many attacks came upon it, but none of the counter-arguments are decisive. No one has ever marshalled a reductio ad absurdum against it. The island parody was refuted rather quickly. There is a difference between talk about a greatest conceivable object within some category, and a greatest conceivable object simpliciter. The latter quantifies over the whole range of being, rather than just a subset of it. Furthermore, islands have great-making properties which do not have obvious maxima. No matter how many good things this island would have, one only need add an additional good thing and the island would be greater. This is not so regarding beings. Power seems to top out at omnipotence, for example.

The formulation by Descartes appears less like an ontological argument, and more like a transcendental argument for the existence of God. Descartes takes the reliability of our mental faculties for granted, and then posits God as a guarantor of this. This is different than using the divine properties alone as justification of the existence of this perfect being. He does, however, give a sketch of the ontological argument that is made complete by Leibniz.

Kurt Gödel paved the way for more rigorous versions of the ontological argument, such as those by Plantinga and Maydole. Gödel’s argument is formal, deductive, and valid. Hence, one cannot deny the conclusions without denying and justifying the denial of, one of the premises. One obvious path of attack is to deny the existence of positive properties, but this seems a bit desperate. Another route is to deny that every property is either positive or has a negation that is positive. Tautological properties such as “being self-identical” do not appear to be positive properties. Properties such as “being green” or “not being green” do not seem to be positive properties. If they were, one would be positive, but it is not obvious which one. Another criticism can be against Gödel’s logic. The second-order logic that Gödel uses is neither consistent nor complete, so one may still evade the argument by claiming that the ontological argument is more like a paradox of the system, the way that Liar and Curry paradoxes, as well as Russell’s paradox, arise as a consequence of this logical system.

Robert Maydole explains one of the more devastating critiques of Gödel’s argument. First, Godel’s argument shows that if there is a positive property, then every tautological property is also a positive property. Worse, Sobel gave an argument that Godel’s ontological argument leads to modal collapse, where all propositions become necessary propositions.[34]Gödel’s argument may be valid, but it is not sound.

Alvin Plantinga serves as the gateway into the most recent versions of the argument. His modal version is valid, and only the first premise, regarding the possibility of this maximally great being, is seriously challenged in the literature. The other premises are fairly uncontroversial. The real issue with Plantinga’s version is that the first premise is not that different from the conclusion of the argument. Indeed, the possibility of a maximally great being is logically equivalent to the existence of such a being.

Aquinas critiques the argument by stating that people can have misconceptions about God, but one might ask whether these misconceptions are really about God, and not about something else. If someone talks about the Titanic, and identifies it as a tin whistle that can be held in the palm of one’s hand, then that person is not really talking about the Titanic. Aquinas does help to draw a distinction between conceiving of something and imagining something. Conceiving means to form a coherent concept, while imagining generally involves forming images in one’s mind. One can conceive of highly complex structures without being able to imagine them. One can conceive of triangularity and yet not imagine it, since the idea is different than any particular triangle.

Hume’s critique is somewhat puzzling. On one hand, he wants to affirm that nothing in the mind exists which is not based on experience. On the other hand, he wants to draw general conclusions which cannot simply be known through repeat observation. Greg Bahnsen observes the trouble with Hume’s line of reasoning.

Hume’s strict empiricism landed into utter skepticism by his own admission. Hume’s philosophy led to skepticism about God, the external world, the existence of the self and all scientific reasoning. Even Hume’s attempt to explain why humans engage in inductive reasoning he said “by force of natural instinct or habit, they do this regardless of rational justification.” Even this attempt rests on the validity of inductive inference, now about human nature and the alleged workings of the human mind and habits. Furthermore, any attempt to mitigate Hume’s skepticism by turning toward a pragmatic interest in action and problem solving rather than theoretical demands of a philosophy, is not only a philosophical cop-out but itself rests upon the premise of experience and regularities in the behavior of nature and man, from which generalizations we are allowed to make successful plans of action. Even the pragmatic attempt to deal with Hume’s skepticism rests upon the very regularity of nature which Hume’s philosophy rules out as intellectual illegitimate. Hume’s anti-metaphysical empiricism proved to destroy objectivity, rationality and science.[35]

Hume’s skepticism becomes like the universal acid, which no one can ever use, since it dissolves any container. The inability for Hume’s empiricism to justify inductive reasoning, which is the foundation of knowledge on empiricism, makes the price of his worldview so high, that no one who holds to it could seriously do science. If the price of denying the ontological argument is total skepticism about the external world, induction, and the existence of the self, then the ontological argument has done its job in reducing atheism to absurdity.

            Kant’s critique of the argument is likely the most difficult to answer. It is more thorough, and does not beg the question in the same way as Hume’s critique does. Hume’s system was so thoroughly mired in skepticism, that no one could seriously live their lives as though they actually believed what he was teaching. Kant was much more subtle, and gave justification for how we could trust our a priori intuitions, at least regarding the world of appearance. The philosophical price of embracing Kant’s system was much smaller, and one could live consistently with it.

            It does seem to be the case that existence is not something we predicate of objects. To say “my car is blue, about 10 years old, stick shift, and existing” seems like an odd description. If the car did not exist, it would not have those other properties. One line of defense is to assert that all objects exist necessarily, but some objects have concreteness as a contingent property. One could then argue that to be concrete is greater than to be abstract, and the ontological argument evades Kant’s critique. Robert Maydole notes that “it is important not to conflate existence-in-reality with existence generally.”[36]Anselm believed that things that exist in the understanding exist just as much as things that exist in reality. In short, Anselm did not believe that existence was a predicate. Kant’s rebuttal is far from decisive, but it is still too strong to ignore. If existence in the understanding is a distinct property from existence in reality, then the ontological argument may be a form of equivocation, at least if the identity of indescernibles holds.

Plantinga also gave a devastating critique of Kant in God and Other Minds.  “Although the argument certainly looks at first sight as if it ought to be unsound, it is profoundly difficult to say what exactly is wrong with it. Indeed, it is doubtful that any philosopher has given a really convincing and thorough refutation of the ontological argument.”[37]He then mentions Kant’s critique, and notes that Kant never gave a rigorous enough definition of “is a predicate” in a clear enough way that existence cannot be a predicate, or even that Anselm’s version requires existence to be one. He also gives his criticism of Kant’s argument regarding God’s necessary existence being a synthetic truth.

But what could Kant possibly mean when he says that there is nothing "outside of" God that could be contradicted by the denial of His existence? Presumably it is propositions that could contradict it; and there are plenty of them that do so, whether or not God exists. Does he perhaps mean to say that no true proposition would contradict the denial of God's existence? But this would be to hold that God does not exist, which is certainly nothing Kant is prepared to affirm. Does he mean that no necessarily true proposition would contradict it? But surely this would beg the whole question; for the claim that the proposition God does not exist is not inconsistent with any necessary proposition, is logically equivalent to the claim that God exists is not necessarily true.[38]

Kant’s arguments seem less forceful when they are analyzed critically. Plantinga argues that it is Kant who begs the question in his attack on the ontological argument. Kant’s argument may be little more than an assertion that no propositions about what exists are necessary.

            Hegel builds on Kant’s critique, but adds little to it. His argument seems to assert its conclusions, rather than reasoning toward them. Hegel is already convinced that human thought is incapable of grasping the infinite, and hence, unable to deliver ontological arguments. He also assumes that the notion of greatness or of perfection are subjective notions, rather than human recognition of objective features of reality.

Conclusion

The ontological argument certainly had its challengers, but is still going strong today. The argument is rationalist in nature, which becomes the focus of its more recent critiques. They assume that humans do not have innate ideas, and hence are limited in thought to the deliverance of sense experience. Such epistemologies bear a burden of proof that must be met in order to guarantee the success of such counter-arguments. It seems difficult, even in principle, for epistemologies which deny absolute knowledge of such universals to lay claim to such absolute knowledge of such a universal principle as empiricism itself.

Modern builds of the ontological argument need to address Kant’s criticisms first and foremost. It was Kant who rightly stated that existence is not a predicate. Things cannot be stipulated into existence, and any viable version of the ontological argument must avoid this pitfall. The ontological argument cannot provide an airtight proof based on indubitable premises, since a determined critic, like Hume, can question even the reliability of our mental faculties. Instead, the argument will have to be based on premises which are more intuitively plausible than their negations. Plantinga has given us a sketch of such a proof, but there needs to be a stronger case for the possibility premise in order for the argument to have any reasonable strength. This will need to be the subject of future investigations.

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[1] Anselm, Proslogion ch. 2.

[2] Ibid., ch 4.

[3] Ibid., ch 3.

[4] Ibid., ch 4.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Descartes, Discourse on Method, ch. 4.

[7] René Descartes, Discourse On Method and Meditations, trans. Elizabeth Sanderson Haldane and G R T. Ross Dover Philosophical Classics (Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications, 2003), 87.

[8] Ibid., 88.

[9] Ibid., 89.

[10] Ibid., 60.

[11] Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, New Essays On Human Understanding. Edited and translated by Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett. 1 vols. Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy, 219.

[12] Kurt Gödel, 1995, "Ontological Proof". Collected Works: Unpublished Essays & Lectures, Volume III, 403-404.

[13] Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974),  213.

[14] Ibid., 214.

[15] Guanilo.

[16] Anselm, Reply to Guanilo.

[17] Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Part 1, Q2, A1.

[18] David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, 1779, edited with an introduction by H. Aiken, London: Macmillan, 1948, 13.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Hume, 16.

[21] Ibid., 45-46.

[22] Ibid., 46.

[23] Ibid., 564.

[24] Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ed. and trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 565.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid., 566.

[27] Ibid., 567.

[28] Ibid., 569.

[29] G.W.F. Hegel, Amplification of the Ontological Proof, from Wikisource https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lectures_on_the_Proofs_of_the_Existence_of_God/Amplification_of_the_Ontological_Proof_1831 360.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid., 361.

[32] Ibid, 363.

[33] Ibid, 364.

[34] William Lane Craig and James Porter Moreland, eds., The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology(Chichester, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 577.

[35] Greg Bahnsen, “The Debate that Never Happened,” http://trueforms.wordpress.com/2013/07/22/greg-bahnsen-vs-michael-martin-opening-remarks/

[36] Craig, 554-555.

[37] Alvin Plantinga, God and Other Minds: A Study of the Rational Justification of Belief in God, Cornell Paperbacks (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1990), 27.

[38] Ibid., 31.

Chizuk Emunah (Pt 2) Under the Microscope: Chapter 27

Matthew 28:18, "And Jesus came and spake unto them (i. e. his disciples). All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth." This passage does not show that he was a Divine Being; for, had he been so, he would not have asserted that the power was given to him. To God, nothing can be given; for "Unto him belongeth the dominion and the power." He is the Giver, and not the Receiver. It could not be maintained that Jesus received the dominion from his Father, for in that case the Bestower and the Acceptor must incontestably be considered as two separate and distinct Beings. This concludes our views concerning the book of Matthew.

In this passage, Jesus is making allusion to the one like a son of man in Daniel. Here is the relevant passage:

I saw in the night visions, and behold, with the clouds of heaven there came one like a Son of Man, and he came to the Ancient of Days and was presented before him. And to him was given dominion and glory and a kingdom, that all peoples, nations, and languages should serve him; his dominion is an everlasting dominion, which shall not pass away, and his kingdom one that shall not be destroyed. (Daniel 7:13-14)

We also have a hymn in Philippians 2 called the Carmen Christi which explains this situation:

Have this mind among yourselves, which is yours in Christ Jesus, who, though he was in the form of God, did not count equality with God a thing to be grasped, but emptied himself, by taking the form of a servant, being born in the likeness of men. And being found in human form, he humbled himself by becoming obedient to the point of death, even death on a cross. Therefore God has highly exalted him and bestowed on him the name that is above every name, so that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, in heaven and on earth and under the earth, and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father. (Philippians 2:5-11)

 Again, the rabbis simply beg the question by assuming that God is not able to enter into his own creation in physical form. Jesus in his divine nature did have such power, but now the new person who was created by the divine Logos taking on the form of a servant, that person Jesus, as man, received such exaltation. The New Testament repeatedly teaches that Jesus is both God and man, and so both need to be taken into account when evaluating his position.

As Paul writes in Philippians, Jesus was in the form of God, and hence was God. He did not think of equality as a thing to be grasped, or to be held onto at all costs, but became a servant. For Jesus to assert his divine power while incarnate would violate the point of the incarnation. The divine Logos had to take on a fully human nature in order to redeem it. This passage also uses the word "God" in two different senses. The first use is as the God of the universe, and the second is meant to denote the Father, even though the Son and Holy Spirit are equally God.

Troki also charges Matthew with treating the Father and the Son as two separate beings, when Matthew does nothing of the sort. They are indeed separate persons, but that does not mean they are separate beings. We make the distinction between being and person all the time. A pen is a being. It is an object that exists. It is not a person. Being is what you are. Person is who you are. God is one being, but multiple persons. Postmodernists argue that God is not conscious, but beyond consciousness. However, they then describe God as though he is unconscious. They should instead describe God not as conscious, but as super-conscious, which is sort of what the trinity is.

Chizuk Emunah (Pt 2) Under the Microscope: Chapter 26

Matthew 27:46, "And about the ninth hour, Jesus cried with a loud voice, saying, 'Eli, Eli, lama sabachthani,'—that is to say, 'My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me'"? See the same passage in Mark 15:34. By this exclamation, Jesus clearly announced that he was not a God, but was like other mortals, who invoke God in the day of trouble. 

Not only has Troki used this, but the proponents of the Zealot hypothesis, such as Shmuley Boteach and Reza Aslan have used this quote to suggest that Jesus was a political zealot who cried this out in defeat after his failed revolution. All such hypotheses have the same method: emphasize one aspect of Jesus and dismiss all the passages against it as later historical invention.

Father Robert Barron explains:


Proponents of the zealot hypothesis have to dismiss all the early material to the contrary, even the material in Mark (considered by secular scholars as the earliest and most historically reliable of the gospels) as a later invention, yet they have no criteria for separating fact from fiction, other than their hypothesis. Interestingly enough, Mark's gospel is mostly a series of miracles performed by Jesus. In several of the stories, Jesus rebukes the Pharisees and leaders of the Jews, foretells his own death, foretells the destruction of the temple, yet there is not a shred of evidence that Jesus had ever meant to start a violent revolution. A ministry of healing miracles is not something you would expect from a militant zealot. All of the evidence that Boteach and Aslan use to establish Jesus as a failed zealot come from sources less reliable than the miracle stories that make up the majority of Mark.

Of course, we haven't answered Troki's challenge yet. Why would Jesus, who was God in the flesh, who freely accepted worship, and repeatedly used divine prerogatives such as the forgiveness of sins cry out to God? The answer should be obvious if you have been reading this blog for any length of time. In the Tanakh, there are two names used for God: Yahweh, and Elohim. The Septuagint translates these as Kurios (Lord) and ho Theos (the God) respectively.

This is the key to the New Testament use of those terms. God can sometimes mean God simpliciter, sometimes means divinity, and sometimes means God the Father. Paul follows this tradition quite thoroughly. He repeatedly makes distinctions between Jesus and the Father and yet says that in Jesus, all the fullness of deity dwells in bodily form. See my two other posts:
Jesus as God: Clearing the Ground
Jesus as God: a Biblical Case

In fact, one does not even need to go to Paul to find this trinitarian view of God. Jesus himself says this in Matthew 28. "Go therefore and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit." That word for name is singular; it is the one name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. You don't baptize in the one name of God, a prophet, and a force.

If you still have issues with Jesus saying those words, keep in mind that he was quoting the opening verse of Psalm 22, perhaps a hint that this psalm was ultimately about him. Matthew was certainly not shy about applying passages in Tanakh to Jesus.

Chizuk Emunah (Pt 2) Under the Microscope: Chapter 25

Matthew 27:9, 10, "Then was fulfilled that which was spoken by Jeremiah the prophet, saying, And they took the thirty pieces of silver, the price of him that was valued, and whom they of the children of Israel did value, and gave them for the potter's field, as the Lord appointed me." Here, again, we meet with the usual misapplication of Scriptural passages. The quotation, taken from Zechariah 11:12, 13, runs as follows: "So they weighed for my price thirty pieces of silver. And the Lord said unto me, Cast it unto the potter," etc. The unbiased reader need merely refer to the context from which this passage is extracted, in order to obtain the conviction that the prophet wished to convey a far different idea than Matthew found in it. Zechariah, in the chapter before us, represents the fate of the children of Judah during the captivity, who had become the prey of their enemy for having transgressed the commandments of the Almighty, and hence he designates the Jews of the second temple as the flock of the slaughter.

The prophet Zechariah's account (in chap. 11:7) of his taking two staves, the name of the one being "Beauty," and the name of the other "Bands," must not be viewed in its literal, but in its metaphorical sense. The staves signify the leaders of Israel, for the shepherd conducts his flock by means of the staff or crook in his hand. Now the prophet hereby intimates that Israel would be treated according to the merit of their doings. The Staff "Beauty" (i. e. lenient treatment) was used in the early days of the second temple, when such leaders as Nehemiah and Zerubbabel stood at the helm of Government; while the misgovernment of the succeeding rulers, which crippled and ultimately destroyed the energies and well-being of Israel, was designated "Bands" (i. e., harsh treatment). The simultaneous death of three righteous leaders, alluded to by the prophet, may have been in reference to Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi, after whose decease severe calamities came upon the Jewish nation.

The shepherd in the prophecy claims his wages—that is to say, he demands that the pious observance of the Divine statutes should be offered as a compensation for the special favours of the Almighty. The thirty pieces of silver are a figurative representation of the righteous men of the time, who were cast to their potter (i. e. literally thrown upon the mercy of their former or Creator). The Staff (termed Bands) was broken; for we learn from our history that the misrule prevailing in Jerusalem was productive of Israel's overthrow. Indeed, it seemed as if every successive bad Government had been destined to be the avenger of the misdeeds of its predecessor. Whether it be correct or not, to refer the details of the prophecy to certain known historical characters, this much is evident, that the political government of the Jews, and their destiny, are the circumstances alluded to by the prophet. No thinking man can, however, admit that the prophecy had reference to Jesus, in whose fate his Jewish contemporaries were so little concerned. 

We are back to the New Testament use of the Tanakh, and specifically Matthew's use of Zechariah. Troki's point is that this prophecy is about Israel and not about Jesus. The New Testament writers, and Matthew in particular, argue that Jesus is Israel personified. He is everything that Israel ought to have been. Michael Brown makes a similar point where Olympic athletes represent their country. So when Gal Fridman won the men's sailboard event in 2004, it was Gold for Israel. One could say that Israel wins the Gold medal, even though it was technically Fridman who won the medal.

Much of the argument in Troki's chapter is based on an allegorical reading of Zechariah 11:1-17. The problem with these kinds of readings is that it's to easy to write into the passage whatever you feel like writing. Matthew's point is that Zechariah had two oddly specific details in that passage: that the price was 30 pieces of silver, and that it was thrown to the potter. This hardly seems to be a coincidence. So, Matthew put this in his writings.

There is an issue with Matthew mentioning Jeremiah, even though it was Zechariah who mentioned the 30 pieces of silver. Matthew blended quotes from Jeremiah 18:2 and 19:1 with one from Zechariah. As the International Critical Commentary on the Bible states:

In early Christian circles, such citations were sometimes attributed to one rather than two sources. Mk 1:2 attributes Mal 3:1 + Isa 40:3 to Isaiah. Rom 9:27 assigns Hos 2:1 + Isa 10:22 to the same prophet. Mt 2:5– attributes to ‘the prophet’ a quotation from Mic 5:2 + 2 Sam 5:2 = 1 Chr 11:2, and 21:5 prefaces its conflation of Isa 62:11 and Zech 9:9 with ‘the word through the prophet saying’ Mt 27:9–10 is one more example of this phenomenon. That Jeremiah is named rather than Zechariah (who is never assigned a quotation in the NT despite several citations) may be due to the prominence of the former or to his reputation as the prophet of doom or to Matthew's desire to call attention to what might otherwise be missed (whereas the use of Zechariah is obvious; cf. Senior). The effect in any event is to prod us to read Zech 11:13 in the light of Jer 18:1ff. (the allegory of the potter) and 32:6–15 (Jeremiah’ purchase of a field with silver).

Additional reading on the issue can be found at Christian-Thinktank: http://christianthinktank.com/judas30where.html

and Apologetics Press: http://www.apologeticspress.org/apcontent.aspx?category=6&article=658

Chizuk Emunah (Pt 2) Under the Microscope: Chapter 24

Matthew 26:39, "And he (Jesus) went a little further and fell on his face, and prayed, saying, O, my Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me; nevertheless, not as I will, but as thou wilt." See likewise Mark 14:35, and Luke 22:41. This passage refutes the Christian belief, that Jesus offered himself spontaneously as the sacrifice for the salvation of mankind. If that had been the case, why should he have hesitated and prayed for the removal of the bitter cup of his portion; and why should he have exclaimed. "My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me"! (see Matthew 27:46). This is another proof that the Father and the Son are not identical, and that the design of the one does not accord with that of the other.

This objection is similar to the following conundrum:

Is the sin of any man committed with the will of God or against it? If he answers "with the will of God," then every sinner ought to find favour with God; if he says "against the will of God," then God is not supreme. In other words the dilemma proposed by the Rabbi is precisely the same as that of the existence of evil, and the commission of any act of sin.

Of course, this ignores the distinction between what God desires and what he permits. If "with the will of God" means "with the permission of God" then in that sense we sin with the will of God. We have been given free will, meaning that our will is not deterministic. God permits us to act against him because he respects our freedom.

Getting back to the issue at hand, why would Jesus have prayed as he did if he undertook this mission of redemption? It shows that Jesus had human emotions and feelings. He did not try to escape what was coming to him. Even in the exact same chapter (Matthew 26), we see the following:

Jesus said to him, “Friend, do what you came to do.” Then they came up and laid hands on Jesus and seized him. And behold, one of those who were with Jesus stretched out his hand and drew his sword and struck the servant of the high priest and cut off his ear. Then Jesus said to him, “Put your sword back into its place. For all who take the sword will perish by the sword. Do you think that I cannot appeal to my Father, and he will at once send me more than twelve legions of angels? But how then should the Scriptures be fulfilled, that it must be so?” (Matthew 26:50-54)

Jesus was still in control, but that did not change the fact that he still felt fear, just as he felt temptation when confronted by Satan earlier. Fear causes us to act irrationally, and the mark of bravery is not that we do not feel fear, but that we act wisely in spite of that fear.
 
A. Lukyn Williams also adds the following remark:

Why was Jesus troubled if it was His will to suffer? What? Did the Rabbi never make up his mind to perform a difficult task, and yet shrink from it, even pray God that he might not have to carry out his purpose? I have no doubt that as a God-fearing Jew he did. And should not Jesus (man in the truest and fullest sense, though also God) shrink from what was ten thousand times worse for Him than for men generally, death, with the hiding of that Face for a moment, in the light of which He had up to that time continuously walked?

Chizuk Emunah (Pt 2) Under the Microscope: Chapter 23

Matthew 26:6, 7, "Now when Jesus was in Bethany, in the house of Simon the leper, there came unto him a woman having an alabaster box of very precious ointment, and poured it on his head." In Mark 14:3, the narrative is given in the following words, "And being in Bethany, in the house of Simon the leper, there came a woman having an alabaster box of ointment of spikenard, very precious, and she brake the box and poured it on his head." In Luke 7:37, 38, however, the version is far different; "And behold a woman brought an alabaster box of ointment, and stood at his feet behind him, and anointed them with ointment." Then Jesus said to Simon, the master of the house (ver. 46), "my head with oil thou didst not anoint, but this woman hath anointed my feet with ointment."

In John 12:3. the story is narrated thus: "Then took Mary a pound of ointment of spikenard, very costly, and anointed the feet of Jesus." These extracts, from the several books of the New Testament, are curious specimens of the want of agreement between the several authors, who of necessity would have been in perfect unanimity, had they been under the influence of Divine inspiration. 

First, let me say that this issue applies even more to the Tanakh than it does to the New Testament. A quick search for "contradictions" between the Kings and Chronicles books shows how easy it is to find these difficulties if you are reading the passages uncharitably.

In the book of 1 Kings Chapter 4 verse 26 we are told that Solomon had 40,000 horses. 2 Chronicles Chapter 9 verse 25 states that he had 4,000 horses. Solomon had 3,300 foremen according to 1 Kings Chapter 5 verse 16 , and 3,600 according to 2 Chronicles Chapter 2 verse 2 . The two pillars were 18 cubits high as described in 1 Kings Chapter 7 verse 15 . This was of course wrong. According to 2 Chronicles Chapter 3 verse 15 they were 35 cubits high. Solomon's molten sea held 16,000 gallons (1 Kings Chapter 7 verse 26) or 24,000 gallons (2 Chronicles Chapter 4 verse 5) . And either 420 talents of gold were brought from Ophir for use in the temple construction (1 Kings Chapter 9 verse 28) or 450 talents (2 Chronicles Chapter 8 verse 18) . Solomon had 550 overseers (1 Kings Chapter 9 verse 23) or only 250 (2 Chronicles Chapter 8 verse 10) . When he began to reign Jehoiakim was either 18 and reigned 3 months after which time his uncle took the throne (2 Kings Chapter 24 verse 8) or 8 and reigned 3 months and 10 days and then his brother began to rule (2 Chronicles Chapter 36 verse 9) . Ahaziah was either 22 when he came to the throne (2 Kings Chapter 8 verse 26) or 42 (2 Chronicles Chapter 22 verse 2) .

Ok, so what is going on here with the New Testament passages? We have a story that is covered in all 4 Gospels: Jesus being anointed at Bethany. Here are the passages in their entirety:

Now when Jesus was at Bethany in the house of Simon the leper, a woman came up to him with an alabaster flask of very expensive ointment, and she poured it on his head as he reclined at table. And when the disciples saw it, they were indignant, saying, “Why this waste?  For this could have been sold for a large sum and given to the poor.” But Jesus, aware of this, said to them, “Why do you trouble the woman? For she has done a beautiful thing to me. For you always have the poor with you, but you will not always have me. In pouring this ointment on my body, she has done it to prepare me for burial. Truly, I say to you, wherever this gospel is proclaimed in the whole world, what she has done will also be told in memory of her.” (Matthew 26:6-13)

And while he was at Bethany in the house of Simon the leper, as he was reclining at table, a woman came with an alabaster flask of ointment of pure nard, very costly, and she broke the flask and poured it over his head. There were some who said to themselves indignantly, “Why was the ointment wasted like that? For this ointment could have been sold for more than three hundred denarii and given to the poor.” And they scolded her. But Jesus said, “Leave her alone. Why do you trouble her? She has done a beautiful thing to me. For you always have the poor with you, and whenever you want, you can do good for them. But you will not always have me. She has done what she could; she has anointed my body beforehand for burial. And truly, I say to you, wherever the gospel is proclaimed in the whole world, what she has done will be told in memory of her.” (Mark 14:3-9)

One of the Pharisees asked him to eat with him, and he went into the Pharisee's house and reclined at the table. And behold, a woman of the city, who was a sinner, when she learned that he was reclining at table in the Pharisee's house, brought an alabaster flask of ointment, and standing behind him at his feet, weeping, she began to wet his feet with her tears and wiped them with the hair of her head and kissed his feet and anointed them with the ointment. Now when the Pharisee who had invited him saw this, he said to himself, “If this man were a prophet, he would have known who and what sort of woman this is who is touching him, for she is a sinner.” And Jesus answering said to him, “Simon, I have something to say to you.” And he answered, “Say it, Teacher.” “A certain moneylender had two debtors. One owed five hundred denarii, and the other fifty. When they could not pay, he cancelled the debt of both. Now which of them will love him more?” Simon answered, “The one, I suppose, for whom he cancelled the larger debt.” And he said to him, “You have judged rightly.” Then turning toward the woman he said to Simon, “Do you see this woman? I entered your house; you gave me no water for my feet, but she has wet my feet with her tears and wiped them with her hair. You gave me no kiss, but from the time I came in she has not ceased to kiss my feet. You did not anoint my head with oil, but she has anointed my feet with ointment. Therefore I tell you, her sins, which are many, are forgiven—for she loved much. But he who is forgiven little, loves little.” And he said to her, “Your sins are forgiven.” Then those who were at table with him began to say among themselves, “Who is this, who even forgives sins?” And he said to the woman, “Your faith has saved you; go in peace.” (Luke 7:36-50)

Six days before the Passover, Jesus therefore came to Bethany, where Lazarus was, whom Jesus had raised from the dead. So they gave a dinner for him there. Martha served, and Lazarus was one of those reclining with him at table. Mary therefore took a pound of expensive ointment made from pure nard, and anointed the feet of Jesus and wiped his feet with her hair. The house was filled with the fragrance of the perfume. But Judas Iscariot, one of his disciples (he who was about to betray him), said, “Why was this ointment not sold for three hundred denarii and given to the poor?” He said this, not because he cared about the poor, but because he was a thief, and having charge of the moneybag he used to help himself to what was put into it. Jesus said, “Leave her alone, so that she may keep it for the day of my burial. For the poor you always have with you, but you do not always have me.” (John 12:1-8)

The difference between the accounts is more than just Jesus having his feet anointed vs. having his head anointed. Take Luke and John for example. In Luke, they are at the house of one of the Pharisees, and this strange woman who was probably a prostitute bursts in and pours oil on the feet of Jesus. Contrast that to John's account, where they are at the house of Martha, having a dinner with Lazarus, who Jesus had just raised from the dead. Here, it is Mary who is anointing the feet of Jesus. Luke's account differs so much from Matthew, Mark, and John, that it is very unlikely that they are the same event. As John records in his Gospel, Jesus did not walk openly among the Pharisees after bringing Lazarus back to life. He would not have stayed at the house of a Pharisee at that time.

As for Matthew, Mark, and John, they do seem to be talking about the same event. Yes, the Pharisee is known as Simon, but Josephus notes that Simon was an extremely common name, so no help there. Still, we have this issue with Matthew, Luke, and John, talking about the same event. Did Mary anoint the feet or head of Jesus? Alabaster perfumes in those days were stored in sealed jars, which had to be broken in order to release the perfume. There was plenty of perfume to do both, and there is no indication in any of the accounts that she anointed only the head of Jesus or only the feet of Jesus. The accounts would have emphasized different lessons from this event.
For more on this, take a look at J.P. Holding's article on Tektonics.
http://www.tektonics.org/af/femanoint.php

Michael Licona gives one of the best treatments of the Bible contradictions challenge. One of the greatest Greco-Roman biographers, Plutarch, recorded the lives of dozens of famous Romans, and often these lives had overlapping material. Often, we see the same events play out in dozens of different ways, depending on whose biography it is. Yet, this is the same biographer telling each person's story. The Romans did not consider these differences to be contradictions or errors. They thought of it as part of the literary genre.

Chizuk Emunah (Pt 2) Under the Microscope: Chapter 21

Matthew 20:28, Jesus thus communicates to his disciples, "Even as the Son of Man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister," etc. The same is stated in Mark 10:45. By this passage, Jesus makes the declaration destructive of the dogma of his divinity, that he, being the son of man, is a servant and not a master; or in other words, that he is not the King Messiah of whom it was said of Zechariah, in his book, chapter 9:10, "And his kingdom shall extend from sea to sea, and from the river to the ends of the earth." Also, in Psalm 72:11, "And all kings shall bow down unto him, all nations shall serve him." And in Daniel 7:27, "And all rulers shall serve and obey him."

Again, Son of Man is a reference to a divine being in Daniel 7, as well as in apocalyptic literature. This figure is heavenly, and is given dominion over all of God's creation. Zechariah also said in 9:9 that the king comes lowly and riding on a donkey. This seems like a humble gesture, and one that would indicate a servant's heart.

Also, remember that in Chapter 41 of the first part, Troki argued that Daniel 7:27 does not refer to Messiah, and yet in this chapter, he does.

But again, it's hard to understand what Troki's objection is supposed to be. It does not follow that because Messiah is supposed to be exalted, that therefore he cannot first suffer shame and humiliation. And it's not as though the New Testament denies a future reign of Jesus.

So when they had come together, they asked him, “Lord, will you at this time restore the kingdom to Israel?” He said to them, “It is not for you to know times or seasons that the Father has fixed by his own authority. But you will receive power when the Holy Spirit has come upon you, and you will be my witnesses in Jerusalem and in all Judea and Samaria, and to the end of the earth.” And when he had said these things, as they were looking on, he was lifted up, and a cloud took him out of their sight.
-Acts 1:6-9

 The context presupposes that Jesus will return to rule on earth. So what exactly is Troki's objection? Is he saying that the New Testament does not teach that Jesus will be glorified and rule the world? Is he saying that anyone who ministers cannot be God? Is he arguing that it is beyond the power of God to minister as a servant? If that is his objection, why does he think that. I do not remember any biblical teaching that prevents God from entering into his own creation in physical form, or of taking on the role of a servant.

Without more detail, it is hard to even understand how Troki is finding fault in this chapter.

Chizuk Emunah (Pt 2) Under the Microscope: Chapter 22

Matthew 23:35, "That upon you may come all the righteous blood shed upon the earth from the blood of the righteous Abel unto the blood of Zacharias, son of Barachias, whom ye slew between the temple and the altar." This reproach rests on an error regarding the names, for it was Zechariah, the son of Jehoiada the priest, whom they slew (See 2 Chro. 24:20). It is impossible to admit the attempted reconciliation according to which Zechariah, the son of Jehoiada the priest, and Zechariah, the son of Berachiah, are identical. For the priest of that name was slain in the days of Joash, king of Judah, about two hundred and fifty-four years prior to the destruction of the temple; while the prophet Zechariah did not prophesy until the second year of Darius, the son of Artachsasta, during the Babylonian captivity. Such errors in the mouth of Jesus are decidedly unfavourable to the divine inspiration attributed to him, as well as to the authors of the New Testament.

 This is a common objection against the New Testament used by skeptics today. It's hard to see what the problem actually is. Troki just assumes that Matthew was referring to the Zechariah 2 Chronicles, yet Matthew does not mention this. A similar problem that skeptics bring up is where the book of Daniel states that Nebuchadnezzar had a bout of madness, while external records say it was Nabonidus who had such a bout of madness. It's not an explicit contradiction.

Troki argues that Matthew got the wrong Zechariah. For challenges against the New Testament, J.P. Holding's site Tektonics is the place to go. He gives 6 possible solutions to the problem.

1. The Zechariah referenced is the father of John the Baptist.
2. It is Zechariah the prophet who wrote the book named after him.
3. It is the Zechariah in 2 Chronicles, and Jehoiada is his grandfather; Berekiah, his unnamed father.
4. Berekiah is another name for Jehoiada.
5. Transmission error.
6. The Zechariah in question is simply unknown.

So if all you want to do is harmonize, this should not be a difficult problem. But if we can, we should do more than just force the text to say what we want.

I side with Michael Rydelnik that the most plausible solution is transmission error. Jerome noted that some variants of Matthew's text say "son of Jehoiada." Likely, the original version of the text said from the blood of Abel to the blood of Zechariah. The "son of" part was added later as a marginal note, and got incorporated into the text.

As Holding argues:

Really, if the writer of Matthew did make an error of the type suggested, how hard would it have been for pious Jews to discredit him? That there is no evidence that they did is testimony to the veracity of Matthew's account, whichever one of these solutions applies.

We have the writings of the early church leaders, who repeatedly defended the New Testament documents against skeptical attacks, from both Jews and Gentiles. If Matthew had made such an error, we would have seen responses from these writers addressing this objection. The fact that we don't is pretty strong evidence that the opponents of the New Testament did not consider this a problem.

Philosophical Objections to Trinitarian Monotheism

The religion of Israel has always held to monotheism: this is the doctrine that there is one God. There are not two, three, or four gods. There is only one. As the Shema states "Hear, Israel, Yahweh your God, Yahweh the one and only!" This was used by Paul when he stated that there is one God the Father, and one Lord, Jesus. Jesus is still considered God in this usage, just as the Father is Lord.

The question then, is whether this formula is compatible with the religion of Israel. Trinitarian monotheism states that there is one God, and yet three persons in that one God. One of the more unusual philosophical argument I have heard was from a Hasidic anti-missionary, who argued that Leibniz' Law prevents such an understanding.

Leibniz' Law


If two objects have all the same properties, then they are the same object. This is closely related to the indescernibility of identicals, which is stated as follows:

Indescernibility of Identicals


If two objects are identical, then they have all the same properties.
So now the problem arises. If God the Son has the property of "being incarnated" and the Father does not, does this make them different beings, and hence, prevent us from affirming monotheism?

Aquinas used divine simplicity as his way out. As one Thomist stated:

Relations which result from the mental operation alone in the objects understood are logical relations only (inasmuch as reason observes them as existing between two objects perceived by the mind).

Those relations, however, which follow the operation of the intellect, and which exist between the word intellectually proceeding and the source whence it proceeds, are not logical relations only, but are real relations (inasmuch as the intellect and the reason are real things, and are really related to that which proceeds from them intelligibly: as a corporeal thing is related to that which proceeds from it corporeally). Thus paternity and filiation are real relations in God. 

So, Thomists think of the Father, Son, and Spirit as real relations within one being. Divine simplicity is difficult to understand, and I recommend the Wikipedia article to see the difficulties with it. The short answer is that if divine simplicity is true, then God does not have any properties, and even our language cannot apply to God. So did that previous statement apply to God? If it did, then it's false, for we have found a counterexample. If it did not, then it does not apply to God, and so is false as well.

With that as an unlikely choice, we can think of another solution. What is God? Well, we generally think of God as an unembodied mind. What does a mind have? It seems that a mind has mental faculties such as reason, volition, will, memory, consciousness, and other properties, and has these essentially. We also think of God as having omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence. The problem is that none of these things have the same properties. We cannot say the same thing of God's will as we can say of God's memory or power, or consciousness.

Do these plural attributes mean that there are many Gods? Not unless we think of faculties as distinctly separate objects. So as long as we do not consider God's center of self-consciousness as a different object from his memory, we still have monotheism.

Now consider the Trinity doctrine, that God is one mind or soul with such strong mental faculties that he has three centers of self-consciousness. It doesn't seem to commit us to Tritheism any more than God's separate will, memory, and consciousness do.

One tactic by anti-missionaries is to bite the bullet and say that God did not have any properties before creation. They would say that God's attributes are descriptions of him after creation. The problem with this view is that God is not dependent upon creation. He could have chosen to refrain from creation. If that were the case, would God be loving, merciful, kind, powerful, or would even exist? If these properties are time-dependent, and time is dependent upon creation, then the answer is no. This means that God is not essentially loving, merciful, kind, or even a necessary being!

As Psalm 90:2 states: "From everlasting to everlasting, you are God." The rabbis affirm this verse in the Psalms as from God. If they believe that before the world existed, the term "God exists" is undefined, it is inconsistent of them to demand that "The Son is begotten of the Father" or "The Spirit proceeds from the Father" are defined.

This is just to admit that the uni-personal God of Judaism and Islam cannot be the perfect being of perfect being theology. Such a God cannot be that than which nothing greater can be conceived. For we can conceive of a being that is greater: one that is essentially loving, kind, and existing.

The problem only arises that to talk about a separate person is to talk about a separate being. We make the distinction between "being" and "person" all the time. This desk is a being, but certainly not a person. Since a center of self-consciousness is a property of the mind and not a separate being, we can state that one mind with 100 centers of self-consciousness would be one being and 100 persons. It might be hard to grasp intuitively, since we are not multi-personal beings, but it's hardly incoherent.

The Greatness Objection to the Ontological Argument

One of the most common objections that Internet atheists give to this argument is that there is no such thing as a great-making or lesser-making property. Greatness, they say, is a subjective thing. It is not really an objection to this argument for the existence of God, but to perfect being theology. William Lane Craig discussed this objection in one of his questions of the week. The questioner argued that the idea of a greatest conceivable being is inherently subjective. Craig responded:

To say that I tacitly endorse Anselmian Perfect Being Theology is an understatement, Aditya. I am an enthusiastic proponent. As I explain in Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview, I see the conception of God as the greatest conceivable being as one of the guides for systematic theology’s formulation of the doctrine of God. . .

This objection seems to confuse God’s being the greatest conceivable being with our discerning what properties a greatest conceivable being must possess. I’ve already acknowledged a degree of play in the notion of a great-making property. For example, is it greater to be timeless or omnitemporal? The answer is not clear. But our uncertainty as to what properties the greatest conceivable being must have does nothing to invalidate the definition of “God” as “the greatest conceivable being.” Here Anselm’s intuition which you mention seems on target: there cannot by definition be anything greater than God.

Now you might think, “But what good is it defining God as the greatest conceivable being if we have no idea what such a being would be like?” The answer to that question will depend on what project you’re engaged in. If you’re doing systematic theology, then you have that other control, namely, Scripture, which supplies considerable information about God, for example, that He is eternal, almighty, good, personal, and so on. Perfect Being theology will aid in the formulation of a doctrine of God by construing those attributes in as great a way as possible. On the other hand, if your project is natural theology, which makes no appeal to Scripture, then you will present arguments that God must have certain properties. Note that mere disagreement about whether a property is great-making does not imply that there is no objective truth about the matter. When we have a disagreement, then we may present arguments why we think it is greater to have some property than to lack it. The fact that some properties (like timelessness) are not clearly great-making does not imply that no properties are great-making or that the concept of a greatest conceivable being is wholly subjective. . .

There is a more fundamental confusion underlying the second question, and that is the confusion of conceivability with imaginability. These are not the same. A thousand sided polygon is unimaginable, but it is hardly inconceivable. Conceivability is taken to be co-extensive with metaphysical possibility. So the greatest conceivable being is the same thing as the greatest possible being. It is, as Plantinga says, a maximally great being, the greatest being possible. True, Plantinga does give content to this notion in terms of specific properties, but those properties are obviously chosen because he thinks of them as great-making properties which a maximally great being cannot lack. Maximal greatness is doubtless not exhausted by the properties he mentions. His version of the ontological argument is based, in effect, on one of those incomplete, inadequate conceptions of God that you mention in this question.

Even in secular literature, the field of ethics and the field of aesthetics are both filled with statements about objective values such as greatness. Some ethical theories talk about "ideal observers" and about contracts signed by "better versions of ourselves."

A Precise Formulation of the Modal Perfection Argument Terms
Putting this objection aside, we can formulate a more exact definition of a Maximally Great Being, at least as far as the argument is concerned. A being has Maximal Greatness if and only if that being has the properties of omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence in every possible world. Thus, A being is a Maximally Great Being if and only if that being has Maximal Greatness. This entails that the being exists in every possible world, since a being that does not exist cannot have properties such as omnipotence. 

Let me cut off one objection really quickly. One might object that unicorns do not exist, and yet have properties, such as having one horn. It is not true to say that unicorns possess the property of having one horn. When we say that unicorns have one horn, what we really mean is that if unicorns had existed, they would have one horn.

We can also define great-making and lesser-making properties as follows. A great-making property is a property that a being would need to have in order to be a Maximally Great Being.

Obviously, the four properties just mentioned are Great-Making properties. These omni properties entail other properties, such as knowledge, will, potency, love, and many others. They also entail properties such as "being self-identical" which all things have. This makes the new formulation less intuitive. We do not think of "being self-identical" as a great-making property, but there is nothing incoherent in saying that it is so. We can then run a more efficient version of the Modal Perfection Argument, and one that does not even need Lesser-Making properties.

Advance Warning to Skeptics
Since the Modal Perfection Argument is valid, the only way to deny the conclusion rationally is to deny one of the three premises. As Marianne Talbot is fond of saying, it is not enough to fold your arms and say that you just think a premise is false, and that you are unconvinced. Philosophy is not concerned with your personal feelings or opinions. You need to give an argument for why anyone else should think that the premise is false. Since premises 1 and 3 are tautologies (true by definition), I suggest that the skeptic go after premise 2. But you need an argument for that, and preferably an example of a property that an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent being would need to have entailing a property that an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent being could not possibly have.

The Modal Perfection Argument
1. Maximal Greatness is a great-making property
2. If a property is a Great-Making property, its negation is the lack of a Great-Making property
3. A Great-Making property does not entail the lack of a Great-Making property

Premise 1 is a tautology. It states that the property of having the properties of omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence in every possible world is itself essential for a being to have omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence in every possible world.

Premise 2 is a tautology. If a property is essential to being a Maximally Great Being, then by definition, a Maximally Great Being cannot lack this property.

Premise 3 is not a tautology, but it seems virtually impossible to deny. If we say that great-making property entailed the lack of a great-making property, we are saying that a property that a Maximally Great Being would need to have in order to be a Maximally Great Being entails the lack of another property that a Maximally Great Being must have. How could a property be essential for omniscience and simultaneously entail a property that an omniscient being cannot have?

If it were not possible that a Maximally Great Being exists, then the property of Maximal Greatness would not be instantiated in any object in any possible world. This means that: 

Necessarily, if a being has a property, then that being lacks Maximal Greatness.

Which is equivalent to saying that for any property, that property entails the lack of Maximal Greatness.

Which is equivalent to saying that every property entails the lack of Maximal Greatness. By premise 3, this means that no property is a Great-Making property. But we just said that Maximal Greatness (not to mention omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence) is a Great-Making property.

Therefore, the proposition: "it is not possible that a Maximally Great Being exists" which is equivalent to "it is possible that a Maximally Great Being does not exist" results in a contradiction.

QED.

God and the Fact-Value Distinction

In philosophy, one of the key distinctions discovered by David Hume is the difference between what is the case and what should be the case.

Consider the argument over abortion. The two sides may argue over how the legality of abortion affects family structure, illicit sexual relations, and the crime rates in society. These disagreements can, at least in theory, be settled by investigation of facts. Enough research might be able to show the literal effects of abortion, such as whether women who have abortions have a higher chance of contracting mental illnesses, for example.

However, the disagreement is about more than just facts. There may be situations where people on both sides of the issue agree completely on the facts of the matter, may even have perfect knowledge of the facts, yet still disagree on whether abortion should be legal. One side may believe that the woman's bodily autonomy trumps all other considerations, while the other may believe that the right to life of the unborn trumps all other considerations. This is not a disagreement over the facts of the matter, but over which considerations trump which other considerations. It is a disagreement over value, and these values cannot be verified or even perceived by sense experience.

There are two fallacies that accompany this distinction. The first is the naturalistic fallacy. People commit the naturalistic fallacy when they derive a value from a fact. Consider the following argument:

(1) Sam is a human
(2) Humans feel pain if you hit them
therefore
(3) You should not hit Sam

This is a fallacious argument. The conclusion (3) simply does not follow from the premises. And you can add all the facts you want, such as:

(3) Pain is a form of suffering
and
(4) Sam does not want to suffer
and
(6) If Sam suffers, it will not prevent the worst possible misery for everyone

and still never be able to entail the conclusion. You need to add a "should" or "ought" statement in order to entail that conclusion.

The other fallacy is the moralistic fallacy. Consider the following argument:

(7) Women and men should have equal rights
therefore
(8) Women and men have equal abilities

or

(9) No one should live in poverty
(10) Social programs ought to keep people out of poverty
therefore
(11) Social programs do keep people out of poverty

As the opposite of the naturalistic fallacy, it starts with "ought" statements, and concludes with an "is" statement. Again, no amount of additional "ought" premises will give us an "is" conclusion. Feminist groups commit the moralist fallacy all the time. As Daniel Miessler notes:

Up until around 50 years ago–i.e. for the last tens of thousands of years–women have been considered “things”, and men have been considered “those who get things”. The fact that this ancient reality has not been eradicated in the eye-blink of the social equality movement should fail to surprise anyone. . .

Slavery is natural. Racism is natural. And so is sexism. We are primates pretending not to be, and every step on the ascent up Mt. Moral will be taxed by the gravity of our animal selves. The fact that these things are natural doesn’t mean we stop working against them, but it does mean we can stop looking for less obvious reasons for their existence. Alas, no additional actors are required.

So I join you in opposing sexism wherever it emerges, but not in assuming it’s some recently contrived tool devised by evil men. We are still the animals we used to be, and unnecessary mystery greets us whenever we forget this.

Here is the problem: if naturalism (the cosmos is all there is, was, or ever will be) is correct, then the only facts of the matter are the "is" statements about space, time, fields, particles, and energy. All facts of the matter are reducible to these facts. Values simply are not objective. Many Internet atheists will bite the bullet at this point and state that the values we have, such as "murder is wrong" are not really objective facts about reality, but are something else.

Theists, on the other hand, believe in the existence of a perfect being. In God, fact and value, is and ought, are one and the same. Fact = value. Is = ought. That is what it means to be a perfect being. If such a being exists, then we have a bridge between fact and value, and between is and ought.

The real kicker: consider an argument you had in the past over which religion is correct, or whether or not God exists. There is a good chance that even if you and your opponent agreed on all the facts of the matter, you might still come to different conclusions. Why? Because you have different criteria for what counts as a successful argument for or against your position. People of different positions disagree all the time over criteria, such as who has the burden of proof. Are these criteria facts or values? We just established that two people can agree on all the facts and yet disagree based on criteria, so criteria are values.

If there are no objective values, then there are no objective criteria by which one ought to judge arguments for anything. Yet, all arguments presuppose that there are such criteria, or else there would be no point in making the argument! An appeal to pragmatism will not get you out of the problem, because what is or is not practical is subjective.

Imagine that there are two routes you could take home from work. The highway will get your to your destination 10 minutes faster, but the back roads will give you a less stressful drive. Which one is more practical? It depends on whether you value a shorter trip or a less stressful one. It is subjective, and therefore cannot rescue objective value from this problem.

Without a perfect being, there can be no objective, factual criteria by which one ought to judge arguments for or against such a perfect being. In short, if there are any objective criteria by which one ought to evaluate arguments in the first place, then it follows with logical necessity that God exists.

For a more complicated and rigorous version of the argument, see Roger Wasson's version on the Ultimate Object website.

Contact Info and Conditional Security

I have been browsing the web, and noticed that some people have been wanting to contact me, but do not know how to do so. I have a YouTube channel, and I check the inbox pretty frequently, so you are welcome to contact me there if you want.

As far as my position on the issue of eternal security, I recommended Dan Corner's book The Believer's Conditional Security, because it gives a balance to the de facto Evangelical view of salvation. I agree that salvation is conditional upon having faith. Faith alone gives you salvation, and faith alone can cost you salvation. Faith is not a work, since Paul contrasts it with works, and therefore, one who has faith and receives salvation cannot boast in the sense that Paul is talking about. One might ask in response "can't you boast at least a little bit for having faith of your own initiative" but Paul was not talking about boasting in this sense. He was talking about the merit-based boasting of the Pharisees, who were in competition with one another for who can be considered the most pious.

William Lane Craig is addressing this issue right now in his Defenders class, so you can catch the sessions in podcast form or on YouTube.